English translation — מצורע ב

A.

In this week's parshah there are two sections about a woman who sees blood: the first section — "And a woman, if she becomes a zavah, etc., seven days she shall be in her niddah, etc."¹,

that when she sees blood <b>one</b> time,

she becomes impure for seven days,

and after the seven days pass

(even when she is "flowing all seven"²,

which means consequently,

that the days of seeing are included in the count of the seven days)

— she must immerse herself³

and she becomes pure; and a second section — "And a woman, if she has a discharge, etc., many days not at the time of her niddah, etc., and she shall count for herself seven days, etc., and on the eighth day she shall take for herself two turtledoves, etc."⁴

— that when she sees blood <b>three</b> days

("many days")⁵,

she must afterwards count seven <b>clean</b> days,

D.

E.

that the days of seeing are not included in the count of the seven clean days

(and if she saw blood in the midst of her counting days,

even on the seventh near sunset — she must begin counting the seven clean days anew⁶),

and after the seven clean days she must immerse herself⁷

and bring a sacrifice.

Our Sages say on this⁸

— and Rashi brings it in his commentary on the Torah⁹

— that the law of counting seven clean days and bringing a sacrifice regarding "And a woman, if she has a discharge, etc., many days",

is specifically when the discharge is "<b>not at</b> the time of her niddah" — that is,

during the eleven days that begin after the days of niddah,

which eleven days are called zivah days

(and if she then sees blood — she is called

(and has upon herself the laws of)

<b>zavah</b>).

But during her niddah days,

even if she then sees three consecutive days

(and even if flowing all seven¹⁰),

she does not need any seven clean days nor any bringing of a sacrifice,

rather she has the law of a <b>niddah</b>

(as the Torah indicates in the first section).

Moreover: she does not acquire the law of a zavah

(that she should need seven clean days and a sacrifice)

unless these three seeing-days are all within the eleven days of zivah¹¹.

2.

Although the section primarily speaks about a zavah of "&lt;b&gt;many&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;days&lt;/b&gt;" — &lt;b&gt;three&lt;/b&gt; days,

that then specifically she must count seven clean [days] and bring a sacrifice — nevertheless,

the Gemara learns¹²

(from "it shall be to her"¹³

or from "she is impure"¹⁴)

&lt;b&gt;another&lt;/b&gt; law: that if in these eleven days she sees blood only one day or two days

(although she does not thereby become a "&lt;b&gt;complete&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;zavah&lt;/b&gt;",

and consequently she does not require seven clean [days] and a sacrifice,

yet)

she must after the day

(or two days)

of seeing guard,

count,

one clean day "corresponding to the impure day"

(or "corresponding to the two impure days"¹⁵)

— "a shomeret day corresponding to day"¹².

(And then she is called "small zavah"¹⁶.

But when she sees 3 days,

she is called "large zavah"¹⁶

or "zavah" simply¹⁷).

And in this law of "shomeret yom" — that the law in this is that it is sufficient also a guarding of only part of the day — there are two categories:

a)

She must wait with her immersion until the morning¹⁹

And the guarding and counting of part of the day during the course of the previous night is not sufficient,

Because the law of counting is specifically <b>by day</b>²⁰.

And therefore when she immerses at night,

She does not become pure through the immersion even when she is <b>not</b> seeing during the course of the entire following day²¹.

b)

Also when she immerses in the morning,

"Her contact and her cohabitation are dependent",

And consequently,

If in the course of the day she sees blood — she becomes retroactively impure,

Because this seeing is joined and becomes one continuum with the discharge of the previous day²².

3.

Since the law of "shomeret yom keneged yom" is derived from the section that speaks primarily about a "zavah gedolah"

(for the beginning of the section is indeed "ve'ishah ki yazuv g'o <b>yamim</b> <b>rabim</b>" and in connection with this comes the instruction of the subsequent verses: "vesafrah lah shiv'at yamim g'o u'vayom hashmini g'o"),

there is a rationale to say that the law of counting one day for the sighting of one day or two days,

does not come as a separate matter and definition in its own right,

but it is a detail that is derived from the law of counting seven days for ra'atah "yamim rabim"²³.

That means: that which for a sighting of fewer than three days she needs shimmur,

is <b>not</b> because the particular sighting <b>itself</b> obligates the shimmur,

but because it is a part of the sighting of three days,

which brings about becoming a zavah gedolah: since when there will be joined to her sightings of another two days,

one will need to count shiv'ah neki'im,

therefore,

also when the sighting is in itself — one needs to have the counting of one clean day at least.

