English translation — בחוקותי ב

Talk pg. 174

A.

The Rambam writes at the end of the Laws of Temurah — which is the conclusion of the Book of Offerings¹

— and this is his language:

Even though all the statutes of the Torah are decrees,

as we explained at the end of Me'ilah

[and his language there: "And the ordinances are the commandments whose reason is revealed and the benefit of their performance in this world is known..

And the statutes are the commandments whose reason is not known..

Statutes I have enacted<sup>2</sup>

for you etc.'<sup>3</sup>],

it is fitting to contemplate them,

and whatever you can give a reason for, give a reason for it,

behold the early sages said<sup>4</sup>

that King Solomon understood most of the reasons of all<sup>5</sup>

the statutes of the Torah

(And afterwards he continues to explain a "reason" for the laws of Temurah,

as below section 4).

That is: in addition to what is implied from the words of the Rambam in the Laws of Me'ilah there, that essentially there are also reasons for the statutes<sup>6</sup>,

rather "their reason is not known"

[And this is in accordance with his method in his book Moreh Nevuchim⁷,

that he elaborated regarding the reasons for the commandments,

that "every⁸

command and prohibition..

is a product of wisdom and its purpose is a specific goal

(and not just "a product of absolute will",

"mere will not for the sake of a purpose")..

all the commandments..

have a reason, meaning that that command or prohibition has a beneficial purpose"⁹.

And so also wrote the Ramban in his commentary on the Torah¹⁰]

—

The Rambam innovates here an additional matter,

that there is an obligation upon a person,

"to contemplate" the statutes of the Torah,

"and whatever you can give a reason for, give a reason for it"¹¹.

2.

And it requires explanation:

It is explained in the Eight Chapters of the Rambam¹²,

that this which our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said¹³

"A person should not say 'I do not desire

(to commit a transgression)..

but rather 'I desire, but what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed upon me'",

this is only regarding statutes,

"that were it not for the Torah, they would not be evil<pg>175</pg>

“Chukim”,

and therefore the abstaining from them is only because of the command of the Torah,

“My Father in heaven decreed upon me”; but not so regarding mishpatim,

that “they are matters that are well-known among all people that they are evil”,

one must say “I do not desire”,

because “the important soul does not desire any of these evil things” — behold it is explicit here that there is a difference between chukim and mishpatim also in the manner of their fulfillment: regarding mishpatim one must say “I do not desire”,

that is, that the obligation of man to fulfill it is because of its rational reason,

whereas regarding chukim one must say “I desire”,

that is, that its fulfillment should be in a manner that it has no rational reason but only because of acceptance of the yoke of His kingship, blessed be He,

“My Father in heaven decreed upon me”¹⁴.

And so wrote the Ramban in his commentary on the Torah¹⁵

(for he holds like the Rambam that all the commandments of the Torah have “a reason¹⁵

correct and complete benefit” — as above in section 1),

that he compared the matter of chukim to “a decree of the king which he decrees in his kingdom without revealing their benefit to the people”

(even though the king himself “knows the need and the benefit in that commandment..

and does not tell it to the people except to his wise advisors”¹⁶),

and because of this “the people do not benefit from them..

and they accept them

(only)

out of fear of the kingdom”.

From this it is understood also regarding the chukim of the Torah,

that their fulfillment must be “out of fear of the kingdom”.

And based on this, one must question in the words of the Rambam here that "it is fitting to contemplate" the statutes of the Torah,

"And everything for which you can give a reason, give it a reason" — meaning that a person must strive to understand the benefit of the statutes

(And that the things that are prohibited by the statutes of the Torah are evil things etc.)

[And on the other hand,

if a person can give a reason for it — then his saying "I desire" is the opposite of the desired path,

since "the precious soul does not desire any of these evils"]?

3.

And one can explain the clarification in this — that there is a distinction between the reasons of the ordinances and the reasons of the statutes:

The reasons of "Mishpatim" are in human intellect,

because the matters are necessary according to human intellect from its own perspective,

and in the language of Chazal¹⁷

"If they had not been written, it would be fitting that they be written"; but not so the reasons of chukim,

their foundation

(only)

is in the intellect of the Torah

(His wisdom, may He be blessed,

which is above the intellect of created beings),

they are not reasons necessary in the simple intellect of man

(but after one explains the reason and benefit in this,

the human intellect "agrees" and accepts that there is benefit here etc.¹⁸).

And with this one can explain the precise language of the Rambam in the continuation of the halachah,

that after he explains the reason for the law of temurah

(and also the reason for adding a fifth in redemption of consecrated property)

— as below section 4 — he concludes: "And most of the laws of the Torah are nothing but counsels from afar from the Great Counselor to perfect the character traits and to straighten all deeds",

one can say,

that the reason the Rambam used this expression,

"counsels from afar from the Great Counselor",

is not because he adopted the language of the verse¹⁹

<pg>176</pg>

For the beauty of the expression,

but rather this is the definition of the matter of the "reasons" in this law²⁰,

that the "reasons" that you can give for the statutes are "counsels" that come "from afar",

"from the great one of counsel".

