English translation — חוקת א

A.

At the beginning of the parshah,

Rashi quotes from the verse the words "This is the statute of the Torah,"

and explains on it: "Because the Satan and the nations of the world taunt Israel, saying, 'What is this commandment

(to you¹)

and what reason is there in it,

therefore it is written 'statute,'

it is a decree from before Me; you have no permission to question it.'"

One must understand:

a)

From Rashi's language "<b>therefore it wrote </b>in it a statute" it implies,

that Rashi is here explaining

(<b>Not</b> to explain the meaning of the word Chukas — because Rashi has already <b>that</b> word translated <b>earlier</b> and in several places<sup>2</sup>

; and one cannot say,

that since the aforementioned explanation he wrote in the earlier <b>books</b> therefore it is necessary to repeat it again — because in this book Bamidbar itself it already says earlier<sup>3</sup>

the word "Chukah" and Rashi does not explain it there.

From which it is understood,

that Rashi relies that the student did not forget the meaning of Chukah from one book to the next<sup>4</sup>

— but)

To explain the <b>superfluity</b> of the word "Chukas": it could have said "Zos haTorah"⁵

— why "kasav bah chokah"?

It is therefore not understood: since the explanation of "chokah" the student already <b>knows</b>,

Rashi should have said briefly "because there is no reason in it, therefore it is written regarding it 'chokah' etc.",

in order to answer the difficulty of the added word "Chukas".

Why all the lengthy discussion "that the Satan and the nations of the world etc." which are already

(seemingly)

said earlier — and several times — in his commentary?

b)

Even more difficult is the question with this, that in his commentary on our verse there are changes in language regarding his commentary in the previous portions:

(a)

In the previous portions Rashi uses the language "evil inclination" and in our verse "Satan";

(b)

There he writes "they answer"&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;

or "provokes"&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;,

and in our verse — "appoints".

Instead of the language "you are not permitted &lt;b&gt;to be exempt"&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;

which stands earlier — he says here "you have no permission to ponder after it"?

(c)

c)

From Rashi's answer "therefore it is written in it &lt;b&gt;Chukah&lt;/b&gt;",

it is proven as above,

that the difficulty existed only in the superfluity of the word "Chukat" in the verse,

but regarding the words "this is the Torah",

there is no question

(because this language is found in many places&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;)

— why then does he quote from the verse "this

(Chukat)

the Torah"?

Is the explanation in this:

From this language of the verse "&lt;b&gt;This&lt;/b&gt; is the statute of &lt;b&gt;the Torah&lt;/b&gt;" it is proven,

that only the red heifer is &lt;b&gt;the&lt;/b&gt; — d.

h.

the only — statute of the Torah".

And superficially there are other statutes,

as Rashi says earlier&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;,

that also "eating pig and wearing shatnez"

(and he adds further*&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;

"and the like of them")

are statutes?

Therefore one must say,

that "statute" as meant &lt;b&gt;here&lt;/b&gt; — is only one &lt;b&gt;red&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;heifer&lt;/b&gt;.

d.

h.

In statutes there are two types: a)

Such that in general they are indeed within the category of the rational,

only they have upon them also difficulties and inconsistency in reason.

b)

2.

Such that are entirely not within the category of the rational.

And therefore it says here "&lt;b&gt;This&lt;/b&gt; is the statute of the Torah",

because the red heifer is indeed the only statute of

(the entire)

Torah&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;,

of such a type that has absolutely no hold in reason&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;.