And the practical halachic difference: if one were to assume,

that the law of "shomeret yom" is an independent concept,

then this law applies also when she saw on the tenth or on the eleventh, even though such a sighting cannot be part of the sighting of three days,

it cannot bring her to become a zavah gedolah

(since the

(second or)

third day is already not from the eleven days of zivah and therefore cannot complete to three days)

; if however one will learn that that which she needs to have the shimur yom echad is because the sighting of one day can bring to zavah gedolah,

it must follow that where it cannot come to zavah gedolah,

as when she saw on the tenth or on the eleventh,

then accordingly the obligation of "shomeret yom keneged yom" should also not apply.

There are, however, three opinions in this matter:

a)

The opinion of Beit Shammai is,

that even in the case of "she who sees on the eleventh day" she is a "shomeret yom" min haTorah,

and therefore she must wait with her immersion until the next morning, just like "she who sees &lt;b&gt;within&lt;/b&gt; the eleven days."

that if she sees blood after the immersion on the twelfth day — she becomes

(min haTorah)

&lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; retroactively impure

(as in the case of one who sees within the eleven days),

because the sighting of the twelfth day — &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; in the "days of zivah" — is not joined to the sighting of the day before it]&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;.

b)

Rabbi Yochanan according to Beit Hillel holds,

that she who sees on the eleventh day is not obligated in shomeret yom,

but she who sees on the tenth is indeed obligated in shomeret yom&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;.

3)

The opinion of Reish Lakish according to Beit Hillel is,

so also the one who sees on the tenth does not need guarding of the day²⁵.

One must understand: what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yochanan to distinguish between the tenth and the eleventh.

Seemingly it is from whatever side: if the law of "shomeret yom" is specifically by such a sight that can bring to ziva gedola — then also the tenth day should not have after itself any guarding; and if the law of "shomeret yom" is a matter in its own right,

which is <b>not</b> connected with the law of "zava gedola" — then also the eleventh day should have guarding?

4.

Since if she saw on the tenth she must have shimur according to Rabbi Yochanan — although through this sight she cannot become a zavah gedolah — one must seemingly say,

that what by "one who sees on day eleven" Beis Hillel are

(according to Rabbi Yochanan)

<b>not</b> obligated in shimur,

is

(<b>not</b> because of the reasoning that the "day" corresponding to which must be "shomeres yom" is a "detail" of "zavah gedolah" and day eleven is not that,

but)

because of some reason that pertains specifically to day eleven,

because of <b>which</b> <b>this</b> day is exempt from shimur²⁶.

Further: even according to Reish Lakish,

according to whom also the tenth day need not have shimur,

there is seemingly a necessity,

according to one language in the Gemara,

that the law of "shomeres yom" has a definition in itself and is not connected to the law of "zavah gedolah".

— In this explanation of the dispute between R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish, there are in the Gemara²⁵

two versions:

One version: "R' Yochanan said: The tenth is like the ninth; just as the ninth requires safeguarding, so too the tenth requires safeguarding.

Reish Lakish said: The tenth is like the eleventh; just as the eleventh does not require safeguarding, so too the tenth does not require safeguarding" — according to which version their dispute is in the definition of the <b>tenth</b>, whether the tenth is

(like the ninth,

which)

requires safeguarding or it is

(like the eleventh,

which)

<b>does not</b> require safeguarding;

And a second language: "R. Yochanan said &lt;b&gt;halacha&lt;/b&gt;

(singular language)

eleven

(So the eleventh day is distinct from the days before it by &lt;b&gt;one&lt;/b&gt; halacha)

Eleven is that it does not require guarding, but the others require guarding.

And Reish Lakish said &lt;b&gt;halachot&lt;/b&gt;

(plural language)

eleven

(So the eleventh day is distinct from the days before it in &lt;b&gt;two&lt;/b&gt; halachot)

Not the eleventh requires guarding, nor does guarding apply to the tenth — that according to &lt;b&gt;this&lt;/b&gt; language their dispute is in the definition of the &lt;b&gt;eleventh&lt;/b&gt; day,

whether it is distinct from the days before it only in that it does &lt;b&gt;not require&lt;/b&gt; guarding or also in that it does &lt;b&gt;not effect&lt;/b&gt; guarding.

