English translation — קדושים א

On "ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול"¹

Rashi explains: "before a blind person in a matter do not give advice that is not proper for him"

(and brings on this an example,

as below section 3).

One must understand: from where does Rashi — <b>in the plain sense</b> of Scripture — take to remove the words from their plain meaning,

and instead of their simple interpretation,

that one may not place a stumbling block before someone who cannot see, may G‑d forbid²,

does he explain that

1.

(a)

"blind" means "the blind <b>in a matter</b>",

and

(b)

"stumbling block" — "advice that is not proper for him".

The Mizrachi learns that this comes as a continuation to the previous commentary of Rashi on the words "Do not curse a deaf person" — "I only have a deaf person; from where to include all people etc.? If so, why was 'deaf person' stated? Just as a deaf person etc., so too all etc."

Since the two laws stand in the verse in one continuation,

one must say,

that "a blind person is analogous to a deaf person,

just as a deaf person is not specifically a deaf person, so too a blind person is not specifically a blind person."

But the commentary is difficult

(as commentators ask³)

: by "Do not curse a deaf person" Rashi does not remove the word "deaf person" from its plain meaning — he only says that one learns from "deaf person" that "just as a deaf person etc. so too all etc."; however by "And before a blind person do not place a stumbling block" Rashi says that "blind person" means

(not according to its plain meaning — someone who cannot see,

but rather)

a "blind in a matter"⁴.

It turns out according to Rashi,

that a blind person is not "analogous to a deaf person".

Also: the above explanation is only a reason why one must explain that "skin is not specifically skin" but rather — "a blind person in the matter"; it remains however not understood what is Rashi's compulsion that "do not place a stumbling block" does not mean giving and not a stumbling block simply but specifically a <b>statement</b>⁵

— and "<b>advice</b> that is improper for him"?

Rashi apparently should have learned

(as according to the — way of the halacha)

that "and before a blind [person] etc." comes to warn that one should not give a stumbling block to a Jew who is blind in the matter,

a matter of transgression,

like the example in the Talmud⁶

: "a person should not hand a cup of wine to a nazirite"

(whereby there is no relevance of a <b>statement</b>,

but an action⁷

of <b>giving</b> a stumbling block of transgression⁸)?

2.

The Gur Aryeh says⁹

that Rashi's proof for his interpretation here is from the end of the verse — "and you shall fear your God, I am the Lord",

which the wording stands

(as <b>Rashi</b> explains there on the spot)

only regarding a "matter that is given to the heart of a person"; and since placing a "stumbling block"

(literally)

before a "blind person"

(literally)

is not a "matter given to the heart",

but an action in which one recognizes his intention,

therefore Rashi learns that here it is about giving "advice that is improper for him",

where one cannot know whether "his intent¹⁰

is for good or for bad and he can evade and say I intended for good".

But it is difficult to say that this is the foundation

(and necessity)

for Rashi — because¹¹

then Rashi would have had to say the interpretation of "and you shall fear your God"

(not in <b>a separate</b> opening phrase,

but)

in the same opening phrase in one continuum: "<b>therefore it is said </b>and you shall fear your God etc.'",

and according to the wording in Torat Kohanim here "lest you say good advice ...

and behold the matter is given to the heart etc."

"and you shall honor the face of an elder" — "he shall not sit in his place etc. perhaps he will close his eyes etc. <b>therefore it is said</b> and you shall fear your God etc."].

From the fact that Rashi separates this in a <b>separate</b> discourse beginning "it is implied",

that the explanation "before a blind person do not give advice that is not proper for him" is a matter <b>in itself</b><span> and the necessity for it is from </span><b>the</b> words

("and before a blind person do not place a stumbling block")

itself¹³.

3.

Further Rashi gives an example of "advice that is not proper for him" — "Do not say: Sell your field and buy for yourself a donkey, and you circumvent him and take it from him."

