English translation — שמיני א

A.

In the laws of entering the Temple,

says

the Rambam¹,

that when someone became impure in the Temple, the law is that

he shall hurry and rush and exit by the shortest path,

and it is forbidden for him to delay or prostrate or exit by a long path"; and regarding the measure of delay and prostration the Rambam rules²

And what is the measure of his delay? Enough to recite "and they bowed"³

faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated and gave thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is forever, and this is the measure of prostration."

Says the Kessef Mishneh,

that the source of the words of the Rambam is in tractate Shevuot⁴

where it states,

"What is the measure of delay? R. Yitzchak bar Nachmani and one of his colleagues disagree etc. One said: like the recitation of this verse, and one said: like 'and they bowed' to the end, and all the children of Israel saw the fire descending and the glory of the Lord upon the House, and they bowed faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated and gave thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness is forever."

And that which the Rambam rules "to be stringent like the one who says from 'vayichre'u' to its end and not like the one who says like the saying of this verse which implies like the saying of the entire verse from its beginning to its end",

the Kesef Mishneh answers "And perhaps one can say that our teacher explains that the one who says like the saying of this verse is not the entire verse but only until 'vayichre'u' alone, and if so, the one who says from 'vayichre'u' to its end is lenient, and he rules like him".

Further writes the Kesef Mishneh "And in the Yerushalmi⁵

etc. How much is the measure of bowing? Rabbi Simon in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: until 'vayichre'u apayim artzah'

'vayishtachavu'. Rabbi Abahu adds: until 'vehodos laHashem ki tov ki le'olam chasdo'⁶,

And based on this one can explain that the one who says like the saying of this verse is until 'vayichre'u apayim artzah vayishtachavu' alone, for then the one who says from 'vayichre'u' to its end is lenient, and due to doubt he rules like the one who is lenient".

It is, however, in need of explanation in both answers of the Ketzos HaChoshen

(as the commentators ask⁷)

The first answer that "the meaning of this verse" means only the beginning of the verse — from where would we say so?

There is seemingly no meaning in the Gemara for this⁸.

And the second answer that "kimeimarei d'hai pesuka" means only "kedi veyichre'u apim artzah veyishtachavu bilvad" is difficult,

according to this,

why does the Gemara bring the entire verse<sup>8</sup>?

There is not a single opinion that holds that the measure is "reisha d'kra".

And by bringing the entire verse, the Gemara is completely ambiguous.

Or: How does it lie in the ambiguous language "kimeimarei d'hai pesuka" only the middle words of the verse; and not the beginning and not the end of the verses.

2.

And it can be said that if one will understand this with an introduction

a)

A precision in the words of the Rambam mentioned above "And how much is the measure of his staying so that he can read and bow..

And this is the measure of bowing": Why does the Rambam divide this into two details — "the measure of his staying",

"And this is the measure of bowing" — and does not say immediately

(as at the beginning)

"And how much is the measure of his staying and the measure of bowing so that he can read etc."?

And although in the words of the Rambam it comes in the continuation in the

(second)

halacha to the words "he did not turn his face but bowed on his way out facing outward is not liable unless <b>he paused for the measure — </b>And how much is the measure of his pausing etc."

is this itself not understood,

he should have seemingly immediately said the wording "he is not liable unless he paused <b>for the measure of bowing,</b>

and how much is its measure

(or "and how much is the measure of bowing")

in order to recite etc.",

and then it would

(also)

have been in accordance with the wording of the Mishnah "he bowed or he paused for the time of a bow".

b)

Simply, the words of the Rambam "and how much is the measure of his pausing in order to etc." refer not only to his words in this halacha "he did not turn his face but bowed on his way out facing outward is not liable unless <b>he paused for the measure",</b>

but rather to the entire law of the prohibition of pausing,

which he said in the previous halacha as above,

"and it is forbidden for him to pause etc. and if he paused etc.".

But — why does the Rambam state the measure of "he tarried and bowed" specifically in the halacha following the law when "he did not turn his face away but bowed on his way out toward the outside, he is not liable unless he tarried for the measure",

and does not state it in the previous halacha following the essence of the prohibition of tarrying "and it is forbidden for him to tarry etc. and if he tarried etc." — "And what is the measure of his tarrying? Enough to recite 'and they shall bow etc.'".

3.

