English translation — מטות א

1.

In the laws of vows¹

the Rambam brings

(from the Mishnah²)

the law regarding the vows of a minor,

and these are his words:

A minor boy twelve years and one day old and a minor girl eleven years and one day old who swore or vowed ..

we examine them and ask them if they know in whose name they vowed ..

their vows are valid ..

And if they do not know, their vows and their words are nothing.

And they require examination the entire year, that is the year of twelve for the girl and the year of thirteen for the boy

(i.e.

e.³

a girl — from the beginning of the year of twelve

(eleven years and one day old)

until she becomes twelve years and one day old; and a boy — from the beginning of the year of thirteen

(twelve years and one day old)

until he becomes thirteen years and one day old).

(And in the halacha after this, he continues:)

How so? If they vowed ..

At the beginning of this year, and they examined them and they were found to know, and their vow was fulfilled, and they vowed another vow even at the end of this year, they require examination, and afterwards it will be fulfilled.

And we do not say: Since they were found to know at the beginning of the year, they do not require examination; rather, they examine them all this entire year.

The Kaftor VaFerach asks⁴

: "I do not know where he gets this, that in the Gemara⁵

we say thus: ..

They examine all twelve months, why do I need? Lest you say ..

Where I examined her for thirty

(days)

and she did not know how to distinguish, I might say: No further examination is needed; it teaches us.

And it implies that the reason is because she did not know how to distinguish,

but if she knew how to distinguish, no further examination is needed."

And he concludes: And perhaps our Rebbe would read<sup>6</sup>

where we examined him and he knows to distinguish, say then do not examine further, it teaches us.

Also the Radbaz says "And it seems that our Rebbe's reading is 'and he knows to distinguish etc.'",

and he adds: "And this reading is correct, for according to the reading of the books there is a difficulty<sup>7</sup>

Because just because he did not know to distinguish at the beginning of the year, he would not know to distinguish at the end of the year, and what does the Tanna teach us that he says we examine all the year,

and according to our Rebbe's reading it teaches us much."

(So even though "they were found knowing at the beginning of the year" we do not place him on the presumption that he is "knowing to distinguish",

rather he still needs an examination "even at the end of this year"<sup>8</sup>).

But in the commentary on the Mishnah<sup>9</sup>

the Rambam writes in the commentary: "They are examined every twelve ...

it arose in our thought ...

If they ask them for thirty days and find that they do not understand, their investigation is removed; he said: 'The matter is not so.' — d.

e.

So also by the Rambam the version in the Gemara was "and she did not know how to distinguish"<sup>10</sup>.

b.

In the Meiri<sup>2</sup>

it stands: "that they examine throughout the year, meaning that even if we examined at its beginning ...

and they did not know, and afterwards they vowed, we do not say: They were already examined and they do not know,

perhaps they learned and knew,

and likewise the opposite: even if they were found to know at the beginning of the year and they knew and their vow was fulfilled, and afterwards they vowed, we do not confirm them except after examination."

And based on this one can say that the Rambam teaches,

that although the reading in the Gemara is

(as we have before us)

"We examined them ...

where we examined them and they did not know how to distinguish" — but the [point] is that

(of the obligation of examination)

also "on the contrary",

that "even if they were found to know at the beginning of the year and knew and their vow was fulfilled and afterwards they vowed, we do not admonish them except after examination."

And that the Rambam brings only the case of "even if they were found to know" — one can explain,

because in this there is a greater novelty than in the law that "even if we examined them ...

and they did not know" requires an examination

(as above from the Radbaz).

But the answer is seemingly not smooth,

d'mah nafshach: if in this law there is indeed a greater novelty — why does the Gemara not say it?

From this, that the Gemara does not say the novelty is understood

(as above from the Kesef Mishneh),

that "if she knows how to distinguish

(at the beginning of the year)

no need for further examination"

(because one places him on the presumption that "she knows how to distinguish").

3.

In recent years, the edition

of the commentary on the Mishnah of the Rambam was printed,

and there it indeed states "and it arose in our mind that according to the one who says thus, if we were asked..

and found them understanding, we would cease to examine them" — i.e.

i.e.

that the Rambam

(in his last Mishnah)

indeed reads in the Gemara "and she knows how to distinguish"

(and according to the answer of the Kesef Mishneh and the Radbaz).

It remains, however, not understood: from this itself, that in the "First Edition" the Rambam accepted the version "ולא ידעה להפלות"

(and the edition of the Commentary on the Mishnah was published throughout the Jewish diaspora over all the generations)

— it is understood,

that according to the Rambam's system, this too has a place

(and he accepts one of the several answers in the commentaries<sup>12</sup>

on the assumption "היכא דבדקנא ..