Is not understandable:

a)

The meaning of "counsel that is improper for him" is seemingly a quite simple one and requires no explanation — why does Rashi need to give an example for it at all?

b)

And if to give an example of "advice that is improper for him" — are there many simpler and easier examples on this matter¹⁴?

c)

Moreover: in Toras Kohanim — the <b>source</b> of this Rashi commentary — are brought down <b>three</b> examples of "advice that is improper for him": "Do not say to him: Go out early in the morning so that bandits will attack him,

Go out at noon so that he will be stricken by heat

(that heat and sun will strike him¹⁵),

Do not say to him: Sell your field and buy for yourself a donkey, and you circumvent him and take it from him"

: "He came and said to him: The daughter of so-and-so, what is she for the priesthood? Do not say to him: She is fit, and she is only unfit."]

— From all the above examples Rashi brings specifically the <b>last</b> one,

and not one of the <b>first</b>

(and simpler)

examples¹⁴

4.

In the above example itself, it is not understood why Rashi <b>in the plain sense</b> <b>of Scripture</b> also brings the conclusion "and you circumvent him and take it from him" — <b>simply</b>,

the "improper advice <b>for him</b>" consists in that before the "blind person in the matter" it is more worthwhile to have a "field" than a "donkey"; how does there come here an <b>addition</b> of a matter <b>entirely new</b> "and you circumvent him and take it from him"¹⁷?

One could ostensibly answer on this

(— at least with difficulty)

On the verse

(in parshas Vayechi 18)

"Issachar is a strong-boned donkey, crouching between the sheepfolds" Rashi explains: "Like a strong donkey that they load with a heavy burden ..

traveling by day and by night and having no lodging at home, and when he wants to rest he crouches between the boundaries of the towns where he carries merchandise."

From this one understands

(even a five-year-old for Scripture),

that regarding livelihood one can have from a donkey more benefit than from a field — because it works both by day and by night,

without extra trouble for the owner of the donkey,

because the heavy loads the donkey carries; in contrast by a field,

the work is

(usually)

only by day and is connected with toil and exertion on the part of the owner of the field in all the types of labors of plowing,

sowing,

reaping etc. during the course of the year¹⁹.

Moreover,

that the work and the going about of the merchandise with the donkey brings immediate profit,

or at least after a short time; but by a field it comes only after a longer period of time — after the time of reaping comes,

and further — after the time of gathering the grain.

It comes out according to this,

that the "advice" of "sell your field and take for yourself a donkey" is quite,

in general,

"in the present"²⁰

— an advice <b>proper</b>.

and therefore Rashi concludes "and you circumvent him and take it from him",

that <b>here</b> it speaks when the "advisor" is with his advice in order to take away the field²¹.

H.

But this is not at all smooth,

because:

a)

It is understood and simple,

that on the other hand "field" has an advantage over "donkey"

(like: death does not apply to it,

and in general — the work with a donkey is connected with the travel-troubles of the donkey's owner who must constantly travel from place to place,

unlike by a field it is usually the field is located in proximity to his city and his house; and more)

— and especially that here the emphasis is "is not fitting <b>for him</b>": it is not suited for <b>him</b> — there can be many ways that for him it is better to have a field

only in <b>that case</b> it is a bad thing because there are bandits and consequently it is

(as the precise language of the Toras Kohanim)

"advice that is not fitting <b>for him</b>"²².

And as the Toras Kohanim concludes "Lest you say 'I am giving him good advice' and the matter is entrusted to the heart, as it is said 'And you shall fear your God, I am the Lord'" — that the advisor can well say that he meant that he is giving "good advice"].

b)

And furthermore, the main point: if it indeed pays better for the field owner to have a donkey than a field — why does it bother him that the advisor will then take away the field from the one who bought it

(from the "blind in the matter")

— for the "blind in the matter" it is not a "stumbling block" and even not an "improper advice for him",

but on the contrary: for him it is indeed better to have the donkey!

6.