And therefore when Rashi brings

(in the book of Vayikra)

examples of chukim,

he lists "eating pig and wearing shatnez and purification of mei chatas" and he does not mention Parah Adumah¹⁴

— because the chok of Parah Adumah is entirely of a different type¹⁵

"Purification of mei chatas"

(which comes already <b>after</b> the making of the parah)

is a matter that <b>in its entirety</b> is understandable by reason: just as the purification that comes through immersion in a mikveh is not found anywhere that Rashi should call it "chukah",

because

(in the plain sense¹⁶)

in reason there is a place to explain,

that water

(mikveh water)

has the power to purify also a spiritual impurity

(tumah),

so too can there be the rational explanation regarding the purification that comes through "<b>mei</b> chatas"; the wonder and the difference in the purification of mei chatas is only in the detail¹⁷,

that they purify by sprinkling a few drops of the mei chatas¹⁸,

whereas by immersion in a mikveh he must immerse his entire body in water.

And since the purification of the water of sprinkling has a place in the category of the intellect,

therefore it is not distinguished from other chukim,

and is included in "My chukim" in the plural,

where it speaks about the type of chukim that are not entirely abstracted from understanding of the intellect.

But not so the "red heifer",

d.

h.

The making of the heifer,

is a matter that has entirely no place in the intellect: as a sacrifice it cannot be considered,

because

(a)

one offers nothing from it upon the altar,

and

(b)

the making of the heifer had

(in all

its details)

to be specifically "outside the three camps",

— the opposite of sacrifices whose place is specifically "inside"; also it is

(the red heifer)

not similar to the "scapegoat"

— in addition to the fact that the goat is initially inside —

(which can also be explained according to intellect,

that by sending away the goat "to a land of cutting off" are also sent away "all their iniquities" by means of that "and the goat shall bear upon it"

because,

in contrast to the scapegoat,

the red heifer belongs "to the Lord"

and therefore

(a)

"its commandment is in the deputy",

(b)

"and he shall sprinkle toward the front of the Tent of Meeting",

and

(c)

"Scripture called it a sin-offering to say that it is like holy things"

It comes out automatically,

that the red heifer has absolutely no place in intellect.

And therefore it is not included in "My statutes" in the plural,

which mean such statutes that have some place in intellect.

3.

Based on this one will also understand,

what in connection with the statute in our verse Rashi uses the expressions "Satan",

"objections" and "you have no permission <b>to ponder</b> it" — and not "evil inclination",

"answers" and "you are not permitted <b>to exempt yourselves</b>",

the expressions which Rashi uses regarding the statutes of the other type:

It is understood simply — and also a "ben chamesh

(for Mikra)

" understands it — that human intellect is incomparable to the intellect of the Above.

And therefore,

when it comes to a mitzvah regarding which the man has absolutely no concept,

the yetzer hara cannot argue to him that from the fact that one cannot grasp the mitzvah with human understanding is a proof that it is, heaven forbid, not from the Above — because the opposite is logical: why should one assume at all,

that a man can even understand the commands of the Above?

Regarding &lt;b&gt;those&lt;/b&gt; mitzvos that have &lt;b&gt;some&lt;/b&gt; place in intellect and together with that have questions upon them,

the yetzer hara and the nations of the world can answer — "they answer",

and "point out" that they are, heaven forbid, not from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;

(for how can it be pictured,

that the Above commanded commands in such an "untenable" manner that the human intellect can grasp them&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;

and simultaneously he should have questions upon them).

And consequently — they argue — the Jew need not fulfill them — "to be exempt":

In contrast to the commandment of the red heifer,

which is entirely not defined in intellect,

it cannot be challenged by the evil inclination and the nations of the world,

as above.

The thing that they can indeed do here is "&lt;b&gt;they count&lt;/b&gt; Israel" — they incite themselves,

&lt;b&gt;they anger&lt;/b&gt; the Jews&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;,

arguing to them: "What is this commandment and what reason is there in it" — you must indeed fulfill the commandment because thus the Almighty has commanded; you are, however, doing thereby a matter that has no content

(that has some connection to a person)

and no "reason".

