English translation — בהעלותך א

A.

In the verse "If any man shall be unclean by reason of a dead body or be on a distant journey etc." ¹,

Rashi stands on the words "or on a distant journey" and says: "It is dotted,

to say that it is not actually distant, but that he was outside the threshold of the courtyard at the time of slaughter."

On this the Ramban asks:

In the Mishnah²

there are two opinions in this verse: a)

that the person is located,

at the beginning of the time of slaughter³,

in a place from which during the entire time of slaughter he cannot come from there into the Temple courtyard.

b)

"outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard and outward",

according to Rashi's commentary.

And at first glance,

the first opinion is much closer to the "plain meaning of Scripture" than the second opinion — because since "outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard" means <b>all</b> places that are outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard,

also right next to the Temple courtyard — then this is simply not "distant".

So Rashi in his commentary on the Torah — where he explains the plain meaning of Scripture — should have better chosen the explanation of the first opinion?

And although the word "distant" is "dotted",

from which there is a proof that it does not mean literally distant — however, the Ramban says,

that also according to the first opinion the dotting is understood: if it were speaking about the way itself,

they would,

also according to the first opinion,

<b>not</b> call it "a distant way"

(because a journey of half a day is not "distant"⁴).

Since, however, the verse calls it "a distant way" only in relation to the <b>person</b><b>⁵</b>

regarding the <b>doing</b> of <b>the Paschal offering</b>,

that he is located in a place from which <b>during</b> <b>the time</b> <b>of slaughter</b> he cannot manage to come from there into the Temple courtyard to offer the Paschal offering — therefore it is "dotted".

The question nevertheless remains: why does Rashi interpret "outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard"⁶,

which is seemingly very far from the <b>plain</b> interpretation<b>⁷</b>

of "on a <b>distant</b> <b>way</b>"⁸?

2.

True indeed that also according to the explanation of "outside the boundary of the courtyard" one can nevertheless learn the wording "distant" — and as Rashi emphasizes "not that it is distant certainly"

(not simply "not that it is distant")

which shows that the distance is not a certain one,

but not that the vowel point negates entirely the content of "distant"⁹

(and as commentators explain¹⁰

: that when the person finds himself outside the boundary of the courtyard he is "far" from the offering of the paschal lamb,

because then he is forbidden to offer the paschal lamb),

It is, however, understood simply,

that even after the point,

which diminishes the content of this word — one must see to learn that the "diminution" should be as small as possible,

i.e.,

that is,

to take out the word as little as possible from its <b>simple</b> meaning.

And since the first opinion is closer to the plain meaning of Scripture — should Rashi then have brought <b>that</b> opinion?

3.

The question is even stronger: the advantage of the first opinion over the second,

is not only in the expression "distant way",

but also from the law "and he shall make the Passover to the Lord in the second month etc." — regarding one who did not offer the Passover

(first),

because he was impure or on a distant way:

If "on a distant road" means a place from which one cannot come

(during the entire time of slaughter)

to the courtyard,

it is understandable what the verse says that specifically whoever was "impure for a soul" or "on a distant road" can offer a Pesach Sheni,

but "And the man who is pure and was not on a road and refrained from making the Pesach &lt;b&gt;shall be cut off&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;that&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;soul&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;from its people&lt;/b&gt;"&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;

and he cannot offer any Pesach Sheni&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;

: When someone was pure and close to the courtyard,

he is a willful sinner; but when someone did not offer the first Pesach because he had no possibility for it,

being "impure for a soul" or "on a distant road",

is

(although he had a choice to start going into the courtyard &lt;b&gt;before&lt;/b&gt; the beginning of the time of slaughter — but since at the beginning of the time of slaughter,

when the &lt;b&gt;obligation*&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt; begins

of offering the Pesach,

he could no longer arrive in the courtyard&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;,

is)

he is an ones,

and the Torah gives him a way out to make a Pesach Sheni.