So it is implied from the precision of the language in the words of R"L,

according to the second language in the dispute,

that that which the tenth day does not need any guarding,

is because of the reason that the &lt;b&gt;eleventh&lt;/b&gt; day does not become a guarding for it — and this means apparently,

that from the perspective of the definition of the tenth day itself

(there is no novelty regarding the previous days,

therefore)

it would indeed have required guarding — also in his opinion,

although that the proof from &lt;b&gt;that&lt;/b&gt; day cannot bring the woman to become a zavah gedolah.

And accordingly it comes out,

that in the reason of B"H,

who hold that one who sees on the eleventh day does not require any guarding,

there are three explanations: a)

According to the opinion of R'L in the &lt;b&gt;first&lt;/b&gt; language,

this is because the eleventh day cannot bring to a major zavah.

And therefore he says "the tenth like the eleventh",

because also the tenth — exactly like the eleventh — cannot bring to a major zavah.

b)

The opinion of R'L in the &lt;b&gt;second&lt;/b&gt; language,

that

(also by a sight that cannot bring to major zivah the law of shomeret yom applies,

and)

one who sees on the eleventh day does not require any guarding because the &lt;b&gt;11th&lt;/b&gt; day has in itself

(a law)

a certain definition by virtue of which it is not only "does not require guarding" but it also does not become "guarding for the tenth".

c)

The opinion of R'Y

(according to both languages)

that the nature of the eleventh day removes from the day only the obligation of guarding,

but not the law of &lt;b&gt;it does&lt;/b&gt; guarding for another day.

In truth, however, one cannot learn that the law of shomeret yom is exclusively a matter in itself,

which has entirely nothing to do with the law of a major zavah

(except that,

then there is no reasoning&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;,

why should the 11th day — according to the second language in the opinion of R'L — be different from the other days also in the detail of "it does &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;

guarding for others"&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;)

According to the second language,

where Rashi says that the eleventh day does not become a safeguard for the tenth,

is Tosafot³⁰

explains: "since it is not fit <b>to be joined</b> <b>to</b> <b>major</b> <b>zivah</b>".

The same thing is found regarding the opinion of R. Yishmael: the Rambam³¹

explains the reason of Beit Hillel that it does not require a safeguard "because one who sees on the eleventh day <b>will</b> <b>never</b> <b>become</b> <b>a</b> <b>major</b> <b>zavah</b> through this sight"; and nevertheless he concludes

(according to the opinion of R. Yishmael)

"And know that one who sees on the tenth requires a safeguard even though she is not at all a major zavah through this sight".

And since that which the eleventh day does not require a safeguard is because of the fact that she cannot become a major zavah,

one must therefore say that that which one who sees on the tenth <b>requires</b> a safeguard

(even though she cannot become a major zavah)

is because according to R. Yishmael,

between the sight of the tenth day and major zivah,

<b>there</b> exists a connection.

5.

It will be understood by prefacing the dispute³²

of R. Yishmael with R. Shimon ben Lakish regarding eating less than the measure of a forbidden thing: "R. Yishmael said it is forbidden from the Torah because since it is fit to combine, he eats a prohibition.

R. Shimon ben Lakish said it is permitted from the Torah,

eating the Torah said and there is none."

What is the reasoning of their dispute?

— The Rogatchover explains³³

: R. Yishmael holds,

that the measure of an olive's bulk

(and the like)

that the Torah gave,

is a definition in <b>quantity</b> — that an olive's bulk constitutes the full <b>measure</b> of the <b>prohibition</b> of the eaten item

(and not that the measure <b>creates</b> the definition of the prohibition of eating)

; consequently,

if he eats even less than the measure of a forbidden food,

since he thereby performs an action of a prohibited eating

(it only lacks in quantity)

— it is forbidden from the Torah³⁴.

R. Shimon ben Lakish, however, holds that the measure is a definition in the <b>essence</b> of "eating",

that is,

if he eats less than the measure,

it is not called an eating at all³⁵

— and therefore less than the measure is permitted from the Torah because "<b>eating</b> the Torah said <b>and there is none</b>".

From this will also be understandable regarding measures in time&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;

And regarding this matter,

The measure of a discharge of three days through which she becomes a major zavah,

That according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosi, the measure of three days is only a boundary in the &lt;b&gt;quantity&lt;/b&gt;.

