English translation — משפטים ב

1.

In the verse "The first of the first fruits of your land etc. you shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" ¹

Rashi stands

(in the second discourse)

on "you shall not cook a kid" and explains: "Even a calf and a lamb are included in the term 'kid,' for 'kid' is only an expression of a tender young, as you find in several places where it writes 'kid' and needed to explain afterwards 'goats'²

a kid of the goats³

two kids of the goats⁴

to teach you that wherever it says 'kid' without qualification, even a calf and a lamb are implied⁵.

And in three places⁶

it is written in the Torah: one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking"⁷

In this it is not understood: The conclusion of Rashi's commentary "And in three places it is written in the Torah etc." seemingly has no connection to the beginning of his commentary "Even a calf and a lamb are included in the term 'kid' etc."

Would it not have been more fitting for Rashi to write the two matters

("Even a calf and a lamb etc." and "And in three places etc.")

in two separate discourse-openings,

and for the matter "And in three places etc." he should have repeated the words "you shall not cook a kid" — as is Rashi's way in other places in similar cases?

The question is even stronger: the two matters mentioned above,

not only do they differ in their content,

but they refer to specific words of the verse: the part of the commentary "Even a calf and a lamb etc." explains <b>only</b> the word "kid",

and it is seemingly not necessary

(because of <b>that</b> part of his commentary)

to copy also the words "You shall not cook"; in contrast, for the second part of his commentary "And in three places etc.",

where he explains that the <b>general</b> prohibition is repeated three times,

it is necessary to copy <b>only</b> "You shall not cook".

And consequently, the question becomes

(not only why both matters are in the same statement,

but also —)

why does Rashi write both matters on all three words "You shall not cook a kid"?

Also, the <b>order</b> in which Rashi brings these two matters is not understood: since with his commentary "And in three places etc." he warns why the prohibition "You shall not cook etc." needs to be stated <b>at all</b>; in contrast, with his saying "Even a calf and a lamb etc." he is only explaining the word "kid",

he should have prefaced "And in three places etc." <b>before</b> "Even a calf and a lamb etc." ⁸

— why does Rashi place the two matters in reverse order?

2.

Regarding the order in which Rashi writes the two matters — the explanation "ובשלשה מקומות כו'" after the explanation "אף עגל וכבש בכלל גדי כו'" — one can explain:

According to Rashi's explanation "one for prohibition of eating and one for prohibition of benefit and one for prohibition of cooking" one must say,

that that which also in the two places where the Torah prohibits eating and benefit the wording "לא תבשל" stands,

it is because of that which cooking is the beginning which brings to eating and benefit: when a person cooks a food item,

he does it in order to eat it or for the sake of having benefit from it in another way: giving it to eat to his child,

selling it, etc.

etc.

etc.

And therefore the Torah states the prohibition of eating and benefit with the wording "לא תבשל" — because this is analogous to*⁸

like the "one of five years old

(studying Scripture)

" knows,

that when he goes to do a not-good thing,

the teacher shouts at him: do not go — even though the teacher cares about

(not the going,

but)

the action which he is preparing to do⁹.

(In the manner that one finds in another place&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;,

that the warning not to &lt;b&gt;eat&lt;/b&gt; any holy things,

the verse says with the language "in any holy [thing] do not &lt;b&gt;touch&lt;/b&gt;" — because touching a food item is the beginning that brings to eating).

It is, however, understood,

that interpreting "תבשל" — eating or benefit,

is this not the &lt;b&gt;"simple meaning &lt;/b&gt;of the verse" in that "verse"

(verse)

from the perspective of &lt;b&gt;itself,&lt;/b&gt;

rather, it is because there is no other choice&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;

due to another &lt;b&gt;other &lt;/b&gt;matter.

And in our portion, if the explanation of "תבשל" should be according to its simple meaning,

the command "you shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" would be in two places superfluous; when one would, however, &lt;b&gt;be able &lt;/b&gt;to learn another explanation which would explain why the prohibition needs to stand in three places,

one would learn that "תבשל" in all three places is according to its simple meaning.

