English translation — שופטים ג

A.

In the Laws of Sanhedrin¹

the Rambam rules: A Sanhedrin that all of them opened in capital cases at the beginning and all of them said guilty, behold this one is exempt, until there are among them some who acquit, who will turn in his merit and the condemners will increase, and afterward he is executed.

The source of the words of the Rambam is the Gemara in Sanhedrin²

and its language: A Sanhedrin that all of them saw [him] as liable, they acquit him. What is the reason? Since it is learned [as a tradition] the adjournment of the verdict to do for him merit, and these no longer see [merit] for him³.

That which the Rambam says "that they all opened in capital cases first and said all are liable" and changes from the language of the Gemara "that they all saw for conviction" — this is simply in order to explain more

(as is the way of later authorities in general)⁴,

that that which the Gemara says in brief "saw all for conviction" means "they all opened...

first and said all are liable",

namely that immediately at the beginning of the trial⁵

there was among the judges no reasoning for acquittal,

but immediately at the beginning "they said all are liable"⁶.

It is also understood why the Rambam omits the reason of the matter that stands in the Gemara "what is the reason? Since they learned etc. and these further

They did not see him — because it is not the way of the Rambam to bring in his composition the reasons of the laws⁷.

One must, however, understand the continuation of the words of the Rambam — "this one is exempt until there are some advocates who will turn in his merit and the condemners will increase and afterwards he will be killed":

a)

Since the halacha is an introduction and foundation to the general content of this chapter — the definition of what constitutes a majority for acquittal and a majority for conviction — the Rambam should seemingly have begun with the main point — the conclusion of the halacha,

that the obligation in capital cases is

(specifically)

when "there were among them some who acquit, so that they turn the verdict in his favor and the condemners increase, etc.,"

and afterwards conclude "but a Sanhedrin that all of them opened in capital cases initially and all of them said 'guilty,' behold this one is exempt."

Since the Rambam states here the side of exemption when "all of them said 'guilty'" and the side of obligation when "there were among them some who acquit, so that they turn the verdict in his favor and the condemners increase" — the Rambam should have stated and concluded

(not "and afterwards he shall be executed",

but)

"and afterwards he shall be liable"⁸

(and the like)

— corresponding

(opposite)

to "behold this one is exempt."

b)

B.

One will understand this with an introduction of the explanation in the reason of the Gemara "since they are learned in the law of delaying judgment to do for him merit and these are no longer fit for him,"

which seemingly one can learn it in two ways:

A)

The main thing is the delaying of judgment

(and the "to do for him merit" is only the reason and rationale why it must be delaying of judgment).

D.

E.

The thing that "they acquit him" is

Therefore, if "they all saw him as guilty" there is no possibility to fulfill one of the conditions that exist in the case of "they did not find merit for him"⁹

— the condition "

(requires)

delaying of judgment".

b)

The reason and cause of the exemption is that "these are no longer fit for him",

and "delaying of judgment" is only a matter that leads to the cause.

4.

5.

The fact that "they acquit him" is not because in this case the court cannot fulfill one of the conditions,

but because "they all saw [grounds] for conviction

(is)

then they no longer see for him

(merit)

(and consequently there is lacking in this the "and the congregation shall judge and the congregation shall deliver"¹⁰

- a congregation that delivers¹¹),

and such a court that cannot see a merit is not in the category to be able to convict — and therefore "they acquit him".

In another style: according to the first manner, this is a "deficiency" that pertains to the verdict of the Sanhedrin,

there cannot be a proper court verdict

(because the fulfillment of the condition of adjournment of the trial is lacking)¹²

: according to the second manner, this is a deficiency in the person who judges — the Sanhedrin

In the manner of "Sanhedrin who saw someone who killed a soul" and if they cannot become

(according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva)

judges "the Merciful One said

And the congregation shall judge and the congregation shall save, and since they saw that he killed a soul they cannot find merit for him"¹³,

is not the meaning that their ruling is not correct,

rather they are not called a Sanhedrin regarding the person who "saw..

who killed a soul"¹⁴].

3.