ולא ידעה להפלות אימא תו לא ליבדוק״)

— one must find a rationale why the Rambam regretted and accepted specifically the non-widespread version "וידעה להפלות"?

The wonder is even greater: according to the Rambam's version

(in the Second Edition)

"וידעה להפלות" will result in a wondrous novelty — that although in the entire Torah one relies on a chazakah,

with vows it is different,

and even though they already examined him and he became established as one who knows how to distinguish,

he requires a new examination,

perhaps he changed<sup>13</sup>

Further: from the language of the Rambam "they require examination and afterwards it will be fulfilled" it implies,

that until one examines him a second time, his vow is not a vow at all,

even not from doubt¹⁴

(and as it is even more explicit in the language of the Tur¹⁵

"it is not a vow until they examine them another time")

— although he has already become established as one "who knows how to distinguish"!

— one must certainly find a very strong reason why the Rambam regretted his first edition,

and accepts the uncommon version and the novelty that in our case one is not at all reliant on the presumption

(even not as a doubt).

One will understand this in the following also a difference between the two editions of the Commentary on the Mishnah — regarding the time of "the season of

vows"

i.e.

the law regarding vows that one does not need an adult,

but even a "wondrous one close to majority"

his vow is valid]

In the common commentary on the Mishnah

(first edition)

it says: "We examine all the year of twelve for a female and thirteen for a male, and as long as we find that they know their vows, they are valid, even though they are minors, and this is the age of vows hinted at everywhere

place".

4.

"Age of vows" begins in the year before majority —

(for a female when she becomes eleven years and one day old,

and for a male — twelve years and one day old),

and their vows are examined whether "they know for Whose sake they vowed"

and other early authorities].

Not so in his later edition, the Rambam repeats and says: "And after twelve for a female and thirteen for a male, they are not asked and their vows stand, even though they are minors

(And on that he concludes)

And this is the age of vows etc."

D.

D.

E.

E.

"The age of vows" begins

(For a female)

When she becomes a bat twelve years and one day

(And for a male — a son of thirteen years and one day)

Even if she has not brought two hairs,

And they do not need an examination because their vows stand "even if they said 'we do not know'"²⁰

the BaHaG²¹].

that "a boy thirteen years and one day old and a girl twelve years and one day old, even if they said 'we do not know for whose sake we vowed..

their words stand..

and their vows are vows, even if they have not brought two hairs, and this is the age of vows mentioned everywhere"

(And the law of "a minor twelve years old etc. if they know for whose sake they vowed..

their vows stand"

(above section 1)

is a separate law,

as below section 7)].

And based on this, one can say,

that the difference between the two editions

(above section 3)

regarding the reading in the Gemara — "and she did not know how to distinguish" or "and she knew how to distinguish" — depends on the two aforementioned opinions regarding "the age of vows."

5.

The point of the explanation in this:

According to the opinion of the Rambam, the category of "chazakah" is not at all applicable in relation to the knowledge of a minor.

Because the meaning of "chazakah" is — that the thing is strong and fixed and so it will certainly remain; but regarding a minor,

no strength in the sense of intellect is applicable,

because he does not have

(true)

knowledge,

which one of the characteristics of

(a bar)

knowledge is — that with him there is an intellectual decision and conclusion in a manner that is unchangeable.

And as one sees tangibly that a minor is changeable,

a strong decision is not applicable and one can easily overturn²³

the decision of a minor.

and that a minor less than thirteen years,

even if he is a "sharp and possessor of comprehension and grasp and expert in the laws of positive commandments and negative commandments very well",

he is not punished if he transgressed a commandment,

because he lacks daat (intellect)].

Therefore the Rambam rules "and we do not say since they were found knowing at the beginning of the year they do not need examination, but they examine them all this entire year" — because this is a simple reasoning

(in which there is no dispute)

that in this one cannot rely on a chazakah<sup>25</sup>.

And the difference between the two versions in the Gemara — "and she does not know to distinguish" or "and she knows to distinguish" — is:

The version in the Gemara "Said the Merciful One ...

we examined her and she does not know to distinguish, say she should no longer be examined",

is according to the view that "the season of vows" means "the twelfth year for a minor female and the thirteenth year for a minor male"

(and they know for Whose name they vow)

— because according to that view there is a greater novelty in this law,

than in the aforementioned law

(in the Rambam)

"we examine them all the year" even though "they were found to know at the beginning of the year"

(as below paragraph 8)

Not so according to the view that "the season of vows" means "after twelve for a female and thirteen for a male"

(as per the conclusion of the Rambam),

there is no place for the supposition that if "we examined her ...

and she did not know how to distinguish" one should not need to examine again — therefore the Rambam must accept the uncommon version "it could be said ...

that we examined her ...

and she knew how to distinguish"

(as below there).