And one can say the explanation in this:

From the plain language of the Rambam "And it is forbidden for him to delay or to prostrate or to go out by a long way,

And if he delayed or went out by a long way, even though he did not delay, or he turned his face toward the Sanctuary and prostrated, even though he did not delay, he is liable for kares" — it is understood,

that here there is not <b>one</b> obligation that he did not hasten to go out by a short way

(Which can present itself in three manners: delayed,

prostrated,

went out by a long way)

— rather there are three separate prohibitions and obligations,

three separate categories: an obligation of <b>delay — </b>due to the time that he tarried in the Sanctuary; <b>prostration</b> even though he did not delay — due to the action of prostration; and an obligation of going out by a long way¹²

— due to the manner of the exit.

And based on this one can consider in this law of "he did not turn his face but prostrated on his way out toward the outside"

(That he is liable only when "he delayed the measure")

— according to which "category" is he liable — which one can learn this in two manners:

a)

The prohibition and obligation is from the side of the bowing,

But if the bowing is towards the outside,

it is not called a bowing unless when "he paused for the measure of time."

b)

The obligation is not from the side of the bowing

(which is not fitting towards the outside)

but from the side of the pausing.

At first glance one must say that the difference is in the two versions of the Gemara in the words of Rava.

On the Mishnah¹⁰

"One who prostrates or who pauses for the time of a prostration" the Gemara says¹³

: Said Rava: They only taught [this] when he prostrated facing inward, but if he prostrated facing outward, [if] he paused, yes, [if] he did not pause, no.

There are those who teach it on the latter clause: "or who pauses for the time of a prostration" implies that prostration itself requires a pause. Said Rava: They only taught [this] when he prostrated facing outward, but [if he prostrated] facing inward, even though he did not pause — and thus it says: "He prostrated facing inward, or he paused for the time of a prostration with that prostration which is facing outward, he is liable."

(And afterwards the Gemara continues: "What is a prostration that involves a pause, etc.").

And at first glance: "What is the practical difference between them?"¹⁴

And according to the above, it can be said that the "mai beinaihu" between the two versions is:

According to the first version,

that the statement of Rava goes on the word "hishtachaveh" in the beginning,

"They only taught that he prostrated facing inward",

it turns out,

that "facing outward" there is not the entire definition of prostration.

And this he means with the conclusion "but if he prostrated facing outward, if he paused, yes; if he did not pause, no".

That "facing outward" there is only the definition of obligation from the aspect of pausing,

and like the language of Rashi¹⁵

"but prostration facing outward to the east <b>this is not prostration</b>¹⁶

<b> </b>and if he paused for the measure of prostration <b>he is liable for pausing</b> and if not, no".

According to the second language,

that this goes on the seifa "or that he paused for the measure of bowing, implying that the bowing itself requires a pause,"

it turns out that by "outward" there is a definition of bowing,

because about this Rava says "they only taught that he bowed outward

(then one says that "the bowing itself requires a pause")

— but inward, even though he did not pause."

But the bowing outward is specifically there when it has a pause,

a measure of bowing.

And it is also precise in the language of Rashi: on the words of the Gemara in the second language "and thus he says: he bowed inward or that he paused for the measure of bowing in this bowing outward, he is liable",

Rashi says "and thus he says: bowing inward — any amount, or that he did not bow and paused for the measure of the obligation of bowing of those outward, a quarter of the measure of obligation."

And at first glance it is not understood: what is the language "for the measure of the obligation of bowing"?

Outward there is not

(according to Rashi's words in the first language)

the entire obligation of bowing except "pause",

Rashi should have said "for the measure of a pause".

And likewise at the end of his language, here Rashi should have said "that requires a measure of a pause".

And one can say that Rashi thereby emphasizes that also outwardly the obligation is from the aspect of bowing,

only the bowing "requires a measure of obligation".

(for the measure of a pause)

even if he did not bow,

he is already obligated anyway "because of the pause",

one can say

(according to the second language),

since a pause is there a prohibition in itself,

the prohibition is specifically when he &lt;b&gt;stood &lt;/b&gt;for the measure of a pause; but if he then performs an action,

he is bowing,

this is not considered as a &lt;b&gt;pause.&lt;/b&gt;

And the obligation then is not "because of the pause",

but from the aspect of the name of bowing].

4.

One of the practical differences¹⁷

in practice between the two manners — one must say:

Regarding half a measure,

which is a rule like R. Yochanan¹⁸

that half a measure is forbidden from the Torah¹⁹

(and according to the opinions that this is not specifically in matters of eating)

— it is known that the prohibition is only when it is half a <b>measure,</b>

it is the same action and deed only the measure is not complete,

like eating half an olive from a forbidden thing,

or when one carried from a private domain to a public domain less than the measure; but when the "half" is not in the measure but in the essential action,

like half a labor,

then this is not forbidden from the Torah.