And therefore Rashi writes his commentary "ובשלשה מקומות כו׳ אחד לאיסור אכילה כו׳" <b>after</b> his commentary "אף עגל וכבש כו'" <b>and in one continuation:</b>

One would assume that "גדי" means only "גדי עזים",

one can then explain the "שלשה מקומות" much more smoothly: the first "לא תבשל גדי גו׳" prohibits a kid goat,

the second — calf and lamb ¹³

(which are indeed the closest to "גדי" — in that they too are a tender young of the species of domestic animal¹⁴),

and the third — a tender young of the species of wild animal ¹⁵.

And although according to <b>this</b> interpretation, in two places the word <b>"גדי"</b> is not literally — it is however understood,

that it is much smoother to say that the verse calls a "ולד <b>רך</b>" of a calf etc. with the term "גדי" because it has the same quality

(characteristic)¹⁶

as the meat of a kid which is distinguished by being soft,

rather than to say,

that the verse prohibits eating and benefit with the term "לא תבשל" — because the <b>purpose</b> of cooking is eating or benefit.

But — after we know,

that Rashi explains "even calf and lamb are included in גדי" and one can no longer say that in the other <b>two</b> places additional details come in the matter of "גדי" — because "גדי" already means every tender young of the domestic animal¹⁷,

it remains now to add only <b>one</b> thing: tender young of the wild animal,

and there are still <b>two</b> remaining verses¹⁸

<b> — </b>one must learn,

that the three prohibitions come to forbid

(not three details in "גדי",

but)

three details in "לא <b>תבשל</b>": eating,

benefit and cooking.

3.

It remains however still difficult: in many places Rashi writes his commentary on a word that appears earlier in the verse before he explains a word that appears in the verse before it.

And this is in a case where the commentary on the earlier word becomes necessary

(or understandable)

only after his commentary on the later word.

But also in such a case,

if only the two commentaries are different topics

(no more than that one compels the other),

Rashi separates them into two separate dibburim.

And if Rashi writes these two topics in one and the same dibbur,

it is a proof that the connection between them exists

(not only in that one compels or is a cause for the other,

but)

also in their content,

4.

5.

That the content

(a part of it,

or entirely)

of the two topics is the same,

and therefore they come in one continuum.

Thus it is not understood: What is the common point in the content of these two matters — "Even calf and lamb in the general category of kid" to interpret the word "kid",

and "And in three places etc." to explain the reason why the prohibition is stated three times — that because of their common content Rashi writes them in the same discourse

(And especially since the first part is only on the word "kid" — not on "You shall not cook")?

4.

In addition to the aforementioned difficulty

(What is the substantive connection of "And in three places it is written in the Torah etc." to the beginning of the commentary "Even calf and lamb etc."),

it is also not understood the commentary itself "And in three places etc.":

In a case when a difficulty on a verse comes from another verse,

it is the way of Rashi to answer the difficulty by the second verse — not by the first.

Because at the time of learning the first verse, there is not yet created for the student any difficulty,

which one would need to answer.

All the more so there where the difficulty is <b></b>

(not from a <b>contradiction</b> from one verse upon the second,

but)

from the fact that one thing stands two or more times — it is thus understood simply,

that it has no place to explain and tell in the <b>first</b> verse the novelty that is revealed only from the fact that a second verse,

which comes

(much)

<b>later</b> is,

apparently,

superfluous¹⁹.

Is indeed very difficult what Rashi writes here "and in three places etc.": what does it have to do with explaining in our verse the novellae that come out only from the side of the further two verses?

b)

According to the simple meaning of the language of the verse "you shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" it would have to turn out,

that when it stands only once it would mean the prohibition of cooking—"you shall not cook"; when "you shall not cook" stands another two times,

one multiplies

(besides cooking)

also the prohibition of eating—from the second time and the prohibition of benefit—from the third time.

But Rashi's language is "one for prohibition of eating and one for prohibition of benefit and one for prohibition of cooking" ²¹

— knowing that in Rashi also the <b>order</b> is exact,

it comes out,

that the <b>first</b> "Do not cook" goes on the prohibition of <b>eating,</b>

the second — on the prohibition of benefit,

and only the third goes on the prohibition of cooking! It is proven from this,

that that which "Do not cook" means cooking literally — is such a great novelty that one says it only after there is no other alternative

(because eating and benefit are already known from the previous two verses)

! From where does Rashi take it?

