English translation — מטות

Sicha 1<pg>186</pg>

A.

In his commentary at the beginning of our parshah,

After Rashi explains the reason that it is said "the heads of the tribes for the children of Israel" — "He gave honor to the princes to teach them first and afterwards all the children of Israel etc.",

He writes: "And what did he see to say it here? Learn<sup>1</sup>

That the annulment of vows [is done] by a single expert, and if there is no single expert, he annuls with three laymen."

And it requires explanation: From Rashi's language "learned<sup>2</sup>

that the annulment of vows [is done] by an individual expert etc." it implies that there is no source here for the essence of the law of annulment of vows<sup>3</sup>,

but only for this detail that the annulment is done by "an individual expert

(And if there is no individual expert, he annuls with three laymen)

" — and at first glance,

from where do we know in the plain sense of the verse that there is a possibility of "annulment of vows" by human beings

(and a sage),

and behold in the entire portion it speaks only about the annulment of the father [of] his daughter's vows and the husband [of] his wife's vows<sup>4</sup>,

and not about the annulment — release — of vows by a sage and the like?

And behold also regarding the homiletical and the law it is stated in the Mishnah<sup>5</sup>

"The release of vows fly in the air and they have nothing to rely on",

and Rashi explained "The release of vows that the sages said that the sage permits the vow, a small hint there is in Scripture and there is nothing to rely on, but rather so it is transmitted to the sages in the Oral Torah",

and it is obvious that it is not explicit in the verse according to its plain sense!

And behold, in the Gemara there⁵

the opinions of several Tannaim are brought that "they have upon what to rely" from several verses

(but they are not in the portion of Nedarim),

and finally the statement of R. Yohanan said Shmuel is brought "as it is said⁶

he shall not profane his word; he does not forgive, but others forgive him"

(and this teaching is brought in the poskim etc. as a source for the annulment of vows⁷).

But Rashi in his commentary on the Torah on the above verse explains "he shall not profane his word; he shall not make his words profane",

and he does not bring at all

(even not as "our Rabbis expounded")

the teaching that "he does not forgive, but others forgive him".

2.

At first glance, one can say,

that according to Rashi's method<pg>187</pg>

The annulment of vows by a sage is a simple thing according to the simple meaning of Scripture,

and no special study is needed for this,

for the annulment of the vow according to its simple meaning is by opening for him an opening for his vow,

that if he had known from the beginning that such and such would happen,

he would not have vowed in the first place.

And thus there is no need for a novelty and special study that a sage can annul the vow,

since the sage only shows that in his opinion⁸

there was here a mistake in the vow and on this condition he did not vow⁹.

And so is proven the opinion of Rashi in his commentary to the Talmud,

that he explained the statement of Rabbi Yochanan¹⁰

"No sage annuls anything except through regret" — "that he opens¹¹

an opening for the vower with matters that come to him through this vow, that if he had known from the beginning that thus it would be, he would not have vowed; it turns out that from its beginning it is not a vow."

And from his words we learned three things regarding the nature of the annulment of vows¹²

:

A)

The annulment of vows from its root is through a regret-based opening,

For although it is stated in the Talmud that the annulment of a vow is in two ways,

through regret or through an opening¹³,

nevertheless, the essence of the annulment of vows

(even when it depends on regret)

is through an opening for his vow.

b)

The annulment of the vow is not an action performed

(now)

by the sage,

but rather through the opening,

that through the opening it is found that the vow is void of itself¹⁴

(in the manner of Rashi's language in that place¹⁵

"the sage must find an opening for the questioner, that he should have an opening of the mouth to say, 'With this knowledge I did not vow, and had I known that it is so, I would not have vowed,' and it is found that the vow is uprooted of itself").

c)

Beyond this: the annulment is not in the category of nullification,

but rather it is a revelation of the matter¹⁶

that it is not a vow from its beginning,

and therefore Rashi specifies "it is found that from its beginning it is not a vow"¹⁷

(and according to this, according to Rashi, that which we say¹⁸

"the sage uproots the vow from its root,"

the meaning in this is not that the sage nullifies now the vow

(retroactively)

as if it were not,

but rather¹⁹

that he reveals now that from the outset it was a vow made in error)²⁰.