But if "distant road" means "outside the threshold of the courtyard",

it is not understood: also the one who was "on a distant road" had a possibility to enter the courtyard&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;

— and even more: not only was he not an ones,

but it was not demanded of him thereby any special exertion — with one step he would already be in the courtyard &lt;b&gt;and at the beginning&lt;/b&gt; of the time of slaughter — so in what is he different from one who "was not on a road" and was in the courtyard?

When someone finds himself in the azarah

(during the time of slaughtering)

only one moment,

and during all the remaining time he is far from the azarah,

he incurs kares for not offering the Pesach at its appointed time; and when someone finds himself near the azarah itself during all the time of slaughtering and in the course of half a day he did not "trouble" himself to cross the threshold of the azarah — not only does he not incur kares,

rather they seek for him a counsel,

to offer a Pesach Sheni?

Today, since both from the language of the verse "on a distant road" and from the understanding of the matter,

it is smoother to learn that "on a distant road" means a distant place,

why does Rashi learn "outside the threshold of the azarah" ¹⁵?

4.

In addition to the difficulty in the body of Rashi's commentary itself,

there are also several precise points that are not understood:

a)

The dot is on the word "rechokah".

Rashi should seemingly have brought from the verse only <b>that</b> word — or at most,

also the word "baderech",

since according to his explanation "outside the threshold of the courtyard" the plain meaning of the word "baderech" also changes,

that it does not mean literally,

then why does Rashi dwell on the three words "oh baderech rechokah"?

2)

The term "certain" is the opposite of "doubt".

So Rashi's wording "not that it was certainly far" is not understood: he should have said "not that it was <b>actually</b> far"<b>¹⁶</b>

and the like — a wording that indicates that the distance is a very small one.

But what fits here the term "<b>certainly</b>" which is connected

(<b>not</b> with a measure of distance,

but)

with the categories of "certain" and "doubt"?

3)

When Rashi explains "not that it was certainly far, but that it was outside the threshold of the courtyard",

he adds "all the time of slaughter".

And at first glance,

if Rashi finds it necessary to explain the time about which the verse speaks,

because he is concerned that the student will not know it on his own — it would seemingly have been fitting for him to place it in a separate opening discourse.

For also according to the interpretation "that it was certainly far".

There could be a concern that the student will not know about which time is being spoken here.

What is the connection of the words "all the time of slaughter",

which explain the <b>time</b> when the person found himself "on a distant road",

with Rashi's interpretation of what "<b>on a distant road</b>" <b>means</b>¹⁷?

The question is even greater: if the student is not clear when the person was "on a distant road",

then the same doubt is with him also regarding "impure for a soul" — so Rashi should have stood on "ki yihyeh"

(the beginning that includes both "impure for a soul" and "on a distant road")

and there explain "all the time of slaughter"?

5.

After Rashi explains the point on the word "rechokah",

he continues — in the same statement: "Pesach Sheni matzah and chametz with him in the house,

and there is no Yom Tov,

and there is no prohibition of chametz except with him in his eating."

It is completely not understood:

a)

Rashi in his commentary on the Torah comes only to explain the plain meaning of the verses — what brings Rashi here <b>laws</b> of Pesach Sheni

(and specifically <b>these</b> three laws¹⁸).

Which seemingly have no connection with

(the understanding)

the plain meaning of the verses?

b)

When Rashi <b>finds</b> it necessary to bring the laws — he should have brought them in the later verses where the <b>laws</b> of Pesach Sheni stand,

but not in our verse which speaks entirely about one who did not offer the <b>first</b> Pesach,

and what brought him to this?

3)

Especially it is not understandable: if even these laws are indeed related to "or on a distant road" — but he should have written it in a separate statement.

Why does he connect it with his explanation "a dot is upon it etc."?

4)

In these three laws themselves,

the first and third laws — "matzah and chametz with him in the house" and "there is no prohibition of chametz etc." — both concerning the matter of chametz.

then Rashi should have placed these two laws adjacent to each other,

why does he interrupt between these two laws with the law "and there is no Yom Tov"¹⁹?

6.