And thereby is also correct what Rashi says the term "Satan"

(and not evil inclination&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;)

because this expression is in accordance with the matter of "they count etc."; the meaning of "Satan" is — to obstruct and make difficult in the doing of a certain thing,

but not completely nullify the thing

(as we find in the verse&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;

"And the angel of the Lord stood in the way to be a satan to him",

where there the plain meaning is,

that the angel only made it difficult for Balaam&lt;sup&gt;'&lt;/sup&gt;

and made his way hard; but did not prevent him entirely from going further on his way&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;).

And therefore Rashi also changes at its conclusion

(not "to be exempt from it",

but)

: "You have no permission &lt;b&gt;to contemplate&lt;/b&gt; it",

because in our case there is even ab initio no thought at all of "to be exempt from it"; it is no more than that "the Satan and the nations of the world &lt;b&gt;prosecute&lt;/b&gt; Israel" and they argue that this mitzvah has in itself no content and no reason — it could indeed be that you, because of this, would take to "overthink" about the mitzvah — therefore one says "You have no permission &lt;b&gt;to contemplate&lt;/b&gt; it",

you may not contemplate it; rather you must fulfill this very chok with vitality and with joy,

exactly like the mitzvos which you grasp with your intellect.

And the reason of the matter is — "&lt;b&gt;A decree&lt;/b&gt; it is from before Me": because the Almighty Himself says about the mitzvah that it is a chok

(a decree),

it must therefore not at all make you narrow the argument "what is the command,

and what is the reason",

because on the contrary: at the fulfillment of the mitzvah,

is the ultimate perfection &lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;

because one does it only because of that which the Almighty has thus &lt;b&gt;decreed&lt;/b&gt;.

Based on the above, it is also understandable that Rashi quotes the words "Zos

(Chukas)

<b>HaTorah</b>"

(although he explains only the word "Chukas"),

because the words "Zos ..

HaTorah" from which it is proven that this chok is different from all other chukim

(as above sec. 2)

— they compel to learn here "according to that <b>the Satan</b> ..

<b>counts</b> ..

You have no permission to ponder after it."

D.

From the matters of "the ways of the Torah" in Rashi before us:

It speaks in Chassidus&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;

that chukim is from the language of engraving.

Also it is explained in Chassidus&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;,

that there are two manners in engraving: a)

Engraved letters in general,

as in a precious stone for example,

that

(although the letters are from within and from within,

and not like in letters of writing which are an <b>added</b> existence to the surface on which one writes,

and the letters cover <b>completely</b> the surface that is found under them,

nevertheless it is)

since that these engraved letters have in the stone a "place of holding",

they have a connection to letters of writing&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;,

because also they are a bit concealing,

they darken the clarity of the precious stone&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;.

b)

Letters engraved from side to side

(like the letters on the tablets&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;),

that they have entirely no place of holding and are completely separated

(and higher)

than letters of writing.

In Torah, all matters are with utmost precision.

So since the word chukah has in it also the meaning of engraving,

one must surely say,

that also in chukim there are the two aforementioned manners that are in engraving.

The question arises: where does one find in chukim these two manners?

But according to Rashi mentioned above it is understandable: the type of chukim that also in intellect has <b>something</b> of a place,

is analogous to letters engraved in a precious stone

(that also they create a giving of place for an added existence)

; and "this is the chukah of the Torah" which is not within the realm of intellect <b>at all</b>,

is analogous to letters engraved from side to side

(that also they are completely abstracted from any giving of place for existence).

5.

It will become clearer by explaining the connection of chukim

(as they are plain)

to legislation⁴¹

A Jew,

<b>by his nature</b>,

wants to fulfill the will of the Above⁴²,

and this nature comes from his very soul which is above intellect.

And it is revealed primarily in the fulfillment of chukim.

When fulfilling the mitzvos of eidos and mishpatim,

having thereby an <b>intellectual</b> taste,

the full "purity" of his <b>will</b> that comes from the very soul is not expressed — because the intellect that is added there — and especially since the intellect is a inner power and unites with the intellectual soul — <b>conceals</b>

(at least partially)

his essential will; but not so in the fulfillment of chukim,

where there is no composition of intellect and taste — the very soul is revealed.