&lt;pg&gt;188&lt;/pg&gt;

And therefore, in general, Rashi does not need to explain from where we know the permission of vows,

because there is no need for a study on this,

for it is simple that if it is revealed that the vow was in error,

the vow is void from its inception,

and from the beginning the obligation of "he shall not profane his word"²¹ did not apply to this.

And the novelty in the portion is only in the annulment of vows by the father and the husband,

which is not through a opening of regret etc.,

and on this comes the main portion of vows here.

3.

And based on this, it is understood that Rashi did not bring the exposition "He does not forgive, but others forgive him" because according to the plain meaning of Scripture,

not only is there no need for this study,

but rather this exposition does not correspond to the content of the matter of the dissolution of vows — because the dissolution is not dependent on others who effect the dissolution of the vow.

And even the body of the homily "He shall not profane his word..

but others may absolve him" does not fit the matter of annulment according to the plain meaning,

for Rashi explained "He shall not profane his word,

like he shall not profane his word, he shall not make his words profane"&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;,

and if so there is no place

(at least according to the plain meaning)

to expound "but others make it profane"&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;

(i.e., that he can profane his word)&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;

— since the definition of annulment according to the plain meaning is a revelation that originally there was not

("his word")

a speech of a vow.

[And also according to the explanation of the early commentators&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;

on the language of the Talmud "but others absolve him" — "absolution and profanation are all one matter, that the language 'he shall not profane' means he shall not annul,

and the matter is like untying the knot, so that the matter returns as if it were not..

And this is what they said that a sage uproots the vow from its root, and absolution also makes the debt or sin as if it were not" — which explains that the matter of absolution is like the annulment of the knot,

meaning that there was a knot and now he unties it

(except that after the annulment it is

(now)

as if it were not)

— then since there is here an action of nullification and annulment of the vow from now&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;,

the language "others absolve him" is not possible according to the above explanation

(in Rashi)

in the definition of annulment,

for it is not that the nullification is newly created now,

in a manner that now it is as if it were not,

but rather it is a matter of logic,

i.e., it is not like the absolution of a debt,

but rather a revelation that there was never a vow here at all].

4.

However,

This explanation has a place in the way of the halacha in Rashi's commentary,

but not in Rashi's commentary on the Torah according to its plain meaning,

for we do not find in the plain meaning of Scripture the different modes of annulling vows by a sage, whether by &lt;pg&gt;189&lt;/pg&gt;

mere regret or by a pretext and the like,

that there is no hint of this in the plain meaning of the text regarding the modes of annulling vows.

And beyond this: in Rashi's commentary on the verse "This is the thing — it is a limitation to say that the sage in the language of absolution and the husband

(and father)

in the language of annulment as the language of the verse here&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;,

and if they passed, there is no permitted and no annulled",

and from the precision of his language

[and especially that Rashi changes in this from the language of the Sifri here "This is the thing which the Lord commanded: the husband annuls and the sage does not annul,

the sage permits and the husband does not permit"

(and similarly is the teaching in the Gemara&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;),

and he emphasizes that the sage in the language of absolution and the husband in the language of annulment],

it implies,

that there is no difference between husband

(and father)

and sage in the essence and manner of nullification of the vow

(and certainly not as stated above that in the absolution of a sage it is only in the manner of revealing that there was no vow from the outset,

and this is not from the side of the sage's nullification)

— but rather both of them,

the sage and the husband,

are equal in the manner and type of nullification of the vow,

and the difference between them is only in language&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;.

And therefore it must be said,

that the definition of absolution of vows according to Rashi in the plain sense of Scripture differs from its definition according to halacha,

and with an introduction of another precision in Rashi's language who wrote at the beginning of his words "he taught that the annulment of vows is by an individual expert..

annuls etc.'",

that at first glance it should have said "that the absolution of vows is by an individual expert etc.'",

since the sage permits the vow unlike the husband

(and father)

who annuls the vow — and Rashi writes "that the annulment of vows"&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;?