On the last question one could seemingly answer,

that the order of the laws in Rashi is according to the order of times: "Matzah and chametz with it in the house",

that it is permitted to have chametz in the house at the time of the <b>slaughter</b> of the Paschal offering,

pertains already from daytime.

Not like by the first Passover,

where there may not be any chametz from the time of slaughter²⁰

; "and there is no festival",

pertains only when it becomes <b>night</b>,

different from the first Passover where the festival begins at the start of the night; and "and there is no prohibition of chametz except with it in its eating",

pertains only at the time of eating the Paschal offering,

which is already a span of time that falls towards the night.

One cannot, however, answer thus: if Rashi had intended here the law of the <b>prohibition</b> of chametz at the time of eating the second Passover,

it would have a connection to the time of eating.

Here, however,

Rashi <b>emphasizes</b> not the prohibition of chametz in its eating

(because in this regard the second Passover is indeed equal to the first Passover)

but on the contrary,

he underscores here the <b>negation</b> "<b>and there is no</b> prohibition of chametz

(<b>except</b> with it in its eating)

that aside from its eating there is <b>no</b> prohibition of chametz²¹.

And <b>this</b> law indeed also begins immediately at the start of the night²²

— should Rashi not have written this law "and there is no prohibition of chametz etc."

(which speaks about chametz)

in proximity to "matzah <b>and chametz</b> with it in the house"?

7.

Is the explanation in all the above:

The question that exists in Rashi in our verse,

that in order to answer it he does not write only "a dot above it ..

outside the boundary of the courtyard all the time of slaughter",

rather he also adds "P.S. matzah and chametz with him in the house etc." — Rashi himself interprets through his copyist

(for his explanation)

the words "or on a distant road".

The word "or",

does not belong to the content of "on a distant road" that follows it,

it only clarifies that "on a distant road" is not the only matter,

but it is one of the examples in the verse

("or" fits specifically when there is at least one more example).

And therefore Rashi also quotes the word "or",

in order to clarify,

that he is primarily to explain

but]

to answer:

Since the verse lists here examples because of which they did not offer the Paschal sacrifice,

why does it still say "defiled for a soul"

(which is <b>relevant</b> here²³),

specifically

(and only)

the example of "on a distant road" — are there not — and as follows — <b>other</b> matters which prevent the making of the Paschal sacrifice?

(And he answers the question with his explanation "it is dotted etc. outside the courtyard of the Temple etc. matzah and chametz with him in the house etc.",

as below).

8.

Which matters — according to the simple meaning — prevent the making of the Paschal sacrifice: a)

Impurity.

He was outside the courtyard.

c)

"His chametz exists" at the time of slaughtering the Paschal sacrifice.

(a)

"A man according to his eating you shall count"²⁴,

and

b)

(b)

"Any uncircumcised one shall not eat of it"²³

— but these two matters have no connection to our parshah: "A man according to his eating you shall count" was said

(according to the simple interpretation)

only at the Pesach of Egypt,

not at the Pesach of generations²⁶

; and "Any uncircumcised one shall not eat of it",

holds back only ²⁷

- <b>the eating</b> of the Pesach but not its offering²⁸].

Thus the question becomes:

a)

That a person is found outside the azarah,

can indeed be caused by several reasons,

not only because he is "on a distant road" — so one cannot ask about one who did not come to the azarah &lt;b&gt;intentionally&lt;/b&gt;.

For in simple logic,

he is indeed then liable to kares and cannot offer a Pesach Sheni&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;

; the question, however, is: there can be many and many reasons due to which he is an &lt;b&gt;oness&lt;/b&gt; and cannot come to the azarah — why does the verse specifically give the example of "on a distant road"?

b)

Further: a greater wonder is that he is &lt;b&gt;in the azarah&lt;/b&gt; and nevertheless "he cannot make the Pesach" because "his chametz is extant": there can indeed be several manners in which he is

(after the beginning of the time for slaughtering)

an oness unable to burn the chametz then?

