English translation — קרח ב

Sicha b<pg>113</pg>

A.

It is written regarding the obligation of separating terumah¹

"So shall you also set apart a gift for Hashem," the Sages learned²

"Also you,

just as you are members of the covenant, so too your agent

(that "also you"

(comes)

to include the agent"³)

members of the covenant",

that there is no agency for a non-Jew.

And we find in the Gemara<sup>4</sup>

that they discussed the definitions of this law: Rav Ashi said that we say there is no agency for a non-Jew, these words are only in terumah, but in the entire Torah there is agency for a non-Jew

(And it concludes in the Gemara)

And that of Rav Ashi is a refutation<sup>5</sup>

it is what is different about terumah that it is not,

as it is written you also you, just as you are children of the covenant, so too your agent is a child of the covenant,

agency of the entire Torah also

(that his agent is like himself.

Rashi<sup>6</sup>)

from terumah we learn it

(in Kiddushin.

Rashi<sup>6</sup>).

Simply it implies<sup>7</sup>,

that the reason of Rav Ashi that the law "there is no agency for a non-Jew" is only in terumah and not in the entire Torah is because he holds that we do not learn agency of the entire Torah from terumah<sup>8</sup>.

But at first glance it is forced to say that the dispute here is whether we derive all agency of the entire Torah from Terumah⁹.

And it is more reasonable to say,

that the distinction between R. Eliezer and the conclusion of the Gemara is in the logic:

Rav Ashi holds that this law "just as you are members of the covenant, etc." is a decree of the verse,

for according to logic we would say that also a non-Jew can be an agent for a Jew,

and therefore you have nothing from it except its novelty,

and only regarding Terumah we say this and not regarding the entire Torah.

But not according to the conclusion of the Gemara,

this is a matter of logic,

that the agent must be similar to the principal — "Just as you [are] etc., so too your agent etc.",

and this means that what is written regarding terumah "also you" is only a revelation of the matter,

that the definition of agency requires that the agent be similar to the principal — and therefore there is no law of agency for a non-Jew

(also)

in the entire Torah.

2.

And it seems that they disagree in the very definition of agency — and with the introduction of the well-known investigation¹⁰

Regarding<pg>114</pg>

The mission,

that a person's agent is like himself,

which can be explained in several ways:

A)

"Like himself" literally¹¹

— regarding the one who performs the action,

that the body of the agent is like the body of the principal

(and consequently the action of the agent is attributed to the principal).

b)

"like him" —

(only)

in relation to the power of the action of the agent or to the deed,

that the doing of the agent is like the doing of the principal.

c)

"like him" — only regarding the results of the deed.

In other words: regarding the object in which the action is done — that even the doing of the agent is not that of the principal,

but rather the doing of the agent in the object is

(effects the same thing that effects)

the doing of the principal.

And based on this, one can say,

that the opinion of Rav Ashi is like the third way above,

that also the act of agency is not attributed to the sender but to the agent,

and since the agent does not stand in the place of the sender

(even not that his deed should be considered as the deed of the sender),

therefore,

if he is only a person who belongs to this action, he can be an agent,

of this one who requests him and connects him with this action,

and in the manner that one connects him with a rope and he does not oppose this.

And therefore he holds that in the entire Torah there is agency for a non-Jew,

for if the agency is in a matter such that also the non-Jew belongs to its doing&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;,

then he can be an agent for a Jew.

However, the conclusion of the Gemara is,

that "this [teaching] of R. Eliezer is an exception",

that this approach is refuted,

and it is necessary that the agent be similar to the sender

("Just as you [are] etc., so too your agent [is] etc.").

That is,

that even if you say that the concept of agency is like the third manner above,

that the action is the deed of the agent — nevertheless,

the concept of agency is not possible except in one who is "like the sender"¹³,

and this is according to all the manners that explain the concept of agency.

Explanation of the concept:

In shlichus there are two matters:

(a)

The actual fulfillment of the shlichus.

(b)

The application of the name shliach.

All three of the above modes in the category of shlichus are only regarding the actual fulfillment of the shlichus: when we discuss how the action of this person

(the shliach)

avails for another person

(the meshaleach)

— then it is possible to say the reason for this in three modes,

whether because the Torah innovated in shlichus that the action of the shliach avails like the action of the meshaleach,

or on the grounds that this action of his is considered as the action of the meshaleach,

or beyond this,

that the body of the shliach is considered as the body of the meshaleach and consequently his action as the action of the meshaleach.