And especially that he changes in this from the language of the Sifri here "that there is no absolution of vows except from the mouth of experts",

in which is explicitly stated "absolution" and not "annulment".

And one could say,

that Rashi holds in the plain sense of the verse,

that the annulment of vows by a sage is the same category as the revocation of vows by the husband and the father

(explained in the verse),

that just as the husband revokes his wife's vows and the father his daughter's vows without any reason³¹

and without any opening and regret,

so too is it in the annulment by a sage,

that its category is revocation,

without opening and regret³².

And therefore Rashi did not bring a special teaching on this,

because it is akin to the revocation explained in the portion,

since it is stated at the beginning of the portion "And Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes",

it is understood,

that its category is like the revocation of the husband and the father,

that just as the woman and the daughter when they are under the authority of the husband or the father³³,

their dominion over them is to revoke their vows — so too is it with "the heads of the tribes",

that because they are the heads of the people of their tribe, the power is given to them to revoke the vows of the members of the tribe.

And behold, also in Kli Yakar³⁴

he connected the two matters,

and wrote the "reason for the permission of vows by a single expert or by three laymen who are called a court,

we learn from the annulment of the father and the husband, for just as the father and the husband therefore have in their hand to annul, because every woman is under the authority of her husband or under the authority of her father, and there is no power in her hand to do a great or small thing without their consent, and it is as if<pg>190</pg>

they stipulated at the time of the vow on condition that the husband or the father agree,

and when they do not agree, then retroactively the vow is void, because presumably she vowed on their mind, or as if she vowed on their mind³⁵,

so every Jewish man is under the authority of the court and is obligated to do all that the court instructs him, and every one who vows, behold this is as if he stipulated at the time of the vow on condition that the court agree with him, and when they do not agree, the vow is uprooted from its root, and every single expert is called a court, and any three laymen have in their hand to permit his vow."

But according to the simple meaning of the plain text it is forced to explain thus,

Because^*35

This definition of the rulings of the court is more suited to the Sanhedrin and the elders of Israel and the like,

And it would have been necessary for the speech

(Not to the heads of the tribes,

But)

To the Sanhedrin,

The seventy elders and the like.

And from the fact that the speech was to the heads of the tribes,

The princes — it appears more

(In the simple meaning of the plain text)

That this is not because it is like a vow conditional upon the court's agreement,

But rather because of the authority of the prince over his tribe³⁶,

Similar to^*36

The authority of the father and the husband over his daughter and his wife.

5.

Based on the above, also the continuation of Rashi's commentary will be understood: "Or perhaps Moses did not say this section except to the princes alone; it is said here 'this is the thing' and it is said in 'those who slaughter outside'&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;

'This is the thing' — just as below it was said to Aaron and to his sons and to all the children of Israel, as it is said&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;

'Speak to Aaron, etc.' — so too this one was said to all of them."

— And the source of the gezerah shavah for "those who slaughter outside" is in the Gemara&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;,

But in the Gemara it continues: "And what&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;

Here 'the heads of the tribes' — so too below 'the heads of the tribes' in the section of vows, for what halachic purpose?

(We require regarding vows Aaron and his sons and all Israel&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;)

Rabbi Elazar bar Yosei said: to qualify three laymen

(For this the gezerah shavah is effective as if it were written in vows 'Aaron and his sons and all Israel' to tell you that all Israel are equal for annulling vows, even laymen&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;),

But 'the heads of the tribes' is written,

Rabbi Chiya said etc.: by an individual expert.

'The heads of the tribes' in 'those who slaughter outside' — for what halachic purpose? Rav Sheshet said: to say that there is a question [of annulment] regarding consecrated property."

And this means that according to the Gemara, the gezerah shavah of the section of vows and 'those who slaughter outside' is to learn from it that the annulment of vows can also be by three laymen,

and that there is a question [of annulment] regarding consecrated property.

But Rashi did not bring the gezeirah shavah for the halachic matter

(that annulment of vows [is done] by three laymen)

only for this matter that this section "was said to all of them"

(in continuation of the beginning of his commentary that it was said to all of Israel).