I.e.,

that is,

Consequently,

That regarding the quality,

Is a sighting of one day or two days

(less than the measure)

— The same quality as a sighting of three days&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;.

And therefore Rabbi Yosi holds that the tenth requires guarding and the eleventh does not require guarding:

The sighting of the eleventh day,

it is not applicable to her to say that it is a half-measure

(of a zivah of three days),

because since in this sighting there is no aspect of &lt;b&gt;combination&lt;/b&gt; —

(the sighting cannot be combined with the sighting of the day after it

(as above section 3,

that even according to Beit Shammai,

who according to their opinion also the eleventh day requires watching — but the sighting of the twelfth day is &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; combined with the zivah of the eleventh day))

— it is a matter in itself and a &lt;b&gt;complete&lt;/b&gt; measure,

it has no connection with the sightings of the later days.

But not so the sighting of the tenth day, which is fit to be combined,

it is a part of a zivah of &lt;b&gt;two&lt;/b&gt; days at least

(because the law of a shomeret yom is indeed — that if she saw on the day of watching

(even)

after her immersion,

the sighting becomes combined with the zivah of the day before it,

as above section 2),

and this is indeed a half-measure

(and the same quality)

of a zivah of "many days" — she therefore requires watching.

6.

And this is the explanation of the dispute between R. Yishmael and R. Shimon bar Yochai — according to the first version — whether "the tenth on the ninth" or "the tenth like the eleventh":

The ninth day — to which another <b>two</b> days can be added,

possesses within itself

(potentially)

the full measure of 3 days.

Furthermore: <b>the</b> proof is "the way of preparation"²⁸

of the measure of 3 days

(can come to them).

The eleventh day — there is altogether not the concept of joining etc.,

as above section 5; and the tenth day to which can be added

(at least)

one day — possesses within itself the concept of half the measure as above.

So R. Y. says "the tenth is like the ninth" — that the tenth which has in itself

(only)

a half-measure,

is equal to the "ninth" which has a full measure,

because he goes according to his method that the measures of the Torah are a boundary only in quantity; in contrast, R. L. compares the "tenth" to "eleventh" — because according to his opinion, less than the measure is a different quality entirely³⁹.

7.

One must still, however, understand what the Gemara says in the <b>second</b> language,

that the reason that R. L. holds that seeing on the tenth does not require preservation — is because of the fact that <b>eleventh</b> does not become a preservation for the tenth.

At first glance,

since his reasoning is,

as explained in Tosafot,

"because it is not fit to combine for a major emission" — does this not have to do with the boundary of the <b>tenth</b> day

(not being able to be transformed into a major emission)

and <b>not</b> with the day of <b>eleventh</b>?

it will be understood by explaining the definition

"one who guards a day corresponding to a day" — which one can explain in two ways

(and from this will also emerge a difference in the relationship of "one who guards a day" to the law of "major zavah")

a)

that the impurity of the day of sight,

&lt;b&gt;it&lt;/b&gt; becomes drawn and spreads also into the day after it, and therefore he must have guarding.

i.

e.

not the next day by itself becomes a cause for the guarding; rather only the spreading of the impurity of the day of sight into the day after it creates the obligation of guarding.

b)

So the obligation of preservation on the day after the sighting comes from that day itself: the sighting of the previous day effected an action in the day after it,

thus,

that he, from himself, becomes obligated in preservation⁴⁰.

which one can explain in two

Modes: a)

That the holiness of Shabbos and Yom Tov spreads into the time adjacent to it before and after⁴¹,

b)

That in the time of the addition there becomes an independent holiness — because of that which it is in proximity to Shabbos and Yom Tov].

So when one adopts like the first mode,

That the guarding on the day after it comes

(Not as a matter in itself,

Because of the spreading of the impurity of the sight of the day before it,

It turns out then,

That the connection of the law of "one who observes a day" to the law of "major zavah"

(As above section 3,

The proof of the connection),

Expresses itself in the cause of the guarding — in the <b>sight</b> that spreads on the day after it: That that which the impurity from the sight of day one spreads also on the day after it

(That she should need to count one clean day)

Is it because of that which the sight has in itself such a strong impurity that can bring,

In combination with another two sightings,

To counting seven clean days

(As above there).