But before that, there must be an application of the status of agency upon the agent,

i.e., the appointment that effects the application of the name of agent&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;.

And in order that the name of agent should apply to him,

there must be a connection between the agent and the principal,

for it is impossible to be the agent of the principal

(in whatever manner)

without there being "like the principal himself",

that "the agent must be related in some measure"&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;

to the principal.

And therefore there is no agency for a gentile in the entire Torah&lt;pg&gt;115&lt;/pg&gt;

all of it,

for he cannot be "like the sender"¹⁶

(the Israelite).

3.

According to the above explanation of the words of Rav Ashi,

we must further explain another statement of R. Elazar concerning the matter of agency,

that we also find that it is refuted in halakhah — in the law of an agent appointing an agent,

that he can appoint several agents¹⁷

("even a hundred"¹⁸),

for Rav Ashi holds¹⁷

that "if the

(agent)

first one dies, all are nullified,

said Mar bar Rav Ashi: this [statement] of father is [from] his youth

(in his youth my father said this tradition which can be refuted¹⁹)

if the owner died, do they have any substance? All of them — from whose power do they come? From the power of the owner they come. If the owner exists, all of them exist; if the owner does not exist, all of them do not exist."

And behold, in the later authorities&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;

they wrote that the dispute of R. Elazar and Mar bar R. Ashi

(whether they come from the power of the first agent or from the power of the principal)

is,

that Mar bar R. Ashi holds that the agent is like the principal himself, or at least that his action is attributed to the principal,

and it is found that the first agent

(and likewise all the agents after him)

comes from the power of the principal who sent him, for he stands in his place; but R. Elazar holds that the agent is not like the principal himself,

and also his action is not attributed to the principal, and it only benefits for the principal,

and if so, the second agent is not made an agent from the power of the principal, but from the power of the first agent.

But it is difficult regarding this,

for from the language of Mar bar R. Ashi "that is the matter of Abba of minorness" it is understood,

that the reasoning of R. Elazar is refuted for halachah

(and so it is ruled for halachah&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;

like Mar bar R. Ashi).

And behold, the later authorities brought&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;

several proofs

(also)

like this side in agency, that the action is not considered except as the doing of the agent.

And therefore it seems to say,

that also here the view of R. Eliezer is not only because the action of the agent is not considered as the action of the principal

(and only that his action is effective for the principal),

but because he holds more than this,

that since the entire matter of agency is only in connection with the results of the action in the object

(as above),

there need not be any connection between the agent and the principal.

That is: after the principal made him an agent, the agent no longer comes from the power of the principal, but the "power" of agency is found with him,

and as if he is the owner of this thing.

And for this reason he holds that "if the first

(agent)

died, all are nullified",

because the agents do not come from the power of the principal but from the power of the first agent²³.

And this is what Mar said in the name of R. Eliezer that this reasoning is entirely refuted — that it is the matter of "Abba's minor opinion" — because "all of them from whose power do they come? From the power of the owner they come",

that is: the definition of agency is that he "comes from the power" of the principal

(for the very term agent means — that he is the power of the principal),

a person's agent is like himself,

and therefore it is impossible to attribute the matter of agency to one who is

(first agent etc.)

without it coming and being drawn from <pg>116</pg>

The owner — the sender.

And even if you say that the act of the agency

(and even the action of the appointment of the agency)

is considered as if the agent did it

(like the third way mentioned above)

— nevertheless, he is not the owner at all regarding the matter of "all of them"...

(only)

by virtue of the owner they come²⁴,

and as above at length.

4.

Based on the above, this will be sweetened: that the teaching to exclude non-Jews from the law of agency — "Just as you are members of the covenant, etc." — was said regarding terumah,

and not regarding divorce and the like

[for also in them the law of agency is stated²⁵]

:

There is a fundamental difference between the matter of agency in the separation of terumah and agency in other matters — divorce etc.:

In the separation of terumah the main thing is the acted-upon,

that the terumah is separated from the produce,

and therefore reason dictates that the matter of agency in terumah need not be in a manner that

(it be considered as if)

the sender

(the owner of the produce)

performed the act of separation,

but rather since he is the owner of the produce, therefore the separation must be with his knowledge — even though it is the act of the agent²⁶.