The wonder is even greater: the Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos ²²

and the Chinuch in his book²³

— which are both <b>halachic</b> books — explain²⁴

that "Do not cook" from Parsha Mishpatim means,

<b>literally,</b>

the prohibition of cooking,

and "Do not cook" from Parsha Tisa and Parsha Re'eh — since they were said "a second time" — they go on the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit.

And Rashi,

who explains the <b>literal meaning</b> of Scripture,

teaches that the first two warnings are on the prohibition of eating and benefit,

and only the third — tells the prohibition of cooking!

5.

Is the explanation in this: Rashi with his commentary "ובג׳ מקומות כו'" is to come to answer a puzzling thing that immediately arises in <b>our</b> verse "לא תבשל גדי":

One does not find anywhere in the Torah

(ופשיטא — according to the knowledge and what a בן חמש למקרא sees)

that a thing should be forbidden in cooking: certain things are forbidden in eating,

other things are forbidden in benefit — but no other thing is forbidden in cooking²⁵.

Why should something "גדי בחלב אמו" be forbidden in cooking²⁶?

Therefore Rashi explains immediately here "And in three places it is written in the Torah one for prohibition of eating etc.",

that our verse indeed does not prohibit cooking,

but it is a warning regarding the prohibition of eating²⁷.

But in order to be able to learn such an interpretation according to the way of Rashi — the plain meaning of the verse,

Rashi must explain "And in three places etc.":

If "לא תבשל" would stand only once,

one would &lt;b&gt;have to &lt;/b&gt;learn that it means the prohibition of cooking in its simple sense,

despite the fact that one does not find anywhere a similar prohibition.

Because even though it is a great novelty — because "I have not found its counterpart" — no thing is prohibited in cooking — but one cannot &lt;b&gt;interpret תבשל — &lt;/b&gt;as eating.

However, since "in three places it is written in the Torah",

which &lt;b&gt;simply &lt;/b&gt;— it is not "to multiply prohibitions" but these are three warnings on three separate matters&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;,

and since in two places one &lt;b&gt;must &lt;/b&gt;take out the "לא תבשל" from its simple meaning and interpret that it means

(not תבשל as it remains by cooking,

but that which comes immediately after,

because of which he cooks —)

eating and benefit.

And all three things are prohibited — cooking, eating, and benefit,

it is plausible to say,

that the first prohibition "lo tevashel" means eating,

that a prohibition of eating is not at all a novelty — the &lt;b&gt;first &lt;/b&gt;prohibition in the Torah is "lo tochal mimenu"

(of the Tree of Knowledge)&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;,

("gdi" and "chalav")

by itself is indeed permitted in eating&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;

— but the novelty is no news even to a child of five studying Scripture,

because he already knows about the prohibition of shatnez&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;]

With the second "Do not cook" the Torah adds more prohibition in "a kid in its mother's milk" — prohibition of benefit; and the prohibition of cooking — which is a very great novelty

(a type of prohibition that exists only by "a kid in its mother's milk")

— one learns only from the third time.

<b>6.</b>

Seemingly one can ask on this: After all, also according to Rashi's explanation in the plain sense of Scripture — meat in milk is forbidden in cooking,

so what do we gain

(that it should be less of a novelty)

by explaining that the first

(and second)

"Do not cook" means <b>not</b> a prohibition of cooking?

What makes it easier for us if the decree of the verse does not stand in Parshat Mishpatim but in Parshat Re'eh?

In truth, it is, however, understandable: when one learns that "lo tevashel" means only cooking

(at any rate — one does not yet know about the prohibition of eating and benefit)

— then it is indeed a great wonder.

Different, however, is when we know

(already)

that meat and milk is forbidden in eating and in benefit; then one can already understand the prohibition of cooking in this,

the reasoning simply: the prohibition of cooking regarding meat and milk is a result of the prohibition of eating and benefit: the prohibition of eating and benefit is so severe

(regarding meat and milk),

that from its side the Torah prohibited also the cooking of meat and milk — because it can lead to eating and benefit³².