But according to the second manner,

that the obligation of guarding on the day after it has to do with the day &lt;b&gt;in itself&lt;/b&gt;

(and not with the spread of the impurity on the day of the sighting),

it is logical to say,

that also the connection of "one who guards a day" to "major zavah" is expressed

(&lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; in the &lt;b&gt;sight&lt;/b&gt;ing,

But)

but)

in the &lt;b&gt;guarding&lt;/b&gt;: that the concept of guarding one clean day is — guarding from major zivah.

And therefore the law of guarding is specifically on such a day when the sighting &lt;b&gt;in it&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;on the day&lt;/b&gt; can lead

(if she will also see blood on its morrow)

To major zivah,

to major zivah&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;.

And these are the two versions in the Gemara regarding the reason that R' L says,

that if she saw on the tenth she does not need any guarding:

The first language in the Gemara holds,

that the relationship of a shomeret yom to a zavah gedolah,

touches upon the <b>yom</b> <b>hare'iyah</b>.

And according to this it comes out,

that that which she does not need shimmur yom when ra'atah be'asiri,

is it because <b>asiri</b> lo ba'i shimmur.

And the second language holds,

that the relationship of a shomeret yom to a zavah gedolah pertains to the <b>yom</b> <b>hashimmur</b>,

and therefore he also changes in giving the reason: that which ra'atah be'asiri lo ba'i shimmur is this because the day <b>echad</b> <b>asar</b> does not become a shimmur for asiri⁴³

— since that is a day whose tum'ah cannot in it effect the matter of zivah gedolah

(the <b>same</b> reason because of which echad asar by itself needs no shimmur — "lo echad asar ba'i shimmur ve'lo shimmur le'acharinei havi").

8.

After the above explanation,

then according to Beit Hillel they all hold that the definition of a shomeret yom is connected with the matter of zivah gedolah

(also according to the opinion of R' Yosi who holds that the tenth requires watching — because he follows his own opinion that a chullin shechita is forbidden from the Torah)

— one can continue in this way and say,

that also that which Beit Shammai obligate watching even on the eleventh day,

is this not because they assume that the law of shomeret yom has a definition in its own right that is not dependent on the law of zivah gedolah — rather,

because they hold that also by the sighting of the eleventh day there is a matter of connection with zivah gedolah.

And the explanation of this: in several disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel,

one finds that the foundation of the disagreement consists in this,

that Beit Shammai hold that it is sufficient or that the main thing is the "b'koach"

(the existence "b'koach" is sufficient and is that which determines — not reckoning with how it is at that time the "b'poel" of it)

; and Beit Hillel hold that the main thing is the "b'poel"

(when it already comes "b'poel",

and the "b'koach" is not sufficient).

For example:

a)

"Honey cakes&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;

From when are they susceptible to impurity as a liquid?

Beis Shammai say: from when he intends&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;

(According to a second version&lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;

: "from when he stirs").

Beis Hillel say: from when he crushes."

Why Beis Hillel hold that the main thing that determines is the "actual"

(that which the thing comes actually to its state and form)

Therefore it becomes a liquid only "from when he crushes".

But Beis Shammai hold that "potential" is sufficient,

Therefore they say "from when he intends"

(or at most "from when he stirs"),

Because since thereby it already becomes a liquid "potentially",

it is already susceptible to impurity as a liquid.

b)

"The mitzvah of Chanukah ..

Beis Shammai say: on the first day one lights eight, from then on he decreases,

and Beis Hillel say: on the first day one lights one, from then on he increases"&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;.

And the Gemara explains

(according to one opinion)

"The reason of Beis Shammai is corresponding to the days that are coming in, and the reason of Beis Hillel is corresponding to the days that are going out."

Why are Beis Shammai inclined to the reasoning "corresponding to the incoming days" and Beis Hillel — to the reasoning "corresponding to the outgoing days"?

This will be understood according to the above: When one assumes that the main thing is the "potential",

then one must determine according to the incoming days which are in potential.

Therefore Beis Shammai say "On the first day one lights eight, from there onward one decreases",

The beginning of the first day in itself includes potentially eight days,

The second — seven,

a.

a.

b.

But when one assumes that it must be the actual,

one must look at the outgoing days which have already been actual; and therefore Beis Hillel say "On the first day one lights one, from there onward one increases" — because on the first day there is "actual" only one day,

on the second — two days,

etc.⁴⁸.

9.

