English translation — שמיני ב

1.

The last verse of the sidra is: "to distinguish between the unclean and the clean, and between the animal that may be eaten and the animal that may not be eaten."

Rashi asks

(in the second comment)

on "between the unclean and the clean" and explains¹

: "One must say: between a donkey and a cow²

But are they not already specified *²

they,

rather between that which is unclean for you and that which is clean for you,

between when half of the windpipe is slaughtered and when most of it is slaughtered."

Then Rashi stands on "and between the animal that is eaten" and says<sup>1</sup>

: "One must say between deer and hyena, and are they not already explained,

but between [an animal] in which signs of terefah were born that is kosher and [an animal] in which signs of terefah were born that is invalid."

One must understand:

a)

In kosher cattle and kosher wild animals

(which one may eat)

as well as in non-kosher cattle and non-kosher wild animals

(which are "lo tochal"),

there are indeed many species — besides donkey and cow,

deer and wild donkey.

Now why does Rashi say

(in the seder)

that the verse specifically means <b>these</b> four species?

True, Rashi here — is taken from Torat Kohanim on the verse — but,

as already discussed many times, Rashi quotes from the interpretations of Chazal only that which is relevant to understanding the plain meaning of Scripture and — in the style of <b>and</b>

(change)

<b>language</b> that is relevant to it³.

b)

(Even if indeed specifically these four species)

From where is it forced that the first half-verse — "between the unclean and the clean" — means "between donkey and cow",

and the second half-verse — "between the animal that is eaten etc." — means "between deer and wild donkey"; what indication is there that "unclean" and "clean" speak about donkey and cow,

and "eaten" and "do not eat" signify deer and wild donkey?

3)

The same question is also in Rashi's conclusion that the first half-verse speaks about "if half of the windpipe was slaughtered etc." and the second half-verse — about "if signs of terefah developed in it etc.": where does it lie in

"between the unclean etc." that thereby is meant the distinction "between if half of the windpipe was slaughtered etc.",

and where is it evident that

"between the living animal that is eaten etc." has something to do with

"if signs of terefah developed in it etc."?

B.

So the explanation in this is:

In the first half of the verse it simply states: ,

"Between the unclean and the clean",

not mentioning the word chaya which comes only in the second half of the verse.

From this it is understood of itself,

that the second part of the verse speaks about chayos,

the first half of the verse however — speaks about davar hamatzui — davar hakatuv &lt;b&gt;bahoveh&lt;/b&gt; — behemos.

it does not mean that everywhere the word chayah includes also the species behemah — it means only,

that the term chayah applies also to the species behemah.

And this is in a case where one must learn it so.

But there where it is simple to learn that it means only the species chayah and not the species behemah,

then behemah is &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; included in chayah&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;.

So too in our verse,

one must accept that "chayah" means only the species chayah.

Because if chayah here would have included also the behemah species,

then the word chayah would have had to stand right at the beginning of the verse].

And therefore Rashi writes that in the first half of the verse one would interpret "between a donkey and a cow": two types of behemah; and in the other half of the verse — "between a deer and a wild ass": two types of chayah.

3.

That one selects specifically the four species — donkey and cow,

deer and wild donkey — is understood simply:

The expression of the verse "&lt;b&gt;to distinguish&lt;/b&gt;

(between the impure and the pure etc.)

" — to &lt;b&gt;distinguish&lt;/b&gt; — fits only where there is a certain similarity between the things which one wishes to separate — things which are completely different and have no similarity between them,

there is no need for a distinction between them — in the language of &lt;b&gt;Rashi*&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;

: for they are separated and recognizable.

From this it is understood simply,

that the concept of "to separate" — both between an unclean animal and a clean one

(in the first half of the verse)

and between the animal that is eaten and that which is not eaten

(in the second half of the verse)

— relates to such animals and beasts which have a certain similarity between them.

And therefore the Torah says,

that one should make a distinction between them.

From this it is understood that as an example there must be an animal

(and beast)

clean of which there is an animal

(and beast)

unclean very similar to it.

And if there are several such — it must be &lt;b&gt;present&lt;/b&gt;,

those which are more common.

When it speaks about a difference between types of animal that have a certain similarity one to the other,

and despite this one is impure and the other pure,

the two types are donkey and cow,

the most fitting for this: they are among the most common animals⁶

and they have between them a certain likeness and commonality,

and therefore one exchanges one for the other

(and all of the Mishnah⁷

: "One who exchanges a cow for a donkey" — the Mishnah seized this reality because "the Sages spoke of the common occurrence"*⁷).