— In any case — the verse should have brought the example

(&lt;b&gt;in addition&lt;/b&gt; to the similar matter of "distant road"),

that &lt;b&gt;he&lt;/b&gt; is found in the azarah but his chametz is found on a "distant road",

so that he cannot burn it&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;?

So these two questions are answered by Rashi with his commentary "dotted above it etc." and with "matzah and chametz with him in the house etc."

(why does the verse not bring the example of being outside the courtyard when he was <b>not</b> "on a distant road")

is from <b>the</b> <b>verse</b> <b>itself</b>: why does it say in the verse "on a <b>distant</b> road" specifically; and the question about the example "his chametz is extant" arises from a different parshah — therefore Rashi writes first "dotted above it etc.",

and only afterwards "Pesach Sheni matzah and chametz with him in the house etc." — according to the order of the questions ]

With the explanation "it was dotted upon him etc. except that he was outside the threshold of the courtyard",

he explains why the verse does not mention any other examples regarding "outside the courtyard",

because according to this explanation,

"on a distant road" indeed means

(<b>not</b> a distance of place,

but)

<b>any</b> manner of "he was outside the threshold of the courtyard"

(even if his not entering the courtyard was intentional,

as above section 3)

; and with the words "matzah and chametz are with him in the house etc." it is explained why the verse does not bring the example of "his chametz exists",

as follows.

9.

In the plain meaning of Scripture,

the section "And G‑d spoke etc. Any man who will be impure through a soul etc." comes as an answer to the question of those "men who were impure through a human soul — why should we be diminished etc."

To this came the answer "Any man who will be impure through a soul etc. and perform the Passover to G‑d",

that their remedy is to offer a second Passover.

Only when the Almighty spoke the law of "If any man shall be unclean by reason of a dead body",

He added to it also "or on a distant road" — although about this they did not ask,

because also this case is similar to the case of "unclean by reason of a dead body": both cases are situations where the <b>cause</b> that prevented offering the first Passover was <b>nullified</b> before the time of offering the second Passover; at the time of offering the second Passover they were already pure and were located in the Temple courtyard.

And consequently there is no place to include in <b>that</b> section the case of "his leaven remains",

because here there is no need for a change

(nullification)

of the cause and reality at the time of offering the second Passover,

for "the second Passover, matzah and leaven are with him in the house",

he also has <b>now</b> leaven in the house

(the <b>law</b> changed: at the offering of the first Passover the leaven hindered the offering,

and at the second Passover it does not hinder.

The reality, however,

did not change,

also now he has leaven in the house).

10.

But when Rashi says that "Pesach Sheni matzah and chametz are with him in the house,"

the question immediately arises,

where is the source for this?

And on the contrary,

at first glance, in the simple meaning of the verses there is a contradiction to this: a few verses further³²

it says "&lt;b&gt;According to all&lt;/b&gt; the statute of the Pesach they shall make it,"

that Pesach Sheni has all the laws of Pesach Rishon — so why should one say,

that on Pesach Sheni it is permitted to have chametz in the house,

not like on Pesach Rishon?

Therefore Rashi explains — "And there is no Yom Tov": this is indeed &lt;b&gt;clear&lt;/b&gt;,

that Pesach Sheni is not a Yom Tov.

For this Rashi does not need to seek any explanation,

this is a simple matter: Pesach Rishon is the time of the Exodus from Egypt — it is a Yom Tov³³.

Pesach Sheni,

which is "in the second month,"

in the month of Iyar,

not at the time of the Exodus from Egypt — it is not a Yom Tov.

And since Pesach Sheni is not a Yom Tov³⁴,

then there is no prohibition of chametz³⁵.

And then, as Rashi says "ואין שם יו״ט" in order to explain the reason of "מצה וחמץ עמו בבית"

(which is required immediately on the spot),

he cautions,

that it is not a contradiction to the law that he is about to state immediately — a verse later&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;

— that just as at the first Passover the law is "ומצות על מרורים יאכלוהו"*&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;,

so too here "על מצות ומרורים יאכלוהו",

that the second Passover must be eaten specifically with matzah

(not with chametz)

— because "אין איסור חמץ אלא עמו באכילתו״: the prohibition of chametz on the second Passover is only "עמו

(with the Passover sacrifice)

באכילתו" — but no other prohibition of chametz exists then.