That is: the reasons of the statutes are not "counsels"

(of intellect)

of man,

that man's intellect

(of itself)

advises man to behave thus

(for they are not things compelled by the intellect itself),

but rather this is a "counsel" of the Holy One, blessed be He²¹,

"from the great one of counsel"

(the "distant" from man).

And therefore caution is required,

that if "he finds no reason for it and knows no cause for it — for he has not yet reached it from afar — let it not be light in his eyes and let him not break through to ascend to Hashem, etc."²².

And therefore our Sages taught that a person must say

(in the statutes)

"I desire it, and what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed upon me" — even though "you can give it a reason" — because human intellect on its own

(without the counsel from afar)

does not see the evil of the forbidden things,

and the fulfillment of the statutes — through acceptance of the decree of the Omnipresent

("My Father in heaven has decreed upon me"),

rather the possibility was given to contemplate them and "give them a reason."

4.

Based on this, it is also well understood,

why the Rambam wrote this matter regarding the statutes of temurah

(and not regarding other statutes that preceded it)²³

— because in temurah it is emphasized,

that the reason you can give it is only a counsel "from afar, from the Great Counselor."

And the Rambam said

(regarding the reason for the law of temurah)

: It seems to me that this that the verse said²⁴

It and its substitute shall be holy,

like the matter that it said²⁵

And if the one who dedicates redeems his house and adds a fifth of the silver of your valuation upon it,

The Torah went to the end of man's thought and the impulse of his evil inclination,

that the nature of a person inclines to increase his possessions and to spare his money,

And even though he vowed and dedicated, perhaps he retracted and regretted and will redeem for less than its value,

The Torah said if he redeems for himself he shall add a fifth.

And likewise if he dedicated an animal with sanctity of the body, perhaps he will retract, and since he cannot redeem it, he will exchange it for a lesser one,

And if you give him permission to exchange the bad for the good,

he will exchange the good for the bad and say it is good.

And superficially,

this reason is not fully understood: since "they redeem consecrated items only with three experts"²⁶,

and furthermore,

rather that "they announce²⁷

about them before all who come to redeem,

one said they are mine for ten sela,

and another said for twenty etc. in the ho-<pg>177</pg>

There²⁸

— how could it enter his mind that it would be within his ability to redeem "for less than its value",

behold "all who come to redeem" will offer a larger sum,

and all the more so and certainly that the "three experts" will not allow redemption for less than its value²⁹?

And likewise it is not understood — the concern that "if you give him permission to exchange the bad for the good,

he will exchange the good for the bad and say it is good" — for after they see that he consecrated his money

(by this that he overcame his inclination and his nature to increase his possessions³⁰),

nevertheless they fear not only that perhaps he will retract,

but that he will turn from one extreme to the other,

until he will lie and "exchange the good for the bad and say it is good"!

And the explanation of this — that these reasons are "counsels from afar from the Great of Counsel": from the perspective of the simple intellect of man, this is not a thing that is acceptable,

but "the Torah descended to the end of man's thought etc.",

that is,

that the Holy One, blessed be He, who created man and the qualities of his soul,

knows the nature of man until its "end",

that this nature "to increase his acquisition and to spare his money" has the power to incline man until he will strive to redeem for less than its value,

and even that it is possible that he will turn from one extreme to the other,

and instead of his previous desire to dedicate his money to God,

he will conduct himself in an opposite manner,

until "he exchanges the good for the bad and says it is good".

And only the Holy One, blessed be He, the Creator of man, can give these "counsels"³¹.

5.

But still the matter is not entirely settled:

All of the above only explains that even after giving a reason for the chukim,

their observance depends on "fear of the kingdom" and acceptance of the yoke of His kingship

(for the reasons that "you can give" for the chukim are not reasons compelled by human intellect,

but rather "counsels from afar from the Great of Counsel")

— but still explanation is needed: after all, contemplation of the reasons for the chukim is the opposite of the matter of acceptance of the yoke,

as is simple to understand,

that when a person strives and yearns to find a reason and benefit in the commandment,

this is a contradiction to the yearning to accept the yoke of the commandment only because thus the Holy One, blessed be He, decreed.

Also it is not well resolved from our Sages, of blessed memory, the aforementioned that regarding statutes a person must say "I desire" — for apparently,

since ultimately it is within the capacity of human intellect to understand that there is benefit in the matter of the statutes

(and as the Rambam explained in his book Moreh Nevuchim the benefit in many statutes)

— even though intellect by itself does not compel these matters — therefore "the precious soul" must say

(at least after the contemplation of the reasons for the statutes)

"I do not desire"?

6.

And this will be understood by prefacing the words of the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim⁷,

that after he explains that "all the commandments..

have a reason..

a beneficial purpose..<pg>178</pg>

“Lo” — continues,

that all this is only regarding the generality³²

of the commandment,

that “the general principle⁸

of the commandments has a definite reason,

and because of a specific benefit He commanded them,

but their details are those about which it is said that they are for the plain sense of the command³³..