And this will be understandable according to the rule

(also in the plain sense),

that when the Torah repeats a law that is already known from earlier,

one must endeavor to find in it a novel law,

and not say that the repetition is merely to "multiply prohibitions"

(and the like)²³.

(and the like)

it is because he does not find there

(in the plain sense)

a novel law].

And as we see in Rashi's commentary on that same verse: on "Do not curse a deaf person" Rashi explains

(as above)

: "From where to include every person? The verse states 'and' — if so, why is a deaf person stated? Just as a deaf person etc." — and at first glance: Rashi could have learned simply,

that although there is the prohibition "Do not curse"&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;,

which includes "every person",

also a "deaf person",

nevertheless regarding "deaf person" specifically it says "Do not curse",

in order to add regarding a "deaf person" an &lt;b&gt;additional&lt;/b&gt; negative commandment.

It is understood from this,

that if it is only possible, one must interpret the verses in a manner that one should not need to come to say that this is only to increase transgressions.

And likewise in our case: the matter of "And before a blind person do not place a stumbling block" <b>literally</b> — that one may not place a stumbling block through which a "blind person" would be harmed — is already known from what is stated <b>earlier</b> in the Torah where it speaks about several <b>forbidden</b> occurrences,

unwanted etc.: "And if²⁶

a man opens a pit, or if a man digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or donkey falls into it, the owner of the pit shall pay etc."

D.

E.

that one may not do a thing — "place a stumbling block" that will cause the other damage²⁷.

And even though there the Torah does not speak explicitly about issur and heter,

only about payment for the damage — nevertheless,

on the contrary: if one is <b>punished</b>

(one must pay)

for the damage that one caused

— it is certainly that this is a forbidden thing²⁸.

Therefore Rashi teaches²⁹

that here comes a new <b>type</b> of prohibition³⁰

<span> which is not included and one cannot learn it from the law of "When a man opens a pit, etc."</span>³¹

(that one causes the other a damage),

as follows from the end of the section onward.

7.

Based on this it is understood simply why Rashi cannot bring the first two examples from Torat Kohanim on "a counsel that is not proper for him" — "Go out early in the morning so that bandits will attack him,

go out at noon so that he will suffer sunstroke" — because <b>such</b> improper counsels are

(according to the plain meaning)

included in the matter of "when a man opens a pit"³²

: through his counsel

(evil)

he caused the other a damage.

(like the <b>action</b> of "when a man opens a pit")

— but in this there is no difference at all regarding the result — causing the other a damage].

For this same reason Rashi cannot learn that "ולפני עור etc." means that one may not cause another to sin — because since one may not cause another physical damage

(to his body and property),

all the more so³³

that one may not cause him damage to his soul³⁴

(by transgressing a sin),

And as we find at length in Parshat Bereishit,

that because the serpent caused Chava to sin³⁵

with the sin of the Tree of Knowledge,

he was punished with a very severe punishment — "Cursed are you from all the beasts etc."³⁶.

From this one understands the magnitude of the prohibition of causing another to sin

(and as <b>Rashi</b> explains there: from here that we do not argue in favor of the enticer etc.).

Therefore Rashi specifically brings the last example from Toras Kohanim — "Do not say: Sell your field and take for yourself a donkey",

and concludes with it "And you circumvent him and take it from him" — because specifically in <b>this</b> example a novel law is introduced,

as follows.

8.

By adding the conclusion "And you circumvent him and take it from him" Rashi emphasizes that the deficiency does not consist of causing the "blind person" to exchange a field for a donkey,

because in this it is not necessary that there be a loss

(as above section d),

Only in that which "and you circumvent him and take it from him".

The Torah is here

(according to the simple meaning)

innovates a new law: here it does not speak about a prohibition to cause damage to the "skin",

rather the Torah prohibits here

(also)

to give him merely "advice that is &lt;b&gt;not proper for him&lt;/b&gt;": when one gives another advice,

one must have in mind &lt;b&gt;only&lt;/b&gt; that the advice should be "&lt;b&gt;proper&lt;/b&gt; for him" — and &lt;b&gt;not&lt;/b&gt; think thereby about one's own benefit,

that &lt;b&gt;he&lt;/b&gt; can profit from it&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;.