An example of the matter from earlier already: that Chavah heard that "from the fruit of the tree of the garden we may eat, and from the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden

(and nevertheless)

God said, 'You shall not eat from it'" — it was for her simple³³

that the command is also

(including)

"and you shall not touch it"³⁴.

And this is an additional explanation on that which Rashi teaches the prohibition of cooking regarding meat in milk only in the third "You shall not cook" — although this is not in accordance with the simple meaning — because

(Besides that which the reasoning obligates to postpone a prohibition that contains more novelty to as late as possible,

as above section 5)

— the prohibition of cooking becomes understandable and has a place specifically after this and because of that which meat in milk is forbidden for eating and for benefit*³⁴.

7.

Based on the above one will also understand the connection of the conclusion of Rashi's words "And in three places it is written in the Torah, one for prohibition of eating etc." to the beginning of his explanation "Even calf and lamb are included in kid etc.":

With the explanation "even a calf and a lamb are included in a kid" Rashi is [coming] to

(not only to explain the meaning of "kid" but)

also to answer a question that arises in the words <b>"You shall not cook </b>a kid" — on which he poses: with what is "kid" distinguished from other types of animals that specifically regarding it there is the prohibition "You shall not cook it in its mother's milk"?

In general, one does not find in the Torah distinctions — regarding prohibitions and the like — from one animal to another, and so much so is this <b>simple,</b>

that therefore Rashi explains

(without any proofs for this)

that "it gores <b>an ox</b>" — means "one ox and every animal, beast, and fowl"³⁵.

In this Rashi warns with his commentary "Even calf and lamb are included in the term kid"*&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;,

that the prohibition "You shall not cook etc." is indeed also on calf and lamb&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;.

and only)

from &lt;b&gt;domesticated animals &lt;/b&gt;

(not from undomesticated animals)&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;

— one cannot ask: how is a tender young of domesticated animals different from all other types — because since the prohibition of cooking

(in &lt;b&gt;that &lt;/b&gt;verse)

is literally &lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;

"in the milk of &lt;b&gt;its mother"&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;40 &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;

it is understood that the reason for the prohibition is because of cruelty&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;

to living creatures

(and if so, all the more so that their pain is forbidden)&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;,

and consequently it is already understood why the prohibition applies specifically by "kid" — because the "cooking"

(including all three details: eating,

benefit and cooking)

of a young offspring in its mother's milk,

is more cruel than of an older one,

and by a young offspring itself it is more in the species of domesticated animal &lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;,

which are more under the authority of man than undomesticated animals",

and — in general — weaker than them.

And according to this it comes out,

that both matters that Rashi writes in his commentary on "You shall not cook a kid" — "even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid'" in which he explains the reason for the prohibition specifically by "kid",

and "And in three places etc. for prohibition of eating etc." where he explains the reason of the prohibition of "You shall not cook" — have in themselves a common point: through both matters he brings out that the prohibition "You shall not cook a kid" is not a decree of the verse that is completely and utterly not understood,

but it has a rationale also in intellect.

8.

In Rashi's commentary there is also "the wine of Torah"⁴⁵

— is one of the instructions that one can learn from this Rashi:

The only thing that the Torah prohibited &lt;b&gt;in cooking — &lt;/b&gt;is a kid in its mother's milk.

And according to what was said above — the reason is — to negate cruelty and pain of living creatures,

from which one sees how much the prohibition of pain of living creatures is severe &lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;

&lt;b&gt; : &lt;/b&gt;Despite the fact that the matter of pain of living creatures directly,

is a reason to prohibit a kid in its mother's milk only &lt;b&gt;in eating &lt;/b&gt;

(or also in benefit),

the Torah prohibited it also in cooking,

because from it can &lt;b&gt;come out &lt;/b&gt;eating&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;.

And from this one must learn how much one must be guarded with all kinds of precautions not to cause, heaven forbid, any pain to a fellow Jew.

For if regarding living creatures the Torah was particular so much about their pain,

now all the more so regarding people,

and in relation to Jews in particular

(the chosen people — You have chosen us from all the nations)

— all the more so.

(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Tisa 5728)