And this is the connection of chukim to chakikah,

because the advantage of chukim over eidos and mishpatim is analogous to the superiority of chakikah over writing: the letters of writing,

being an added thing to the parchment,

therefore they cover with themselves the written format; but not so the letters of chakikah,

they are not an additional thing upon the even tov,

and consequently — they are not me'aleim upon it.

And according to this it is also understandable,

how the two types mentioned above in chukim are similar to the two manners mentioned above in chakikah:

Since intellect conceals the essence of the soul,

it is therefore understandable that during the fulfillment of the chukim which have

(in general)

no hold in intellectual understanding,

this intellect at least somewhat conceals the essential will,

and there is not revealed so much the essence of the soul — like letters engraved in a precious stone,

which somewhat dim the clarity of the precious stone — in the place of the engraving the precious stone does not shine so much; but "this is the statute of the Torah",

which is completely above intellect,

it is like letters engraved from side to side,

which having no place of hold — they do not conceal at all.

6.

The advantage of engraving from side to side over ordinary engraving,

is not only regarding the engraved letters themselves

(that by engraving from side to side they have no place of hold as above),

but also in relation to the thing engraved: by ordinary engraving,

as by letters engraved in a precious stone for example,

only the outer part is engraved through by the letters,

the surface of the stone; but not so by engraving from side to side,

the entire thing engraved is penetrated,

through and through,

by that which one engraves in it.

And since in Torah everything is with ultimate precision,

one must say,

that the connection of "this is the statute of the Torah" to legislation from beyond to beyond is not only from the aspect of the matter of the Holy One blessed be He itself that is in the fulfillment of the statute of the red heifer — not having any place in intellect

(as above ibid.),

but also from the aspect of the Jew in whom the Holy One blessed be He is engraved,

that the legislation of "this is the statute of the Torah" takes hold of him in his entire existence through and through.

7.

The explanation of this in a possible way: the Alter Rebbe says in Likkutei Torah⁴³

on the verse "this is the statute of the Torah,"

that the commandment of the red heifer is the entirety of the Torah; and he explains there,

that the connection of "ratzo" and "shov" — which is a matter <b>essential</b> in all the commandments — is expressed in the commandment of the red heifer in a revealed manner.

And seemingly: According to Rashi that with the phrase "this is the statute of the Torah" the verse intends to emphasize that the red heifer is the <b>only</b> statute in the entire Torah — and consequently,

also <b>distinguished</b> from <b>all</b> the commandments of the Torah

(even from statutes)

— then how does it fit with the explanation that "this is the statute of the Torah" points specifically to its <b>connection</b>

(and)

to all commandments?

And although "seventy faces to the Torah"⁴⁴

and "these and those are words of the living God"⁴⁵

— but it is nevertheless known the word of the old Rebbe himself⁴⁶,

that "Rashi on Chumash is the <b>wine</b> of the Torah"

(and it is understood,

that the "wine of the Torah" expresses itself in the <b>plain meanings</b> of Rashi).

Therefore it is plausible to say,

that not only are the two aforementioned explanations not contradictory to one another,

on the contrary,

they are explained and perfected one through the other: this very matter with which the red heifer <b>distinguishes</b> <b>itself</b> from all other commandments — according to the explanation of "this is the statute of the Torah" according to the <b>plain meaning</b> of Scripture — is she <b>thereby</b> <b>itself</b> the <b>principle</b> of all commandments in the Torah,

just as the explanation according to the <b>inner dimension</b> of the Torah,

as below section 8.

8.

In the discourse that the Rebbe Baal HaSimchah VeHaGeulah said on the day of Yud-Beis Tammuz of the year of Geulah⁴⁷,

is explained the concept of "eidus",

"mishpatim" and "chukim".