Yes.

After all the above it is still not understood

(as above section 4)

(a)

Rashi's wording "לא שרחוקה &lt;b&gt;ודאי&lt;/b&gt;" and not "לא שרחוקה &lt;b&gt;ממש&lt;/b&gt;",

and

(b)

why does he add "כל זמן שחיטה".

Is the explanation in this:

The reason for this that if someone does not offer the Passover offering because he was

("impure from a corpse" or)

"on a distant road"

(as it appears simply,

without Rashi)

— he can bring a second Passover offering,

is it because he was an &lt;b&gt;anus&lt;/b&gt; (forced/compelled); and since so,

it is logical to say that the measure of distance is measured

(&lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; by the spatial distance itself,

but)

by the amount of time,

how much time remained to offer the Passover offering: at the &lt;b&gt;beginning&lt;/b&gt; of the slaughter time the measure is larger — such a far area that one cannot manage to arrive in the Temple courtyard within half a day; and the closer it gets to the end of the slaughter time,

the smaller and smaller the measure becomes.

According to this, it is necessarily forced,

that the meaning of "on a distant road"

(even when <b>not</b> "marked upon him")

is <b>not</b> that the road is a distant one in area — because³⁷

in the time close to sunset the measure is indeed a very small one — rather

(according to the explanation of the Ramban)

"that it is distant from him <b>in the doing</b> <b>of the Paschal offering</b>⁵,

not literally distant".

And therefore,

when Rashi wishes to negate the explanation that "distant" means that one cannot arrive at the Temple courtyard in time — he cannot say "it is not that it is <b>literally</b> distant",

because even without Rashi one knows that "it is not literally distant"; rather he says "it is not that it is certainly distant":

According to the aforementioned explanation — then "on a distant road" means that he finds himself in a place from which he &lt;b&gt;cannot&lt;/b&gt; come into the Temple courtyard to offer the Paschal sacrifice in time — it turns out,

that his "distance" from performing the Paschal sacrifice is a &lt;b&gt;certain&lt;/b&gt; one: it is clear,

without any doubts,

that he will not offer the Paschal sacrifice;

Not so according to Rashi's explanation "that he was outside the threshold of the Temple courtyard"

(even in a manner that he can enter the Temple courtyard in time),

it turns out that his "distance" from performing the Paschal sacrifice is &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; a certain one: while he finds himself outside the Temple courtyard,

he is indeed "far" from performing the Paschal sacrifice,

but it is not a distance that is certain and absolute — because he can, after all, at any moment go into the Temple courtyard and make the Paschal sacrifice.

12.

After Rashi explains that "on a distant road" means

but]

"outside the threshold of the courtyard",

it can be a reasoning,

that the possibility "and he shall make the Pesach for Hashem in the second month etc." that the Torah gives to one who does not offer the first Pesach because "he was

on a distant road",

it is even in a case when most of the time of slaughter he was in the courtyard,

and only a moment during this time was he outside the courtyard:

— If one learns that "on a distant road" means "definitely distant" — then it turns out that the reason for the law "for he was impure for a soul or on a distant road etc. and he shall make the Pesach for Hashem" is because he was an anus

(as above sec. 3)

— it is understood simply,

that if at the beginning of the time of slaughter he was pure "and on a road he was not" and afterwards he

(by his will)

made himself impure or went away "on a distant road",

he then cannot offer a Pesach Sheni,

because

(although there is no obligation to offer the Pesach immediately at the beginning of the time,

one may offer it until the last minute — and then he was after all an anus³⁸

— it is nevertheless understandable,

that)

the very fact that he

(<b>after</b> the beginning of the time of obligation of offering the Pesach)

did an action which prevents offering the Pesach — that very thing is a willful act³⁹

According to Rashi, however, "that he was outside the threshold of the courtyard,"

that the enactment to offer a Paschal lamb is even for one who was in proximity to the courtyard and had