From the Gemara there is room to prove both in the first manner,

and in the second manner:

A proof for the first manner can be deduced from that which the Gemara brings explicitly only the law "since it is learned [as a tradition] the postponement of judgment",

and not the source of this law that one is obligated to seek a merit for the defendant¹⁵,

and especially that the Gemara does not state the reason

(in the manner of the aforementioned Gemara "Sanhedrin who saw one who killed")

"for the Merciful One said 'and the congregation shall judge and the congregation shall rescue'" — it implies from this,

that here it primarily pertains to what one cannot fulfill the law of postponement of judgment.

But on the other hand — from that which the Gemara is not uncertain with saying only the law because it is learned halanat din,

and adds the reason "to do for him merit" and leads out "and they no longer see for him" — it implies that the main deficiency is in the "and they",

that which "not

see for him

(merit)

like the second manner.

Moreover: specifically according to the second way is precise the language of the Gemara "Sanhedrin who saw all for liability",

namely,

that the deficiency here is that their proof is only for liability and therefore they cannot see his merit

(in the manner of the above in "Sanhedrin who saw one who killed a person")].

And based on this one can say that one can also have a practical difference: according to the first way,

that it is a deficiency in the ruling of the court,

it must follow that if the court finds afterwards a rationale for acquittal,

there is room to say that they can again¹⁸

judge the defendant¹⁹

But not according to the second manner,

since they are not in the category of Sanhedrin

(regarding that person)

because of that which "they all saw [him] as guilty",

it is logical that they can no longer judge that defendant — even if they later find a merit for him.

4.

From the words of the Rambam it is implied that he does not learn like the two aforementioned manners:

Even though it is not his way to bring the reasons of the laws,

but if the Rambam would have learned that the deficiency is because the fulfillment of the condition of delaying the judgment is lacking

(in the first manner)

it is plausible that the Rambam would have mentioned it.

Because that

This is not merely a reason,

but

(also)

a condition²⁰.

And from the continuation of the words of the Rambam it is evident that the deficiency is not

(like the second manner mentioned above)

in that they do not have the ability to see a merit

(since "they all see [him] as guilty"<sup>21</sup>),

but in that what is lacking is the "

(some of those who acquit who turned [him] to his merit" in actuality.

That is: from the language of the Rambam "behold this one is exempt until there are etc. and afterwards he is killed" — it implies,

that this is not a deficiency in the person who decides,

in the Sanhedrin,

but in the execution of the ruling in actuality in the subject -

And therefore

(a)

the Rambam does not say "they exempt him"

(which would have emphasized that the exemption is connected to the court and their ruling),

but rather "behold this one is exempt",

which speaks about the defendant,

that he is exempt from death; and

(b)

for this reason the Rambam continues "until there are etc. and afterwards he will be killed",

that through "some who acquit etc." creates the possibility

(not upon the liability — "and afterwards he will be liable" / but rather)

to carry out the actual — "and afterwards he will be killed"*²¹.

5.

And to explain this we must preface:

There are commentators<sup>22</sup>

who explain the reason for the law "Sanhedrin that began with him",

that because "they all began ..

and they all said 'guilty'" is a proof of a deficiency in the Sanhedrin,

that their approach to this law was not correct

(because "they revealed their opinion..

they all desire to put him to death"<sup>23</sup>

; or because<sup>24</sup>

for every defendant one can find some side of merit — and since all of them did not find it,

it is a proof that they are not expert in laws,

or that they decided hastily and did not deliberate properly in this law,

and so forth,

in several explanations of the deficiency in this Sanhedrin).

Of course, however, it is a great difficulty to say so regarding a court in general,

and all the more so regarding the Great Sanhedrin

as explained in Rambam according to several versions²⁵.

And so it is also understood*²⁵

from the content of the law

(Because if here it is discussing a small Sanhedrin of twenty-three, why "they acquit him"?

They should have judged him in another court²⁶

until

(if needed)

over-

giving the law and judgment to the Great Sanhedrin)],

A great difficulty because even in a small Sanhedrin "they do not appoint...

except men wise and understanding, outstanding in Torah wisdom, possessing abundant knowledge, etc."²⁷.

How is it possible that among all of them there should be no proper approach to this judgment, etc.²⁸?

And especially when from the words of the Rambam it is proven,

as above,

that this is not at all a "deficiency" in the Sanhedrin or in their ruling,

but only in relation to that person being judged.