And in our discussion²⁰

: According to the first manner,

that the prohibition and obligation is "because of &lt;b&gt;shehiy&lt;/b&gt;,"

then if it is less than the measure of shehiy,

then this is not a half-measure but rather it is entirely not &lt;b&gt;the &lt;/b&gt;matter.

Because,

"shehiy" is not a quantitative measurement that is formed from the combination of parts of time²¹,

but rather a state

(in quality)

that is achieved through a specific time.

Less than that is not called shehiy,

consequently — it makes no sense to say &lt;b&gt;half shehiy&lt;/b&gt;²².

But if one would say that this is because of bowing, only "the bowing itself requires shehiy" because "it requires &lt;b&gt;a measure &lt;/b&gt;of obligation",

then since the obligation is not "because of

(the state)

shehiy",

the "shehiy" is only a &lt;b&gt;"measure &lt;/b&gt;of obligation" in the bowing,

then when there is a half-measure, this is also a definition of bowing,

only it lacks the completeness in measure to obligate for the bowing — "measure of obligation",

and consequently a half-measure is also prohibited by the Torah²³.

5.

One can, however, learn a third way,

that even "outwardly" the obligation is not "because of the pause" but from the aspect of the bowing,

but the "pause" is not only a <b>measure</b> for the bowing outwardly,

rather the pause <b>creates</b> the name of bowing.

In itself, outwardly there is not the definition of bowing.

But when "he paused for the measure of bowing"

(in the bowing outwardly),

thereby a definition of bowing is created,

and consequently he is liable as bowing.

And one can say that this is the opinion of the Rambam,

and therefore: a)

he is precise in the .

halacha "he did not turn his face but bowed on his way out outwardly, he is not liable unless <b>he paused for the measure",</b>

b)

he brings "the measure of his pause to recite 'and they bowed down faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated themselves and gave thanks to the Lord for He is good for His kindness endures forever'" in <b>the</b> halacha,

not earlier when he speaks about the essential prohibition of pause,

c)

he concludes "and this is the measure of bowing" —

Because if the Rambam would have said "unless he paused for the measure of bowing"

(without the conclusion "and this is the measure of bowing")

one would have learned that outwardly there is a definition of bowing but it needs to be a combination until it will be a "measure of obligation".

Therefore the Rambam says "he is not liable unless he paused for the measure, and what is the measure of his pausing? To recite etc. and this is the measure of bowing": thereby he emphasizes both things,

that in and of itself there is no definition of bowing outwardly; but when "he paused for the measure",

thereby becomes a definition and obligation from the aspect of bowing,

that "the measure of his pausing"²⁵

is "to recite 'and they bowed down faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated themselves and gave thanks to the Lord for He is good, for His kindness endures forever'",

(as follows).

And therefore the Rambam says it in continuation of the halacha where he speaks about the measure of pausing when "he bowed <b> </b>on his way out",

not in the previous halacha regarding the essential measure of pausing without bowing,

because according to the opinion of the Rambam the definition of the measure of bowing is not merely a definition and obligation from the aspect of pausing,

but this

(the measure)

itself creates a definition of bowing as above.

And consequently if the Rambam would have said the measure in the previous halacha regarding the essential prohibition of pausing,

one would simply have learned that this is not related to the definition of

(measure)

bowing,

but the measure is only in order that there should be a definition of pausing²⁶.

6.

One will understand this by prefacing that which seemingly needs to be understood: Since all the measures are a law to Moses from Sinai,

as the Rambam says²⁸,

and in a law to Moses from Sinai there is no dispute²⁸

— how is a dispute possible regarding the measure of bowing or prostration?

And we must say that that which the measures <b>in our subject</b> are a law to Moses from Sinai is only in general²⁹

that there must be bowing for the measure of prostration,

but what the measure of <b>prostration</b> is — was not explained,

and therefore in this a dispute is possible.

And based on this one can say,

that the dispute of the Amoraim regarding the measure of bowing depends on the three manners

(rationales)

mentioned above in the definition of "he paused for the measure of bowing":

In a bowing

(in the Holy Temple)

there are,

in general,

three details: a)

the cause that brings about the bowing

(seeing the Divine Presence and the like),

b)

the actual act of bowing,

c)

the pausing during the bowing

(when one gives thanks to God and the like).