It is impossible to give any reason at all” for the details of the commandments,

that is,

that the details of the commandments are in the category of “chok”,

i.e., a decree without reason³⁴.

And it follows,

that according to the view of the Rambam, in all commandments — even mishpatim — there is an aspect of actual chok,

that “it is impossible to give

(to it)

any reason at all”,

from which it is understood all the more so and a fortiori regarding chukim,

that this that the Rambam wrote that it is possible to give them a reason

(now, in addition to this that the reason is “counsels from afar from the Great of Counsel”),

there are in them details that “it is impossible to give

(to them)

any reason at all”³⁵.

<pg>179</pg>

And the distinction between mishpatim and chukim is: In mishpatim, the general principle of the commandment is a matter that human reason compels,

and this aspect of the commandment overpowers and decides regarding the details of the commandment that have no reason; in contrast, in chukim,

in them the part of the commandment that has no reason overpowers

(whether because the general principle of the commandment has no known reason,

or because it has many details that have no reason&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;)

over the part of the commandment for which one can give a reason

(and in particular, even the reason that one can give is only "counsels from afar from the Great of Counsel,"

as above).

And based on this, it is understood,

that in chukim there are two matters: acceptance of the yoke of His kingship and contemplation of the reasons,

and they do not contradict each other — because they are in different parts of the commandment: in chukim there is that which "it is impossible to give a reason at all"

(and in chukim — this part is the one that overpowers and decides)

— and the fulfillment of the commandment is through fear of the kingship,

acceptance of the yoke of His kingship

[and in them a person must say "I desire it, and what can I do? My Father in heaven has decreed upon me"&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;]

; and from the aspect of the commandment that "you can give a reason for it" — contemplation of the reason of the commandment

(even though its main part has no reason)&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;.

7.

And behold,

according to all the above it is found,

that according to the Rambam's view there is "inclusion" in the commandments: in mishpatim there is a matter of "chok"

(that it is impossible to give a reason at all),

and this is the details of the commandment; and on the other hand,

in chukim there is reason and benefit

(and so it is in all the chukim,

as the precise language of the Rambam regarding King Solomon,

that "he understood most of the reasons of all the chukim of the Torah").

And the reason for the matter — one must say:

It is the nature of man that Hashem implanted in him that a commandment that has a reason

(ordinances)

— its fulfillment is with more vitality and delight³⁹,

and a commandment that has no reason

(statutes)

— its fulfillment is with more acceptance of the yoke,

as a statute and decree of the King.

And the desired purpose is — that both virtues be in all the commandments,

that also the fulfillment of the statutes should be with vitality and delight

(like ordinances),

and therefore also in statutes there is a matter of "reason"; and on the other hand,

also the commandments of ordinances must be fulfilled

(not only because of the intellectual reason,

but)

because of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He,

"Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us",

like statutes — and for this there is no reason for the details of the commandments

(of ordinances),

that also the fulfillment of ordinances is connected with acceptance of the yoke of His kingship and fulfillment of His decree of the Holy One, blessed be He.

<pg>180</pg>

And deeper:

By this that a reason is given also for the chukim,

this brings about,

that a person will fulfill these mitzvos with vitality and delight,

not only because of this part of the mitzvah that "you can give it a reason",

but also because of the entirety of the mitzvah,

namely that his acceptance of the yoke is with vitality and delight,

the fulfillment of the chok is not only through his power of action,

that compels it to do the will of the Holy One blessed be He,

but rather all the powers of his soul "participate" in the doing of the mitzvah,

"All my bones shall say" fulfills His will, may He be blessed⁴⁰

;

And likewise on the other side in Mishpatim — that this that the details of the commandment have no reason

(and they are only a statute and a command of God,

without reason)

also affects the intellectual part of the commandment,

that a person will recognize,

that also this part of the commandment that he understands and grasps,

"this is not..

the purpose of the reason and its limit"&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;,

for in truth they are

(like statutes)

"counsels from afar from the Great of Counsel"&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;,

that the true wisdom in the commandments of God is indeed His wisdom, blessed be He,

which is above the intellect of created beings,

and as the Rambam wrote&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;

that "there is no power in man to grasp and find the knowledge of the Creator."

But in the future to come, also the reasons of Torah will be revealed,

as Rashi explains on the verse&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;

"Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth" — "they are assured from Him to appear upon them further to explain to them the secret of its reasons and the hidden mystery of its secrets" — in the true and complete redemption through our righteous Messiah,

who will teach Torah to the entire people&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;,

and then "Israel will be&lt;sup&gt;46&lt;/sup&gt;

great sages and will know hidden things and will grasp the knowledge of their Creator according to the capacity of man, as it is said&lt;sup&gt;47&lt;/sup&gt;

for the earth will be filled with knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea."

(From the talk of Shabbos Parshas Re'eh 5747)