(without any special trouble)

the possibility to enter the courtyard and offer the Paschal lamb — it comes out,

that the distinction of "impure for a soul or on a distant road" from "the man who is pure and was not on a road,"

is <b>not</b> due to compulsion, but it is a decree of the verse — and since so,

one can already say that "and he shall make the Paschal lamb for Hashem in the second month etc." is also even when "he was

(impure for a soul or)

on a distant road" only <b>one</b> moment during the time of slaughter,

— therefore Rashi explains "that he was outside the threshold of the courtyard <b>all</b> the time of slaughter,"

that the verse speaks specifically in a case when for the <b>entire</b> time of slaughter he was

(impure,

or)

"outside the threshold of the courtyard"; but if earlier he was pure and <b>in</b> the courtyard — it will not help him that he was later "impure or on a distant road."

And from this itself that Rashi brings no proofs to be his explanation "all the time of slaughter",

it is evident that it is a matter understood by itself,

and it requires no proof⁴⁰.

13.

Most laws of the Torah are understood also by intellect — laws in the Torah which are "chukim",

are only <b>counted*</b>⁴⁰.

And therefore,

is also a law that <b>entirely</b> by intellect one cannot explain it — one must find — at least on details of it — an intellectual explanation.

As much as possible,

so that it should not remain <b>completely</b> a decree of the verse.

Therefore, [he] sets out to say,

that that which the Torah distinguishes between one who was "on a distant road" and one who was not "on a distant road",

is it therefore because being in the [Temple] courtyard and nevertheless "refrained from making the Pesach" — he is a deliberate sinner in the making of the Pesach itself; but the one who was "on a distant road",

is although he had the choice to enter the courtyard,

since however the deliberate sin is in a secondary matter — in remaining outside the courtyard,

but in the making of the Pesach itself he is an unwilling one,

one cannot offer the Pesach there where he finds himself — then one gives the remedy of offering a second Pesach.

And since according to Rashi "that he was outside the threshold of the courtyard",

"on a distant road" is a matter of duress,

it follows automatically,

that if at the beginning of the time of slaughter he was <b>in</b> the courtyard and afterwards went out from there — one cannot call him an unwilling one.

And therefore Rashi teaches "that he was outside ...

<b>all</b> the time of slaughter".

14.

From the matters of "the wine of Torah" in Rashi of ours —

As mentioned above

(section 8),

is according to the simple meaning there are three reasons which prevent the making of the Paschal offering: impurity; being outside the Temple courtyard; his leaven existing.

The explanation in this:

In offerings there are generally three matters: a)

The essential matter of offerings,

That "an offering to the Lord" is according to its name,

the term closeness⁴¹

— That which a Jew becomes

(through the offering)

drawn near to the Most High.

b)

The elevation from below to above,

which expresses itself

(mainly)

in the part of the offering that is burned and included and ascends in the fire above.

c)

The drawing down from above to below which expresses itself

(mainly)

in the part of the offering that is eaten by the priests or by the owners — that the holiness of the offering is drawn down to the person and in an inwardness,

until it becomes blood and flesh like his flesh⁴².

In the Paschal sacrifice — the three matters are with greater emphasis:

The "drawing near" in the Paschal sacrifice is not from level to level,

but in a manner of <b>skipping</b>

(as the explanation — the simple — of the word "Pesach"⁴³).

d.

e.

That the Jew who offers the Paschal sacrifice,

"jumps" and tears himself away from his existence entirely

(not as in an ordinary drawing near,

that also after the drawing near — he remains in his existence)

The elevation from below to above at the Pesach is

(Not only in the part that is burned on the altar,

but)

also in the part that is eaten,

that it must be "roasted over <b>fire</b>"

(not "cooked in water" or in other liquids)⁴⁴,

for fire is its essence and it indicates an elevation from below to above;

And so too conversely: the drawing down from above to below which is expressed in the eating of the offering,

is with the Pesach offering more than with all other offerings,

because Pesach is indeed "not brought from its inception except for eating"⁴⁵.