And this is brought out in the aforementioned example³⁸

"Do not say, 'Sell your field and take for yourself a donkey,' and you circumvent him and take it from him": even if the recipient of the advice will have no damage from it at all, it is, however, "&lt;b&gt;not proper for him&lt;/b&gt;" — not a &lt;b&gt;need&lt;/b&gt; for &lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt;him&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;

The Torah has prohibited this.

Because when giving advice to another, one must thoroughly think about the &lt;b&gt;other's&lt;/b&gt; situation and determine what is a need for &lt;b&gt;that one&lt;/b&gt;

("proper for him"),

and not use it for one's own gains — "and you circumvent him and take it from him"

— although he may think to himself: this

(the blind one in the matter)

is &lt;b&gt;not lacking at all&lt;/b&gt; — so what does it matter that he

(the advisor)

will be &lt;b&gt;benefited&lt;/b&gt;?

And this Rashi says "ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול" — "before a blind person in a matter do not give advice that is not proper for him": "מכשול" here includes even when

(for the "סומא בדבר" no loss came at all,

but)

the "מכשול"

(failure)

is only in the manner of giving the advice — "עצה שאינה הוגנת לו"⁴⁰

: the "סומא" means that the "יועץ" gives advice that is "הוגנת לו",

and the advisor is "עוקף עליו",

deceives him and gives him advice "לפי⁴¹

his way and his pleasure".

9.

Based on this one will also understand the length of language of Rashi in his commentary on "ויראת מאלקיך" — "because this matter is not given to people to know if his intention is for good or for evil and he can evade and say I intended for good therefore it is said about it ויראת מאלקיך who knows your thoughts" — unlike in Toras Kohanim where he says briefly: "lest you say I am giving him good advice and the matter is given to the heart as it is said ויראת מאלקיך אני ה'":

In the Torah, the precise point is "lest you say &lt;b&gt;good advice&lt;/b&gt; I am giving him".

D.

H.

In practice it was &lt;b&gt;bad&lt;/b&gt; advice,

but a human being cannot blame him for it, because the advisor can excuse himself that he thought that this is good advice

(and therefore it is a "matter dependent on the heart").

According to Rashi, however, the distinction is not whether the advice was &lt;b&gt;in practice&lt;/b&gt; "good advice" or "bad advice",

but the entire matter is &lt;b&gt;only&lt;/b&gt; a matter related to "his knowledge" and "the intention of" the person — whether he, at the time of giving the advice, thought about the other person or not&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;.

but &lt;b&gt;afterwards&lt;/b&gt; an opportunity arose that he should be able to buy the field

(from the buyer from the "עור")].

Also this the verse says "And you shall fear your God — &lt;b&gt;He who knows your thoughts&lt;/b&gt;" and knows what the person thinks when giving the advice.

Yud.

And here there is a wondrous teaching in the matter of Ahavas Yisrael — how much a Jew is obligated to invest himself in the good of another Jew:

It is not enough that you conduct yourself in a manner that the other has <b>in practice</b> benefit from your conduct,

but in this is also relevant <b>your</b> "way",

intention and purpose: while you do the other a favor you must be entirely "divested" of yourself and think thoroughly about the other's situation,

and thus there will not interfere in this any personal interests and biases etc.

What then is the fulfillment of ahavas Yisrael in a manner of "and you shall love your fellow as yourself"⁴³.

When one feels that the "fellow" is "as yourself"<b> simply</b>,

as yourself literally — your fellow is not an "other" but is one thing with you,

<b>Unity</b> of Israel⁴⁴

— then he thinks about "fellow" in a manner that occupies him <b>entirely</b>,

"as yourself" literally.

(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Kedoshim 5741)