And this is the foundation of the dispute in the measure of bowing:

If one learns that the measure of bowing is a definition in <b>pausing,</b>

while that "one who pauses the time of bowing is liable <b>because of pausing"</b>³⁰

(also when the actual bowing is outward)

— then it follows to say,

that the measure of bowing is like the measure of the <b>entire</b> order of bowing from its beginning to its end

(with all three details mentioned above)

If one learns that the measure of bowing is not a measure of pausing,

but rather a definition of bowing,

then it is logical that the measure is how much the essential act of bowing takes;

And according to the third reasoning mentioned above,

that these are both matters,

the bowing is created from the pausing, then it is logical that the measure of the essential act of bowing is not sufficient,

but it also needs to be as the measure of the pause during the bowing.

7.

With this one will also understand why the aforementioned Amoraim connect their dispute with a specific part of the verse specifically:

This is not

(only)

but a sign

(sides)

for the time of the measure,

but in <b>this </b>verse is hinted the <b>content </b>of the dispute,

That is: since the Halachah L'Moshe MiSinai says that the measure of bowing is enough for bowing and it is not explained what exactly this measure of bowing is, it is logical to say,

that somewhere in the Torah there is a hint

(and support)

how much is the measure of bowing.

how much is the measure of bowing³¹.

And therefore it is accepted by all that the hint for this measure of bowing is in the verse in the Torah where it is said

(and described)

the bowing <b>in the Holy Temple</b>³²

(in all details).

Only their dispute in which part of the verse the measure of bowing is hinted — depends on the <b>content</b> of the text,

in accordance with their aforementioned dispute in reasoning.

And the explanation of this:

In this verse there are three parts: the beginning of the verse "And all the children of Israel saw when the fire came down and the glory of the Lord upon the house",

which is the cause that brought about the prostration; the middle of the verse — "and they bowed down with their faces to the ground on the pavement and prostrated themselves" — the act of prostration; and the end of the verse "and giving thanks to the Lord for He is good for His kindness endures forever" — the content and purpose of the prostration.

And based on this, one must explain the differences of opinions:

If one learns that the measure of bowing is a definition in <b>the duration,</b>

and the measure of bowing is as the measure of an entire order of bowing

(with all its details)

— then

He sets himself to say that the measure of bowing is hinted at in the reading of the entire verse,

where the entire order of bowing is described.

When one also includes the beginning of the verse,

the reason that brought about the bowing,

this is the content of the matter of the delay in the Temple which includes the entire order: the reason — the seeing of the people at the descent of the fire etc.

(the seeing of the Shechinah),

the bowing and the thanksgiving which this brought about.

If one learns that the measure of bowing is not a &lt;b&gt;measure of delay,&lt;/b&gt;

but a definition of bowing,

then it is logical,

that this is the reading of the part of the verse where the action of bowing is stated,

"And they bowed down faces to the ground on the pavement and prostrated themselves."

According to the reasoning of the aforementioned the gaon that these are both matters,

the bowing is created from the side of the "was",

then it is logical that it is not sufficient the reading of the part of the verse that speaks only about the action of the bowing,

but also the reading of the continuation and conclusion of the verse that brings out the content — the entire continuation — of the bowing,

"And thanksgiving to Hashem for He is good for His kindness is forever" — in this is expressed that this is a "was-ish"

(content-wise)

bowing.

8.

Based on this is understood also the change and difference between Bavli and Yerushalmi,

that in Bavli³³

is brought the opinion "like the explanation of this verse" from the entire verse,

but not so in Yerushalmi³⁴

are all opinions only in relation to the <b>end </b>of the verse

(from "and they bowed" and onward)

In the Bavli, the wording is "And how much is the <b>measure of staying</b>,"

which emphasizes that the measure is a matter that is connected not so much with the law of bowing, but rather it is a definition of staying.

In the Yerushalmi, however, the wording is "How much is the <b>measure of bowing</b>."

This is a definition of bowing,

consequently, there are brought only those opinions that learn from the parts of the verse that speak about the action of bowing,

or also its content as above,

but not the beginning of the verse, which pertains only to the definition of staying,

as above.

— Based on this, it follows,

that what the Rambam rules that "the measure of his staying is in order to recite 'and they bowed down faces to the ground and prostrated themselves and gave thanks to the Lord, for He is good, for His mercy endures forever,' and this is the measure of bowing" — is not

(only)

because he rules leniently³³,

but because according to the opinion of the Rambam, this is the content and definition of the measure of staying and the measure of bowing as above.