6.

The reasoning in this:

The definition of vows in "the twelfth year for a minor female and the thirteenth year for a minor male" — that "if they know for Whose sake they vowed..

their vows are valid" — can be learned in two ways²⁶

A)

The novelty consists in the age,

that for vows one need not wait until the age of majority

(thirteen years and one day)

But even a son of twelve years and one day can make a vow; and that which one must examine "if they know in whose name they vow,"

is only to remove a preventing thing<sup>27</sup>

: because the .

law is that "if they do not know, their vows and their words are nothing,"

and he is still a minor,

one must be certain that he does not lack knowledge.

b)

The matter is in the aspect of daas — regarding vows a lesser daas is sufficient to make a vow; and that which one needs to be a son of twelve years and one day is only a sign,

because specifically at this age sufficient daas for the matter of the vow is possible

(but before that — even the weak daas is also not present).

7.

And it can be said that in this there is a difference between the two opinions mentioned above regarding "the season of vows":

The two manners mentioned above have a place only according to the opinion that "the twelfth year for a minor female and the thirteenth year for a minor male" is "the season of vows",

and this is the novel idea

(the Torah)

of "one near to majority who is extraordinary"

: the detail of "מופלא"

(that he is יודע להפלות)

; or the detail of "סמוך לאיש"

(that he is in this year סמוך לזמן הגדלות)]

משא״ב according to the view that "עונת נדרים" is "a boy of thirteen years and one day etc. a girl of twelve years and one day..

ואע״פ that they have not brought two hairs" — it is plausible,

that the entire definition of the vow before the year of majority — "the twelfth year for a minor girl and the thirteenth year for a minor boy" — consists

(not in years,

but)

only in that "they know for Whose sake they vowed".

Because this is indeed the content of the distinction between the two types mentioned above in "Onah Nedarim" —

(a)

"A son thirteen years and one day old and a daughter twelve years and one day old ..

and even though they have not brought two hairs",

(b)

"the twelfth year for a minor girl and the thirteenth year for a minor boy" and they know how to make vows:

The novelty of the Torah regarding "a son thirteen years and one day and a daughter twelve years and one day and even though they have not brought two hairs" — is regarding years,

that the age of vows begins immediately when one becomes a son thirteen years and one day

(and the law is indeed not connected with knowledge - as the Rambam rules

(as above)

that "even though they said we do not know etc. their words stand")

And then there is a second wonder,

of "the year 12 for a minor female and the year 13 for a minor male",

that in this the definition is

(not connected with years,

but)

that from the aspect that "he knows how to distinguish" his vow is a vow.

explains,

that according to the Rambam "a youth close to majority is Biblically [valid] only in a boy of 13 or a girl of 12 who have not brought two hairs"

(as is implied from the plain sense

Continuation of the language of the Rambam"³

: "Since they have reached the age of the great ones, their vows are valid, even though they have not brought ..

signs ..

And this matter is from the words of the Torah, that the precocious one close to adulthood, his consecration and his vow are a vow")

— But not so, the law of "the year twelve for a minor female and the year thirteen for a minor male" is

(according to the system of the Rambam)

for everyone only rabbinical³¹

— is certainly plausible,

that the rabbinical enactment is connected

(not with the actual age of the year twelve and the year thirteen,

but)

with that which he is already "knows in whose name he vows"*³¹,

and therefore the sages said that his vow is a vow].

8.

And based on this, the difference between the two versions in the Gemara is understood:

According to the view that "the season of vows" means "the year of twelve for a minor female and the year of thirteen for a minor male",

it is understandable how there can be a question that "where we examined ...

and she did not know how to distinguish, say that we should no longer examine" — because it can be that the primary definition of "one close to majority who is extraordinary" is based on years,

4.

5.

The Torah revealed that the age of a daughter of eleven years and one day can make a vow:

And since we see that the minor girl,

being at this age,

"does not know how to distinguish",

it is a proof that with her the time has not brought about maturity

(to be able to make a vow),

and consequently her "age of vows" is pushed off until the age of actual maturity³².

On this, the Mishnah comes to teach us that the main novelty

(the Torah)

is — that the intellect of the twelfth year for a minor girl

(and thirteenth for a minor boy)

can effect a vow,

and therefore,

as soon as she attains this intellect

(during the twelfth year)

her vow is a [valid] vow.

And therefore one must always examine — even if at the beginning of the year she "did not know how to distinguish" — perhaps she has acquired intellect.

that the simple reasoning has much more place than the simple reasoning "since they were found to know at the beginning of the year, they do not need examination" — and as above that the simple logic obligates that there is not the definition of "chazakah" in relation to the knowledge of a minor].