6.

And it can be said the explanation in this:

It is known that the law of punishments of Beit Din,

death, lashes, etc.,

their essence is for the sake of atonement.

As is explained regarding lashes²⁹

"And your brother will be degraded before your eyes, when he is lashed he is your brother,"

similarly it stands³⁰

the punishment of death comes,

then through this the punished one comes to life of the World to Come

In practice, the Rambam rules that he

that "All those liable for court-imposed death penalties and those liable for lashes do not achieve atonement through their death or their lashes until they repent and confess"

From which it is understood that the purpose of court-imposed death or lashes is to atone for the person,

But the atonement is conditional on "that he repent and confess".

And based on this, it stands to reason,

that in a case where court-imposed death will

(can)

not bring about atonement, there is no place to carry out the death.

And like the Kesef Mishneh

explains the ruling of the Rambam

regarding conspiring witnesses,

that "If the one against whom they testified was executed and afterward they were found to be conspirators, they are not executed by law, as it is stated

'as he conspired to do to his brother' and he has not yet done, etc. But if the one against whom they testified was lashed, they are lashed" — and he explains the reason for the distinction in this

"We do not say 'when he plotted but not when he did' except where they killed on their testimony, because their punishment is too great to bear, it is not fitting to give them court-imposed death that would atone for them, but rather it is fitting to leave them to be judged after death with terrible punishments, an example of the matter³⁶

One who gives all his seed to Molech is exempt³⁷

which is not the case regarding those lashed on their testimony."

And similarly in our case: since

(They all opened etc. and said all—)

a valid court,

That "Elokim stands in the congregation of G-d"<sup>38</sup>,

and certainly the Great Sanhedrin in the Chamber of Hewn Stone,

they all immediately said guilty,

and there is not even a single one who should argue in his merit — is a proof that the defendant is "his iniquity is too great to bear" — he finds himself in the lowest state and condition,

until the punishment of death by the court is unable to atone for him and therefore "they acquit him".

This, however, is not entirely sufficient to explain the wording of the Rambam "behold this one is exempt until etc. and afterwards he will be killed",

from which it is implied that the verdict of the Sanhedrin is a verdict only that the defendant "behold he is exempt",

one cannot carry out on the defendant

(as above section 4)

- but according to the above, the Sanhedrin that "they all opened..

and they all said guilty" says that regarding this man the obligation is not applicable

(punishment)

as atonement,

that is,

that their verdict "guilty" is not a verdict

(as the language of the Gemara),

which emphasizes,

that in this case the court cannot issue a verdict,

because "his iniquity is too great to bear"].

7.

And one may say about this an additional explanation:

Every Jew,

in whatever situation and condition he may be,

is like the ruling of the Rambam³⁹,

even a Jew,

whom the court must coerce to give a get to his wife,

is "he wants to be of Israel and he wants to perform all the commandments and to distance himself from the transgressions."

And even regarding Achan,

who was at the ultimate descent,

our Sages say⁴⁰

"Even though he sinned, he is [still called] 'Israel'."

The difference is only on how much the "he wants to fulfill all the commandments",

The good of a Jew is: in his revealing it openly or in concealment: there are Jews by whom the good is in the ultimate revelation,

and there are Jews by whom it is not so much in revelation,

until there are such whose good is in complete concealment,

but a part of the concealed good eventually comes to some revelation — because the good in a Jew is not an additional thing⁴¹

upon his essence

(like the matters

(of evil)

which come⁴¹

from the fact that "his evil inclination overpowered him"⁴²),

but it is the essence and the truth of his existence.

Based on this it is understood,

that every Jew,

whoever he may be,

even at the time that he transgresses a sin for which one incurs death by the court,

one must find a merit for him,

because his true will,

his true existence is the good that is in him⁴³.

But when the Sanhedrin "opened all with capital cases first and said all are liable",

it shows that the good among them became so concealed,

that even the Great Sanhedrin who are "wise and understanding, exceptional etc." —

d.

they are "understanding" to infer one thing from another⁴⁴

and with exceptional ability,

to understand and grasp what is hidden and not revealed — even all of them cannot find any merit for him

- regarding such a one they say "he is exempt": since with him there is certainly good,

only the court cannot "find" it for him because he is in the utmost concealment - therefore for him the

(the final verdict and consequently not the)

verdict of the court cannot be carried out.