But not so regarding divorce, it is simple that the divorcer must be specifically the husband,

because divorce is

(not only the action of writing and giving the get,

but primarily)

that the husband divorces his wife,

and it is understood that agency in get means that through the doing of the agent it is considered that the husband divorced his wife.

And accordingly,

if the Torah had not written the law of "just as you are children of the covenant etc." regarding divorce and the like, it would have been logical to say that it applies only to matters that require the action of the owners, and consequently the agent must be similar to the principal

(the owners)

so that he is fit to stand in the place of the owners;

And therefore this law is stated specifically regarding terumah,

to teach us,

that the entire concept of agency

(in whatever matter it may be)

— even in terumah where we discuss only the action and the deed that will benefit the Israelite — the name of agency cannot take effect if the agent is not similar to the principal

("Just as you [are] etc., so too your agent etc."),

for the essence of the concept of agency is that the agent is "like the principal himself."

5.

And one may bring a proof for this matter from the words of our master, the Alter Rebbe,

that regarding the matter of agency he writes²⁷

"that a person's agent is like himself,

and therefore there is no agency for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who are not like the principal himself."

And at first glance it is puzzling,

for it is explicit in the Gemara²⁸

<pg>117</pg>

that the reason they are not capable of agency is because "they are not of sound mind"²⁹?

And although it can be said that this is the explanation of the words of the Gemara,

since they are not of sound mind, therefore they are not "like him, the sender"³⁰

— nevertheless, an explanation is needed: what is the necessity for this explanation?

And according to the above, it can be said:

It is known the principle³¹

that a minor has no intention,

but he has action.

And based on this,

it could be said that the matter of agency is not that the agent stands in the place of the principal,

but rather only that his action is effective for the principal,

if so, in matters that do not require intention but only action,

there is no reason, seemingly, that there should not be the law of agency for a minor³²?

And this is what our master, the Alter Rebbe, precisely expressed, saying that what a deaf-mute, mentally incompetent, and minor are not capable of agency is because they are not "like him, the principal" — therefore they are inherently excluded from the category of agency.

That is to say: even though regarding the action of agency there would be room to say that they are included in agency,

that their action will be effective for the principal,

nevertheless,

they are not within the category of agency,

for it is impossible that the name agent should apply to them,

since they are not "like him, the principal".

6.

The law of agency simply,

between a person and his fellow,

is drawn and descends from the matter of agency between a person and the Omnipresent,

between Israel and their Father in heaven:

Each and every one of the children of Israel is an agent of the Holy One, blessed be He,

An agent of a person — the superior — is like him³³,

to complete the purpose of creation through the service in the fulfillment of Torah and mitzvot.

And just as there are three aspects in the law of the aforementioned agency,

so too is it in the service of man,

that there are three levels in the manner of the surrender and nullification of the agent

(the man)

to the sender

(the Holy One, blessed be He)

:

There is a level in divine service,

that the serving man — in his feeling is a separate entity in all his matters,

except that he forces himself to fulfill His will, may He be blessed — in his actions he fulfills the agency of the Holy One, blessed be He;

And there is one who effects in himself inner nullification,

until his actions are attributed to the sender,

that is,

his deeds and his affairs

(in the matter of the mission)

they are surrendered and given to God until these his actions are not an independent existence and are only the power of the sender;

And beyond this is one who is completely nullified to the Holy One, blessed be He,

until his entire existence

(and consequently all his actions)

is only the existence of the sender.

However, all these levels are only in relation to the fulfillment of the mission,

but that each Jew has the ability to fulfill this mission

(in whatever manner),

is because the name "agent" applies to him; and the application of this name can only be upon the children of Israel

(and not upon the nations of the world, to distinguish)

because only regarding the children of Israel can it be said that they are "like the sender himself"³⁴

; and this is because the souls of Israel are "a portion of G-d from above"³⁵,

a portion of G-d<pg>118</pg>

from above literally³⁶,

and therefore only they have a relationship of "somewhat" regarding the Holy One, blessed be He,

the Sender,

to the extent that they are "like the sender himself".

[And this is also hinted in our Sages, of blessed memory, "Just as you are members of the covenant, etc."&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;

— that all of the Children of Israel are "members of the covenant" with the Holy One, blessed be He,

that this is the very essence of the existence of a Jewish person

(comparable in each and every one of Israel)

that he is included in "members of the covenant",

that is, the connection and the covenant between Israel and their Father in heaven].