When he explains that chukim are not according to reason,

rather Gzeiras HaKesuv — he brings a proof for this: "And as it is brought in Rashi

(based on Zos Chukas HaTorah)

because the Satan and the nations of the world taunt Yisrael ...

it is a decree from before Me, you have no permission to question it" and immediately afterwards he continues,

that also the fulfillment of rational commandments must be with acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of heaven specifically, just like chukim.

Seemingly: also &lt;b&gt;earlier&lt;/b&gt; before Parshas Chukas Rashi says &lt;b&gt;several&lt;/b&gt; times that chukim are a gezeiras hakasuv — why does he bring specifically this Rashi from Parshas Chukas

(and he furthermore notes that this Rashi is "based on 'this is the statute of the Torah'")?

What is the &lt;b&gt;inner&lt;/b&gt; reason for this

— in addition to what can be said that he wants to bring from the parshah of &lt;b&gt;the week&lt;/b&gt; adjacent to the matter of redemption.

And he explicitly brings the words "this is the statute of the Torah" which "the Targum renders here 'a decree of the Torah'" which alludes to a decree upon the Torah as brought in the sefarim&lt;sup&gt;*47&lt;/sup&gt;.

The explanation in this: by bringing down <b>the</b> commentary of Rashi,

the Rebbe brings out a proof

(not only to the matter that is explained there earlier that chukim are a decree of the King,

but)

also to that which he says further,

that also the rational commandments one must fulfill with acceptance of the yoke of heaven just like chukim:

Since the words "this is the statute of the Torah" contain within them also the explanation that the commandment of the red heifer is "the entirety of the Torah",

it is proven from this,

that <b>all</b> the commandments,

the <b>particulars</b>,

one must fulfill with acceptance of the yoke of heaven

(which is above intellect <b>completely</b>)

exactly as one fulfills the <b>general</b> — the statute of the red heifer,

because particulars emerge from

(and are similar to)

the general.

9.

At first glance one can ask: the three types mentioned above — eidus,

mishpatim and chukim — are indeed &lt;b&gt;distinguished&lt;/b&gt; according to &lt;b&gt;Torah&lt;/b&gt;,

Torah itself says that there are mitzvos which have no reason and Torah calls them "chukim",

and there are mitzvos which do have a reason and are called

(in &lt;b&gt;Torah&lt;/b&gt;)

"eidus" and "mishpatim".

So it means: the Torah wants that the mitzvos which are "eidus" should be fulfilled as such that &lt;b&gt;bear witness&lt;/b&gt; to certain matters&lt;sup&gt;48&lt;/sup&gt;,

and the mitzvos which are "mishpatim" should be fulfilled because of the obligation of the intellect&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;

— so how can one say that &lt;b&gt;all&lt;/b&gt; mitzvos must be fulfilled because of acceptance of the yoke of Heaven like chukim?

So the explanation in this is,

that also this very thing,

that the rational mitzvos must be done because of the reason,

must be in the manner of acceptance of the yoke of Heaven,

i.e.,

namely,

i.e.,

that is,

only because the Almighty has &lt;b&gt;decreed&lt;/b&gt;,

that the fulfillment of &lt;b&gt;these&lt;/b&gt; mitzvos should be because of the reason&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;.

And just as this is in the &lt;b&gt;manner&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;of existence&lt;/b&gt; of the commandments,

so is it also regarding the commandments themselves: also the supernal will that is in the commandments of "edot" and "mishpatim" is an intrinsic will that is higher than wisdom,

(also this is)

"a decree it is from before Me" that the will of the commandments should also be clothed in reason and intellect.