But according to the conclusion of the Rambam,

that the definition of "year twelve for a minor female and year thirteen for a minor male" is only from the aspect of the definition of knowledge

(as above section 6)

— on the contrary: one has no place to say that because they did not have knowledge at the beginning of the year one does not need to examine again perhaps afterwards knowledge came

(as it must be according to nature)

must the Rambam accept the version "SDA ..

"and she knows to distinguish" — and this itself teaches us,

that even though the minor has enough intellect to make a vow,

he nevertheless does not have true intellect in which a chazakah applies.

9.

And one must explain the reason of the Rambam

(according to the explanation of the TzePHeN)

to decide like the opinion that "the season of vows" is specifically from when he reaches two [stages of] maturity

(only he did not bring signs)

In the matter of vows there is a wondrous novelty — that a Jew has the power to cause a permitted thing to become forbidden

(according to Torah)

that it should become prohibited like a sacrifice,

until there applies upon that forbidden thing a holiness

(similar to the holiness of a sacrifice)³³.

And in this there is a novelty even regarding actual sacrifices³⁴

<b> </b>Because sacrifices have several restrictions,

and only certain types of animals

(and plants and inanimate objects)

are fit to be offered upon the altar; but in vows these restrictions do not exist — if only one causes [the object] to be forbidden by means of a thing that is vowed,

One who makes an impure item — is effective

(through his vow)

a holiness upon the vowed object.

It turns out a thing and its opposite — that specifically by vows,

which requires an additional strength

(even more than by other commandments),

the Torah says that even a minor

(who regarding all other commandments is not relevant)

— can effect the holiness

(if he is a "mufla samuch l'ish")

Therefore the Rambam teaches

(according to the interpretation of the Tzemach Tzedek as above)

that it is to say the novelty regarding a minor who has reached two stages of growth but he lacks

(only)

signs: but not to say an even greater novelty,

that the "one who knows how to express [a vow]" of a boy of twelve years and one day should be able to effect such a holiness

(without limitations)

Yud.

Nevertheless, the opinion of several Rishonim³⁵

(and according to several Acharonim³⁶

— also the opinion of the Rambam)

that a "muf'la samuch l'ish"

(whose vow is a vow from the Torah)

means

(at least also)

a boy of twelve years and one day who knows how to express [a vow].

It will be understood according to how the Tzemach Tzedek

explains the reason for that which by vows there are not the limitations which exist by sacrifices

(as above)

— that the matter of sacrifices is that which "becomes holy by decree of the Torah which is the supernal wisdom",

but by vows a holiness is drawn from a level which is higher than "wisdom".

And this is the hint in the language of the verse

"A man etc. when he makes a special vow" — that vows come from a level which is called "yaflee" — language of wonder,

which is higher than wisdom

(the Torah)

and intellect.

And the power for this

(to achieve higher than the wisdom of the Torah)

exists among Jews from the aspect that Israel “preceded the Torah”⁴⁰

— the bond between Jews and the Most High is deeper and higher than Torah! And therefore “Israel, even though he sinned, he is Israel”⁴¹

— even a Jew who does not keep the Torah, G-d forbid,

he does not cease to be Israel, heaven forbid]

: and this is expressed in the matter of vows,

where the speech of man imposes a holiness according to his will

(without the limitations that are in offerings etc.).

because all matters of the service of G-d are revealed through the Torah; analogous to the matter of repentance⁴²,

which is “higher”

from Torah,

as the statement of our Rabbis, of blessed memory⁴³

"They asked the Torah: a sinner, what is his punishment? It said to them: He shall bring a guilt-offering, etc. They asked the Holy One, blessed be He, etc. He said to them: He shall do repentance and it will be atoned for him"

(so the matter of repentance does not come from Torah

(from its own side),

but from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself)

— and therefore repentance has the power to fill the lack,

what one has missed in the fulfillment of Torah —

And nevertheless, specifically Torah reveals to a Jew about the possibility and power of teshuvah,

until teshuvah becomes a commandment in the Torah].

And this is the explanation in that which the power regarding the matter of vows a Jew has even before he becomes obligated in all the other commandments of the Torah⁴⁴

— because vows

are connected with His existence as He is "prior" to the Torah.

And this is the function of "the extraordinary one adjacent to a man"

(knows how to distinguish)

Here is not so relevant the advantage of daat — that it becomes complete only when he becomes a gadol — but rather that which by him there is the "lehaflot",

that in this time enters into him the level of "pele"

(which is in the soul)

above chochmah⁴⁵,

in a revealed manner.

(From talks of Shabbat Parshat Ekev

(20 Menachem Av)

&lt;b&gt;And so it is from the source, year 5744)&lt;/b&gt;