And from all this we learn a practical directive in the service of God:

Also one whose service is still at the lowest level,

that he is an existence in himself and only his action is for the sake of God,

nevertheless,

since his very existence is "like the sender himself",

he has the ability — and therefore he must — to also bring into this service of his vitality from his very soul.

7.

And behold, although the words of Rav Ashi

(that there is agency for a non-Jew,

and as we explained the reason for the matter,

that he holds that the agent does not need to be "like the sender")

were rejected for halacha until they said "it is a breach" — nevertheless,

from this very thing that his words were also included in the Torah of truth,

it necessarily follows that they also have a place³⁸.

And it can be explained regarding this — in the service of man:

In the service of man to his Creator there is an elevation when the agent is an existence in itself

(separate from the sender)³⁹

— because then in his service there is revealed the quality of "his own kav,"

And our sages, of blessed memory, said⁴⁰

that according to the nature of his creation "a person prefers his own kav to nine kavim of his fellow,"

And as we see tangibly,

that when a person's feeling regarding a certain matter is that this is a matter that pertains to him, this arouses in him greater exertion,

and likewise he has in this more pleasure⁴¹

etc.

And so in spiritual service,

that when his service is in a manner that he does not feel his own existence and thinks only about the sender

[or even at the lower level of agency,

that he is considered as doing the agency but his doing is for the sake of the sender],

this can cause weakness in the matter of exertion.

And for example: when he exerted himself with all his strength,

and nevertheless the matter is not yet completed,

that then it is possible that it will arise in his thought,

that since he did all that was in his ability,

and the matter is of the "sender"

(the Holy One, blessed be He),

he has done his part,

and the rest — the sender will complete.

And therefore there is an advantage in the feeling that exists from the reality of the shliach,

that the matter of the shlichus was given over to him and this is his matter,

and consequently the matter pertains to him particularly.

[And known is the parable regarding this — from the difference between the dedication of a clerk or hired worker who does a matter faithfully,

to the dedication of the baal habayis in that same matter: the clerk,

since he does his work faithfully works with all his ability in his revealed powers,

and afterwards goes to his affairs in tranquility,

since in truth he did all that was incumbent upon him; but not so the baal habayis — who cannot sleep in tranquility,

even if he did all that he could,

&lt;pg&gt;119&lt;/pg&gt;

And consequently, hidden powers are revealed in him, etc.].

8.

However, the Gemara's conclusion is nevertheless "that of Rabbi Eliezer is an exception,"

for even though there is an advantage in feeling the existence of the agent,

this does not, heaven forbid, contradict the principle of "a person's agent is like himself,"

that the agent must be nullified to the sender.

Explanation of the matter:

This itself that there must be an existence of a messenger

(separate from the sender),

this itself is only because this is the will and pleasure of the sender — for specifically through this "nachas⁴²

spirit before I said and My will was done."

And from this it is understood,

that in the depth of the matter,

the existence of the agent

(is not an existence in itself,

but rather it is)

united with the existence of the sender to be one existence.

[And on the contrary — this itself is the novelty in the matter of agency,

that the agent must be an intelligent person on his own

(and not a minor&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;),

that the power and strength of the sender are given over to him,

and nevertheless all his power

(in the matter of agency)

comes from the power of the sender].

And it is found,

that there is no level and manner in the agency that the agent remains

(in truth)

an independent existence,

but rather this matter

(that the agent must be an independent existence)

is an additional detail in the matter of agency

(that a person's agent is like himself),

that in order for the will of the sender to be completed properly, the act of agency must be done through the existence of the agent

(until he feels himself as the owner of the matter).

And this is also the hint in the language of our sages

(the aforementioned)

"A person prefers his own kab over nine kabs of his fellow":

"Adam" and "his fellow" refer to Israel and the Holy One, blessed be He

("your fellow..

this is the Holy One, blessed be He"⁴⁴),

that through both of them together there are ten kavs,

which indicates perfection

(for ten is the complete number⁴⁵).

And in order to reach this perfection, there must be the connection of the "his kav" of the man and the "nine kavs of his fellow" — that is,

on the one hand, there must be the toil of the man,

through which he feels that this is his

("his kav"),

and together with this he must recognize that all his work

(including that there is a "his kav")

is for the sake of "his fellow",

and through the combination of both of them together⁴⁶

— there are all the ten kavs.

(From sichos of 20 Menachem Av 5745,

21 Menachem Av 5744)