And in order to carry out these three matters,

it is required that a)

at the time of performing the Passover sacrifice, he should not have chametz in his domain; b)

he should be pure; c)

he should be located in the courtyard:

Chametz indicates haughtiness and pride⁴⁶.

And since regarding a haughty person the Almighty says "I and he cannot dwell together"⁴⁷

— therefore "chametz" is the opposite of the concept of "drawing close to G‑d" which is in Passover;

Impurity, and in particular “impure for a soul” — impurity of death — is the opposite of the concept of elevation that is in Passover.

Impurity is not a thing that one can grasp

(even not in intellect)⁴⁸

; when a thing becomes impure — no change is seen in its physical substance⁴⁹,

it is a concept that is

(not applicable and is not <b>noticeable</b> in the body,

rather it is a change in its spirituality,

it is)

related to the soul⁵⁰

— it becomes <b>lower</b>.

And therefore it hinders the concept of elevation from below to above,

which needs to lift a Jew from the physical world — to the spiritual world.

And in particular impurity of death,

whose concept

(death)

is indeed that the body is rather descending from its level as it was when alive.

“He was outside the courtyard”,

which this is indeed relevant to the <b>body</b>

(for the law in connection with “he was outside the courtyard” is indeed even when he has a strong desire to be in the courtyard,

and consequently,

he is from the aspect of the soul <b>in</b> the courtyard⁵¹,

but from the aspect of <b>the body</b> he is outside the courtyard),

is this the opposite of the concept of drawing down that is in Passover — which is expressed.

In the eating of the Passover offering — literally — a part of the flesh of the physical body becomes.

15.

This is also the explanation

(in the words of the Rebbe in the inwardness of the matters)

that the enactment to make a Pesach Sheni for one who is "impure through a corpse or on a distant road",

is stated explicitly in the Written Torah; but not so "his leaven remains",

would from the Written Torah alone have been able to be a logical reasoning that he cannot make a Pesach Sheni,

and one must come to Rashi

(the Oral Torah)

that also he has the enactment of Pesach Sheni:

Since leaven is the opposite of the <b>general</b> concept of the Pesach

(not like impurity and a distant road which are opposed only to particular matters of the Pesach — elevation and drawing down),

it follows automatically,

that the one who does not remove his leaven

(intentionally)

— is similar to willfulness regarding the making of the Pesach itself.

And the one who intentionally does not offer the Paschal sacrifice — does not have the advice of Pesach Sheni,

as above section 3.

16.

This is, however, from the perspective of the level of teshuvah

(its subject⁵²

of Pesach Sheni)

as it stands explicitly in the Written Torah

(in the aspect of Asiyah⁵³).

But the Oral Torah comes

(as it stands adjacent to the Written Torah — and this is the subject of Rashi,

who explains the plain meaning of Scripture)

and says,

that also the one who was a willful transgressor regarding chametz — since his willful transgression was nevertheless not regarding the offering of the Passover sacrifice itself,

he too has the remedy to offer a Pesach Sheni;

Until the Oral Torah comes

(as it is higher than the Written Torah)

and rules — at least according to several poskim

(as above, section 3*⁵³)

(from the subject of "the words of the scribes are dearer to me, etc."⁵⁴),

that even the one whose willful transgression was regarding the offering of the Passover sacrifice itself — he too may offer a Pesach Sheni;

And even more: there is a principle

that "one who says I will sin and I will repent etc. they do not enable him to repent" and the reason is "because repentance causes him to sin"

that this is analogous to "an accuser cannot become a defender"],

But in our case

(and according to the aforementioned poskim)

it is not found anywhere that if someone did not offer the Paschal sacrifice at its appointed time

(willfully)

and relies on the Second Passover — that the Second Passover should not help him?

That this corresponds to the well-known maamar⁶⁰

of the Rebbe, my father-in-law, the Rebbe,

that the essence of Pesach Sheni is: "There is no 'lost',

one can <b>always</b> make it up."

(From sichos of Shabbos Parshas Beha'aloscha and Shlach 5726)