There is no deficiency in the court or in their approach to the ruling — because the Torah said, "A judge has only what his eyes see"<sup>45</sup>,

and everything that the Great Sanhedrin, "which will be in those days"<sup>46</sup>

must and can see,

they saw;

But since the verdict of the Torah of truth is that he desires to fulfill all the commandments,

that there is good in him

(which was not revealed),

the court's verdict cannot apply to him — "until there are some of his advocates who will turn [the verdict] etc."

And it can be said further the matter — that through this itself is also revealed the good that was previously in the ultimate concealment and hiddenness,

and since that it becomes revealed, the verdict of the court can apply to him — and "they turn [the merit] in his favor etc."

In greater depth: When can the verdict of the court "he shall be put to death" be carried out upon this Jew — specifically after that "there are some who acquit, that they turn [the merit] in his favor",

because as discussed earlier

(from the Kesef Mishneh)

is the content and purpose of the punishments of the court — atonement of the person.

And when can a punishment bring about an atonement,

specifically when this

touches

(and reveals)

the good within him.

And therefore,

when all see only obligation,

which means that the good within him is in the ultimate concealment and hiding,

the punishment can

("he shall be killed")

not effect an atonement for the Jews;

Specifically after one turns [the judgment] in his merit,

which itself brings out the good within him⁴,

then the punishment does its action — that the Jew receives his atonement and merits the World to Come.

8.

From this we derive a lesson in the greatness of their virtue and merit of Israel:

Even when it speaks about such a Jew who finds himself in the lowliest state to such an extent,

that even the Sanhedrin, about whom the Torah says that their purpose is "and the congregation shall save" — to seek and find a rescue and merit for every Jew,

and yet even they see upon him only liability,

they see no merit upon him — nevertheless, the Torah of Truth rules a clear verdict,

that this is a reality that cannot be,

also by this Jew there is the will to fulfill all the commandments; and consequently, this itself brings that the Sanhedrin are advocates for this Jew and through this⁴⁷

one reveals the will that is in him,

the good that is in him.

All the more so when it speaks about Jews in our generation, who although they are in a state of "I am asleep"<sup>48</sup>,

nevertheless "my heart is awake" to the Holy One blessed be He and to His Torah and to His commandments<sup>49</sup>,

and when the Jewish heart is,

as the true Torah law rules,

awake — it eventually becomes awakened and comes to be revealed;

And especially finding ourselves now in the time of the month of Elul when the King

(our Teacher Moses, the Holy One blessed be He)

is found "in the field",

"Then<sup>50</sup>

are permitted

(and able<sup>51</sup>)

anyone who wishes to go out to greet His face

(in the field)

and He receives them all with a pleasant countenance and shows a smiling face to all" —

One must go out and effect upon every Jew, in whatever situation he may be,

that there should be revealed in him the "will" to receive the face of the King in the field.

And this effect is through this very thing: while one is pleading and speaking in the merit of a Jew,

that in him,

in him there is the actual part of G-d from above,

the divine spark,

until that — in the language of the Rambam: "He wants to be of Israel and he wants to perform all the commandments and to distance himself from transgressions",

and that this is his true reality — through this very thing one reveals even more the good that is in him,

And one effects upon him that he should go out - "to go out" - from his place

("Bamidbar"⁵²)

In order to receive the face of the king "in the field",

Which through this becomes revealed,

In addition to "a portion" of his good

("a portion who merit that they become meritorious through him"),

It becomes revealed his good in abundant measure,

Until that the abundance of good and merit overcomes the opposite side in him and overcomes that which he is "balanced" and brings him "salvation and rescue"⁵³

And afterwards goes out acquitted in judgment,

Every Jew is aroused with a repentance properly and in completeness,

and consequently he has an atonement complete as this is a complete soul in a complete body,

soul in body below

From ten handbreadths⁵⁴,

And each and every one is written and sealed immediately⁵⁵

in the book of completely righteous ones for a good and sweet year in the good that is seen and revealed in physicality and spirituality together.

<b>And the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Tisa 5745)</b>