And about this they warn "to distinguish" — donkey is impure and cow⁸

is pure.

And when one speaks about non-domesticated animals — they are deer and wild donkey,

because of the kosher non-domesticated animals the deer is the most common non-domesticated animal

— as we see from the fact that the verse wants to say that one may eat a specific animal in the same manner as a wild animal,

then the example *⁸

"like a deer and like a hart" —

And the arod is similar to a deer.

— arod here Rashi means the arod that is mentioned in Tanach and in the Mishnah⁹,

and about which the Rambam says¹⁰

"and arod is a wild donkey accustomed to the desert",

it is an animal that runs fast¹¹

like a deer.

And therefore there must also be a similarity between them in the structure of their bodies

(and it is explained in Chovot HaLevavot¹²

that the body structure of every living creature,

the Most High created in accordance with the needs of its body).

And because deer and arod resemble each other

(both in their characteristic of running fast *¹²

and also)

in their appearance,

therefore it is necessary to make specifically between them a distinction — ,

'to distinguish"¹³.

4.

This is an explanation in the S”D of the commentary of Rashi.

The explanation in Rashi’s commentary in the conclusion: from where does Rashi derive that “tamei” and “tahor” imply the distinction of “if half of the windpipe was slaughtered, etc.,”

and that “a kosher animal, etc.” — the distinction of “if signs of tereifah developed in it, etc.”?

Is the explanation in this:

The term "tamei" regarding the prohibition of &lt;b&gt;eating&lt;/b&gt;,

is found regarding the &lt;b&gt;species&lt;/b&gt; of animals that are forbidden for eating.

But &lt;b&gt;species&lt;/b&gt; of animals that are permitted for eating — they are called only "tehorim".

Even the parts in them that are &lt;b&gt;forbidden&lt;/b&gt; for eating

(a limb from a living animal; blood; the sciatic nerve; etc.)

are not called "temei'im".

Thus the question arises: Since with "to distinguish between the tamei and between the tahor" the verse means

(&lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; between &lt;b&gt;chamor&lt;/b&gt; and parah,

the matters of issur and heter that are in a tahor animal itself — why does he use the language "tamei" and "tahor"&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;?

Therefore Rashi teaches "between &lt;b&gt;unclean&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;to you&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;and clean&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;to you&lt;/b&gt;",

that the impurity and purity here means impurity and purity in its simple sense and

(not the animal &lt;b&gt;itself&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;

but)

but)

— in relation to the &lt;b&gt;person&lt;/b&gt;,

meaning thereby the law that is stated &lt;b&gt;earlier&lt;/b&gt; in the portion&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;,

that the carcass of a clean animal defiles the person who touches it or who carries it.

And therefore Rashi explains "between &lt;b&gt;slaughtered&lt;/b&gt; etc. ",

because the thing that makes this distinction whether the animal is "unclean" or "clean" — is the manner of its death and slaughter: when "half of the windpipe is slaughtered" it is as if there was no slaughter — since this is an invalid slaughter,

it then has the law of a carcass&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;,

and consequently it defiles; but if "most of it is slaughtered" — a valid slaughter,

it does not defile.

The law of "one who touches its carcass shall be impure etc." is stated specifically by "and if it dies" not by it is slaughtered&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;.

When it comes however to the second half of the verse where it says "the eaten" and "you shall not eat" — which shows that here it speaks only of permission and prohibition of eating

(<b>not</b> regarding impurity and purity)

— Rashi learns "between that signs of tereifah were born in it etc.",

because "signs of tereifah" have to do with prohibition of eating and not with impurity: also when "signs of tereifah were born in it, it is invalid",

if only the shechitah was a kosher one — it does not impart impurity¹⁹.

Ch.

From the "wondrous topics" in halachah that are in our Rashi²⁰

The law is,

that for an animal the slaughter must be of both simanim: the windpipe and the esophagus; d.

h.

One must slaughter the majority of each of the two simanim.

When, however, one has slaughtered only a <b>half</b> of one of the simanim,

even when the second siman was cut through entirely,

the slaughter is invalid²¹.

The question arises: Since in <b>both</b> simanim — both the windpipe and the esophagus — there must specifically be a slaughter of the majority of the siman,

then why does Rashi seize only <b>one</b> siman: "If half of the <b>windpipe</b> was slaughtered etc."²²?