And based on this, it is puzzling why Rashi needed to add "And if there is no expert individual, he annuls with three laymen,"

for what relevance does this halacha have to his commentary itself

(that it was said to all of Israel)⁴¹.

And also it is puzzling,

that since he explains the words "Heads of the tribes," Rashi should have used the language "experts" and not "by an expert individual,"

and in the manner of the language of the Sifri,

the source of Rashi

(that he showed respect<pg>191</pg>

To the princes who precede the congregation)

That concludes "indicating that there is no permission of vows except from the mouths of experts"

(And not "an individual expert").

[And also does not add in the Sifri "And if there is no individual expert, three laymen permit" — and on the contrary,

they reversed its meaning,

as the simple language of the Sifri "that there is no permission etc. except from the mouths of experts"].

But Rashi did not come to teach us here the laws of annulment of vows,

but rather to emphasize its definition according to the plain meaning of the verse,

that the annulment of vows by the heads of the tribes is in the same category as the nullification of vows by the husband and father,

because he is the prince of the tribe — a "single expert"^*41

(and not because they are ordinary "experts")^**41

; and from this it is understood that the nullification of the vow by three laymen is only a matter of ex post facto,

that is, not because the Torah included three laymen for nullification of vows from a gezerah shavah

(of Aaron and his sons and all of Israel)

of slaughtering outside⁴²,

that their power is equal to a single expert,

but only with difficulty and ex post facto^*42,

"And if there is no single expert, he nullifies with three laymen."

6.

The essence of the Torah in Rashi's commentary:

In the content of the matter of vows,

that a person prohibits upon himself something that is permitted to him,

several aspects were said about this in Chazal,

and in the words of the Rambam we find about this three halachos:

In Hilchos Nedarim⁴³

the Rambam wrote: "One who vows vows in order to establish his character traits and to correct his deeds, behold this one is zealous and praiseworthy,

How so? For example, one who was a glutton and prohibited upon himself meat for a year or two, or one who was etc. All of them are in the way of service for the sake [of Heaven] and about these vows and the like of them the Sages said⁴⁴

Vows are a fence for abstinence";

And in the halacha after this⁴⁵

He continues "And although they are work

(for the sake of)

a person should not multiply in vows of prohibition and should not accustom himself to them, but rather he should distance himself from things from which it is proper to distance himself without a vow";

And in the Laws of Opinions the Rambam wrote⁴⁶

"The sages commanded that a person should not withhold himself except from things that the Torah alone forbade him..

So said the sages⁴⁷

Is it not enough for you what the Torah forbade, that you also forbid upon yourself other things".

Behold, before us are three modes in the service of G-d: a)

Abstinence from permissible things by means of a vow.

b)

Abstinence without a vow.

c)

Not to abstain from permissible things.

And the explanation regarding this is known,

that the discussion is about different levels in the service of G-d⁴⁸

:

One who is found on a low level in the service of G-d needs to separate himself even from things that are permitted,

because from his pursuit after luxuries

(things that are permitted)

a person descends lower,

and since&lt;pg&gt;192&lt;/pg&gt;

that he is from his own essence bound and connected with worldly matters,

he needs a vow to separate himself

(the opposite of his will from his own essence)

— and such a person, the way of his service to G-d must be with strengthening through a vow.

Above this there is a person who is not drawn after luxuries,

and consequently does not need a vow to separate himself,

but nevertheless, since he has not yet reached a lofty level in the service of G-d, he separates himself without a vow from permissible things,

and this is what the Rambam said in a law in its own chapter "Even though it is service

(for the sake [of Heaven])

a person should not multiply in vows of prohibition etc. but rather separate from things that are proper to separate from without a vow",

and fulfills the command⁴⁹

"Sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you",

and this is because the discussion is about a person who has risen to a higher level in the service of G-d.

Above this is one who has already reached a more lofty level in the service of G-d, where there is no place to fear that the permitted thing will cause him a descent,

and about him our Sages said,

(as brought in the Rambam above)

"Is it not enough for you what the Torah has forbidden" — because a person at this level,

who has no concern of descent,

indeed on the contrary,

he should engage with worldly matters,

to refine and purify the permissible things,

as the Rambam concludes

(in Hilchos Deos⁵⁰)

"The Sages commanded and said⁵¹

and all your deeds shall be for the sake of Heaven",

and even in a manner of "In all your ways know Him"⁵²

and to elevate them to the level of holiness of the person.