That the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel must stand both by the loaves of honey and by the Chanukah lamp — even though in both places the dispute is from the same reason — is one of the explanations on this:

By challos devash,

in order that from them should come forth the beverage in actuality

(and not that it should remain in potential as during the contemplation),

an action is required — the action of crushing.

By the days of Chanukah, however,

the days come "in actuality" in a manner of automatically⁴⁹.

And therefore,

when this view of Beis Shammai that "we follow the potential" would have been said only by Chanukah,

one could not have learned from there that they accept the same reasoning also by challos devash.

Because one could say,

that the rule is specifically in such a case — as by Chanukah — when from the side of the potential the actual is already "finished" and no action is required for it — it is merely lacking time.

So too conversely,

if the above principle would stand only by loaves of honey,

one would not be able to learn from it about the days of Chanukah.

Then one could say,

that what by loaves of honey Beit Shammai hold we follow the potential is it because of that it is in his hand to bring immediately from potential to actual: at the same time that the crumbler is in potential,

he can also immediately crumble,

bring it out into actuality.

— Example: anything fit for mixing, mixing does not impede it⁵⁰.

But not so by the days of Chanukah,

since the actual is dependent on time,

and it is not possible that on the earlier day of the potential,

should come the actual of the coming days — so we do not follow the potential⁵¹.

Yud.

After we see that also by matters that are connected with time,

Beit Shammai hold that we follow the potential,

one could say,

that what Beit Shammai hold that she saw on the eleventh day requires guarding,

it is because of the same reason — that also the eleventh day can "in potential" bring to a major flow.

That which &lt;b&gt;in actuality&lt;/b&gt; cannot come out from him any major zivah,

is it only because of the essence of the days &lt;b&gt;after it&lt;/b&gt;,

because &lt;b&gt;they&lt;/b&gt; are not from the days of zivah,

but regarding the eleventh day itself there is no difference concerning the &lt;b&gt;previous&lt;/b&gt; ten days,

consequently it possesses in itself all that they possess,

the same "in potential" of the matter that can bring to major zivah,

therefore Beit Shammai hold that it requires guarding.

And the &lt;b&gt;novelty&lt;/b&gt; that exists in "in potential" by seeing on the eleventh day regarding the same principle by challot devash and the days of Chanukah

(and therefore one cannot learn it from the two disputes)

— is understood &lt;b&gt;simply&lt;/b&gt;:

By challot honey and the days of Chanukah,

can

(or will)

the potential come out into an actual tangible

(it is not more,

that the actual is lacking time or action).

But not so the potential that exists in day eleven,

cannot come to a great actual flow.

And nevertheless Beit Shammai hold that also in such a case,

the "potential" of day eleven obligates guarding,

because the lack of actual is only in the days after it

(which <b>they</b> are not from the days of flow)⁵².

Yes.

Although that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the law is like Beit Hillel⁵³,

so that Beit Shammai in the place of Beit Hillel is not a ruling⁵³,

this however was said only regarding the conduct of a person in practical law.

Because however that "these and those are words of the living God"⁵⁴

and it is the Torah⁵⁵

of truth⁵⁶,

one can and one must derive lessons in divine service also from the view of Beit Shammai — the importance and effect of the "potential" in itself —

And from this there is a lesson regarding the greatness of the elevation of a Jew: that even such a Jew who, from the perspective of his actual revealed powers,

stands in a very low state and condition, to the extent that from the perspective of &lt;b&gt;their essence&lt;/b&gt;

(of the powers)

&lt;b&gt;they&lt;/b&gt;,

his actual powers are not fit to be affected

(in the daily conduct)

by the power of self-sacrifice,

(that the aspect of "eleven",

above the chain of descent,

remains for itself,

it cannot join with the "days" afterwards,

which are below it,

it does not affect the other "days"),

nevertheless,

since the deficiency is only from the perspective of the revealed powers,

but the power of self-sacrifice of his is with everyone — whoever it may be — in perfection

(and from the perspective of &lt;b&gt;his essence&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;he&lt;/b&gt; has the potential to affect the revealed powers)

— teaches us the opinion of Beit Shammai,

that this power of the Jew ultimately decides and determines his essence — although he goes here and there,

Your image is engraved within you forever&lt;sup&gt;57&lt;/sup&gt;.

(From the talk of the 24th of Tevet — the yahrtzeit of the Rebbe, our master, our teacher, the Baal HaTanya — 5712)