Rashi seemingly should have written "siman",

an expression that would include both the windpipe and the esophagus²³?

Is the explanation in this: At the time that there is a perforation of any size in the esophagus in the place fit for slaughter,

Is the animal a neveilah from life and slaughter no longer helps it.

And consequently,

If one cuts the esophagus less than the majority — the animal receives the status of neveilah immediately at the very beginning of the slaughter²⁴.

For as soon as one begins cutting the esophagus, a perforation is already made in it,

And through a perforation of any size in the esophagus, the animal becomes a neveilah²⁵.

And therefore one cannot say that "to distinguish between the impure and between the pure" means "between half of the <b>esophagus</b> having been slaughtered and the majority of it having been slaughtered"; since the law of "impure" comes immediately at the first <b>any amount</b> of perforation of the esophagus

(And that which afterwards he continues the slaughter until "half" — is neither here nor there),

And "pure" applies only at its majority — the expression "to distinguish" does not fit this,

Since between "any amount" and "majority" there is a wide gap²⁶,

And the expression "to distinguish" — to separate — fits specifically by such things that are very strongly similar and close.

Specifically by the windpipe,

that as long as the majority of the windpipe is not cut through, the animal is still pure and its slaughter helps²⁷,

and the impurity that exists by "he slaughtered half of the windpipe" is because of not completing that little bit more than half with a kosher slaughter — upon <b>that</b> very small difference between impurity and purity the language "to separate" applies.

6.

Another matter of halacha that exists in this Rashi commentary:

There is a principle

"It is impossible to [precisely] reduce [to a half]."

And consequently,

if half of the windpipe was cut,

one cannot determine with certainty that it is indeed no more than half; it could be that there was one hair more than half,

only one cannot detect it.

The question arises: Why does the Torah rule "to distinguish between the impure etc." — that if half of the windpipe was cut it is impure,

it could be that there was a kosher slaughter,

with one hair more than half,

and since that is already considered a majority of the siman, should the animal not be pure?

The question, however,

can be asked only according to the opinions

which hold that the law "a doubt regarding a Torah law is stringent"

is only rabbinic; according to Torah law, a doubt is permitted,

only the rabbis were stringent that a doubt regarding a Torah law should be stringent.

One can then ask: How does the Torah say that "half of the windpipe was cut" is impure — at the time that the Torah permits it due to the doubt that must arise in such a case,

not being able to determine exactly with human measure whether it is indeed exactly half or a hair more?

Not so according to the opinions

which hold that a doubt regarding a Torah law is stringent is from the Torah,

it is not possible to ask the aforementioned question — because since this doubt regarding a Torah law,

whether half of the windpipe was cut or most of it,

is <b>from</b> <b>the Torah</b> stringent,

consequently it turns out that in such a case the Torah rules that in any case it is impure.

7.

Regarding the opinion of <b>Rashi</b>

(with whom we are dealing)

in the matter of a doubt regarding a Torah law — one could seemingly prove,

from his commentary on the Gemara,

that he holds that a doubt regarding a Torah law is from the Torah lenient: The Gemara

brings a baraisa: "Two pots, one of non-sacred food and one of terumah, and before them two mortars, one of non-sacred food and one of terumah, and these fell into those — they are permitted."

(to a stranger)

Because we assume that "terumah fell into terumah and non-sacred food fell into non-sacred food."

The Gemara there asks: Now if one will say that eating terumah

(an olive's bulk within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf)

is from the Torah,

how can one then assume that "terumah fell into terumah etc." and therefore one may eat the pot of non-sacred food — could it not be that into the pot of non-sacred food the terumah fell?

Rashi explains the Gemara's question: "And we rely leniently regarding the sin of death" — that.

That.

How can one by doubtful terumah rely leniently, since it concerns "the sin of death" of terumah to a non-priest?

From these words in Rashi,

one can seemingly deduce that he holds³⁵

: specifically there where there is a sin of death, a doubt of Torah law is from the Torah stringent,

but in a case where there is no sin of death — a doubt of Torah law is lenient

(from the Torah).

But one finds in many places³⁶

where Rashi says <b>explicitly</b>,

that a doubt of Torah law is stringent from the Torah.