7.

And behold, according to the above, the entire content of the matter of the annulment and dissolution of vows in the service of G-d is understood,

that a person who vows a vow and prohibits himself from permitted things,

behold, it is in the power of the father

(and husband)

and a sage⁵³

to elevate him to a higher level,

so that he will not need a vow to separate himself from permitted things.

And in this there are two ways:

One who is on a lower level,

who still needs the conduct of abstinence from worldly matters,

they annul and nullify the vow,

meaning they elevate him to a level where he will not need a vow to abstain himself,

for he can already abstain from his own power and good will,

without a vow; and this is also the content of the matter of the annulment of the vow,

which indicates that he still has a connection to the matter of the vow,

but they annul and nullify it,

and this is because the man from his own side is still connected to the category of the matter of vows,

namely the conduct of abstinence,

but in actual practice he has been elevated to a level where he can abstain himself without a vow,

"Sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you."

Above this is the matter of the release of vows by a sage

("Heads of the tribes")⁵⁴,

who says "it is permitted to you,"

and in the service of man it is that the sage draws down a supernal holiness into the man until he has the power to engage in worldly matters in a way that elevates them to the level of the holiness of man.

[And one could say,

that the concept of a sage uproots the vow from its root is,

that the sage reveals the innerness of a Jewish person,

that each and every one has the power

(and the wisdom)

needed in order to draw down holiness&lt;pg&gt;193&lt;/pg&gt;

in worldly matters.

For the need for the matter of the vow is because this power in his soul was in concealment; and the sage reveals in him this power of the soul,

in a manner that it becomes clear that the vow is founded on an error,

that he did not know his true power,

but "if he had known" and it had been in revelation of this power from the outset he would not have vowed,

but rather would have engaged in refining and purifying the world].

8.

Based on all the above, one must explain the difference between the action of the sage according to the simple meaning versus as it is according to the law:

The study according to the simple meaning — corresponding to the world of action⁵⁵

— it is in accordance with a simple and low level in the service of man,

and therefore according to the simple meaning,

the action of the sage is only in the category of "annulment"

(as above at length),

because such a person is not yet worthy to rise to such a level that he needs to deal with physical matters in a manner of "in all your ways know Him."

But according to the homily and the law in the Oral Torah,

that this is in accordance with a person who elevated himself above the world of action and the simple meaning⁵⁶,

in this level it is possible to have the annulment of vows,

that the sage acts upon the person so that he can elevate physical matters to the service of God.

And more deeply it can be said — that this, that according to law a sage annuls the vow of every single Jew,

without distinction

(even one who is on a low level in the service of God)

— is because this is the power of a true sage,

that he can draw down a supernal power into every single Jew,

to elevate him to a higher level

(disproportionate to his state on his own).

And this is the hint in the language of our Sages⁵⁷

that "the annulment of vows fly in the air and have nothing upon which to rely"⁵⁸

— that this, that a sage can annul the vow of any Jewish man, is a thing that "flies in the air",

that it is a thing that remains above and separate from the person who vowed,

and there is not in him

(in the one who vowed)

upon what to "rely" this power of the sage,

that it be grasped in him in an internal manner.

But not according to the simple meaning of the verse — corresponding to the world of action — since "they have nothing upon which to rely",

this power of the sage

(to annul the vow)

can actually affect the vower

(who is not on this level).

And this is the explanation

(the inner one)

of this,

that even according to Rashi

(that the sage annuls the vow)

the sage must say in the language of "absolution"

(and not in the language of annulment)

— because that the sage only annuls the vow,

is only due to the state of the vower,

that he is not a "vessel" for the sage's power,

and therefore the sage's action upon him is only a category of annulment of the vow; but from the sage's side, his power is that he can absolve the vow,

and therefore the sage's language is — absolution.

(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Matos-Masei and Shabbos Parshas Devarim 5748)