And this is the inner reason of that which is stated "this is the statute of &lt;b&gt;the Torah&lt;/b&gt;"

(although the red heifer is the entirety of &lt;b&gt;the commandments&lt;/b&gt; — &lt;b&gt;will&lt;/b&gt; of the Supernal One,

and Torah is &lt;b&gt;wisdom&lt;/b&gt;),

in order to emphasize that

(not only from the aspect of the matter of the "commandment" that is in edot and mishpatim they are a decree,

only

but)

also the Torah that is in them,

that which they came into wisdom and intellect

(until also the intellect itself),

it derives from "chok" — "&lt;b&gt;a decree&lt;/b&gt; it is from before Me".

Yud.

It is, however, still not understood: How is it possible that the intellect should be from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He — intellect and the Holy One, blessed be He are indeed two opposites?

To this comes the answer "This is the statute of the Torah,"

that this is an "engraving from side to side" that removes the entire essence of Jews through and through:

When a matter is engraved in a person in the example like letters that are engraved in a precious stone,

D.

It is indeed an engraving <b>in</b> him

(not like letters of writing that are written <b>on</b> the parchment)

But it does not reach until his very self — then,

is just as the engraved matter does not remove its very deep inwardness,

so too is it not carved into his external faculties.

But the K"v,

since he is engraved in a Jew from side to side — d.

H.

h.

in his entire <b>essence</b>,

therefore he also comes into the most external powers,

because all the powers of a person are indeed related to his essence⁵¹.

And this means "engraving from side to side": from his deepest inwardness until his farthest outwardness⁵².

And therefore the K"v also affects the power of intellect⁵³

(that in the <b>understanding</b> of the commandments of testimonies and laws there should be heard not the reality of the intellect for itself,

but as it is from the aspect of "<b>a decree</b> it is before Me")

— because the essence of the soul is indeed inclusive and affects <b>all</b> the powers.

And this also corresponds with that the statute of the red heifer — which is distinguished from all other statutes — contains within itself the two opposites of "outside the three camps" and "in front of the Tent of Meeting"

(as above sec. 2)

: a Jew from the aspect of his essence

(the aspect of legislation beyond limit)

— even when he finds himself "outside the three camps",

he "intends and sees the entrance of the Sanctuary"⁵⁴.

Yes.

And it can be said that this is also the connection of the portion of Chukat to the 12th of Tammuz — the holiday of redemption,

which is why⁵⁵

one reads it

(in some years)

on that Shabbat⁵⁶

which is before the 12th of Tammuz,

And in any case, in proximity to 3 Tammuz, when then "freedom was given to him," the redemption began,

until that also in the maamar that was said on the first 12 Tammuz — is brought the Rashi on the verse "This is the statute of the Torah":

The Rebbe, the Baal HaSimchah VeHaGeulah,

was all his days occupied with the service of mesirus nefesh b’poel,

and together with that — all his matters were in perfect composure; and even “the great work which I performed in disseminating Torah and strengthening the religion”⁵⁷,

because of which came the imprisonment that before 12 Tammuz — although the service had no place according to intellect,

even not according to intellect of holiness,

and it came <b>openly</b> from the service of mesirus nefesh <b>b’poel</b> which is completely above the measure of intellect — it was nevertheless a service arranged perfectly

(although in the nature of man it is,

that at the time he stands in a movement of mesirus nefesh — there is then no place for “calculations” and the like),

and so calculated and arranged,

that the dissemination of Torah and strengthening of religion should be in a greater scope.

And since,

as Rashi says in today’s parshah⁵⁸,

“Moshe is Yisrael and Yisrael are Moshe,

to tell you⁵⁹

that the leader of the generation is like the entire generation, for the leader is everything” — it is therefore understood,

that this power the Rebbe gives to all Jews,

until even to one who

(merely)

“is called by the name Yisrael”<b>⁶⁰</b>

And when we will go in the path that He has paved for us,

we have the promise,

that "it will be fulfilled that 'Hashem our God will be with us as He was with our fathers; He will not forsake us nor abandon us, and for all the children of Israel there will be light in spirituality and in physicality'"⁶¹.

(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Chukas 5725)