One must therefore reinterpret,

that what Rashi adds in the case of two pots etc. that one cannot permit the pot of non-sacred food due to the doubt because of the fact that terumah is a "sin of death" — and he does not suffice with the general reason that a doubt of Torah law is stringent — it is due to the reasoning that the pot of non-sacred food has a presumption of permissibility³⁷

; and if terumah to a non-priest were not a prohibition of death,

then one could say that the presumption of permissibility of the pot of non-sacred food outweighs the doubt of Torah law — toward leniency.

— In such a case, however, where in this doubt of Torah law there is no presumption of permissibility,

Rashi holds that a doubt of Torah law is, from the Torah, stringent.

And all the more so that Rashi holds thus in our case,

regarding "if half of the windpipe was cut": because not only is there no presumption of permissibility,

but on the contrary: the animal has upon itself during its lifetime a presumption of prohibition³⁸

— It is thus certainly that when a doubt arises in the slaughter,

a doubt of Torah law is stringent from the Torah.

8.

From "the wine of Torah" that is in our Rashi commentary:

It has already been spoken several times³⁹,

that the name of a sedra relates to all the parshiyos and pesukim that this sedra contains within itself,

until the last word; i.e.

that is,

the content and inner-meaning of the <b>entire</b> sedra,

is indicated in its name

(and certainly its conclusion — which is interwoven⁴⁰

their beginning is in their end and their end is in their beginning).

One can ask: what connection do the words and the subject of "to distinguish between the impure and the pure" have to the name "Shmini"?

And on the contrary: Shmini is a holy number⁴¹,

and from the aspect of the virtue that exists in "Shmini"

(also — in the language of Torah — from the word shemen⁴²)

this day took ten crowns⁴³

— now when here it speaks about such a high level about which it says "no evil shall sojourn"⁴⁴,

how does a matter of tumah come here — for which the separation "between the impure and the pure" is required?

The explanation in this is: at the time that it deals about the distinction between impure and pure which consists only in a something of a hair's breadth,

which from that perspective it could appear that the impure is actually pure,

and yet one should distinguish between him and the pure — establish that he is impure and declare him impure — for this one needs a special empowerment specifically,

from the high level of "Shmini":

When one holds only at "the seven days of <b>the building"</b><b>⁴⁵</b>

the aspect of chain-like descent,

it is difficult to come together properly and distinguish in such a doubt where it concerns a hair,

a hair's breadth.

On the contrary: the evil inclination is indeed a "clever one",

he puts himself on in a "silk cap",

in a cloak of holiness "⁴⁶,

and argues to the person:

Since every thing that the Almighty invites a person to is certainly in order that the person should refine the divine spark that is found in that thing,

so how do you have the right — argues the evil inclination — not to use that food and to reject the divine spark that is in it?

Oh,

it is a doubt,

perhaps it is actually a forbidden thing,

so who tells you to be concerned about such things! In general — argues the evil inclination — when one slaughters an animal it is a kosher slaughter; most slaughters are kosher,

so why must you be concerned,

and because of this concern to reject⁴⁷

the divine spark that is in the thing?

When a Jew, however, has the aspect of "Shemini" which is above the chain of descent,

he has the correct will not to deviate, heaven forbid, a hair's breadth from the supernal will,

and this will is with a force that is above the limitations of intellect — then one does not let oneself be fooled by the temptations of the evil inclination,

because upon the essential will of a Jew

(which is above the chain of descent in the soul)

the animal soul cannot obscure⁴⁸.

(And in the manner as it is known⁴⁹

in the matter of teshuvah,

that for a doubtful sin the teshuvah is more difficult and deeper than for a definite sin,

therefore chatat bat danka

(specifically⁵⁰,

or even less⁵¹)

asham bi shtayim⁵²

(two selaim — 48 danka's⁵³)

— so too regarding that one should initially not come to the prohibition,

that to guard oneself from a doubtful prohibition⁵⁴,

especially such a doubt where one needs the "lehavdil" — one must come to the aspect of "shmini").

And this is also the continuation of Parshat Shmini to the parshah that follows it — "Isha ki tazria veyaleda zachar": through that which one arouses the "shmini" in the soul,

in which there are no changes,

and even when in intellect it turns out not as it is according to the supernal will,

one still stands with a strength etc. — then one comes to the aspect of "veyaleda <b>zachar"</b><b>⁵⁵</b>

shir chadash leshon zachar⁵⁶,

which will be in the future redemption,

redemption after which there is no exile

(above changes),

in the true and complete redemption,

with the coming of Mashiach Tzidkeinu,

very soon.

(From the talk of Shabbos Parshas Shemini 5725)