9.

The explanation of the opinions regarding mussar and chassidus:

Prostration is indeed its matter and content — nullification entirely,

that a Jew nullifies himself to the Most High.

In this there are generally three levels:

A bowing in completeness.

Because of that which comes to a Jew is the contemplation in his mind and thought in the greatness of G‑d,

it becomes by him until into a manner of seeing,

"They see the descent of the fire and the glory of G‑d etc.",

And this³⁶

effects upon him a bowing with spreading of hands and feet,

he becomes entirely nullified to the Above,

not only in externality in the power of action of his,

rather his entire measure of stature,

beginning from the power of delight and the will that is in him, from head until the power of action that is in him.

On the other hand there is a level where to the Jew does not apply a revelation of G‑dliness,

there is not the "the children of Israel see the descent of the fire and the glory of G‑d etc.",

And nevertheless he bows.

He "forces himself"³⁷

and bows.

He compels himself and nullifies himself to the Above at least in action.

<b>— In general </b>the Jewish people is this regarding the distinction between the time of the Temple and the time of exile³⁸

: In the time of the Temple, G‑dliness was revealed,

there was seeing of G‑dliness,

and in the manner that one comes to see, so one comes to be seen³⁹,

the seeing brought the prostration "in a manner of inwardness".

He became nullified entirely and put on his own existence.

In the time of exile, however, "our signs we have not seen"⁴⁰

and "we are unable to ascend <b>and see </b>and prostrate ourselves before You"⁴¹,

since there is no "to see", also the prostration is not in completeness,

it is only in externality,

he has other desires and thoughts,

only he is "subduing"⁴¹

the body that it not rebel, but the essential desire and inwardness of the soul is not nullified" —

But these two modes of nullification — prostration

(the entire verse,

or only the act of prostration "and they bowed down faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated themselves"),

are both not the regular order for every single Jew in all times: the first order which is connected with "waiting",

is a lofty level.

Not always is Divinity revealed and not everyone can elevate themselves up to seeing the glory of God.

On the other hand,

the second manner of prostration alone,

is a lower level and a Jew must constantly strive to elevate himself above it,

so that for him the prostration should be not merely "bowing in a general sense"⁴²,

he "subdues the body so that it does not rebel",

but also "intention in his heart",

a feeling of the soul.

And this is the third manner of bowing: at the beginning of his service it is in a manner that "he forces himself",

but from this itself he comes to a continuation to "and to thank God for He is good etc.",

that he has in this a feeling of the soul of gratitude and self-nullification to God.

And <b>the </b>manner of bowing pertains to every Jew.

For although not every individual is "his hand of intellect and spirit of understanding attain to produce"⁴³

(through contemplation)

a self-nullification from the aspect of his innermost soul — there is, however, present in every Jew a self-nullification to the Most High from the aspect of <b>the nature of his soul; </b>and it is in the power of each and every one of Israel to arouse this and reveal it,

that through this itself that a Jew coerces himself and nullifies himself to the Most High,

there becomes thereby ultimately revealed the inner self-nullification that is from the aspect of the nature of his soul.

And therefore the Rambam rules halachically

(that the Torah speaks of the majority⁴⁴)

"How much is the measure of his stay in order to read and they bowed down faces to the ground on the floor and prostrated themselves and gave thanks to Hashem for He is good for His kindness is forever and this is the measure of prostration",

So the prostration is with a certain stay,

By him there is

(not only the point of prostration in action "and they bowed down faces to the ground and prostrated themselves" but also)

the thanksgiving to Hashem in his soul.

And the Rambam according to his approach — that he rules⁴⁵

that even such a Jew who one must coerce him in a court of non-Jews to fulfill the command of the Torah,

is <b>"willing </b>he is ,

to do all the commandments and to distance himself from the transgressions",

and this is <b>his true will </b>of every Jew.

And therefore even when one coerces him,

and outwardly it is heard that his crying "I am willing" is only because of the coercion with lashes,

it is "a mere bowing" in externality — rules the Rambam that on the contrary "this is not coerced <b>by him",</b>

it is only "his evil inclination overpowered him and since he was beaten until his evil inclination weakened and he said 'I am willing' he has already driven it away <b>by his will".</b>

This is a prostration

(also)

from the side of his soul within.

Therefore it is demanded of each one that in the external bowing which is only in action actually,

he should arouse in himself and reveal until "he says" the nullification which is hidden from the aspect of his soul's inwardness.

And through the action that one endeavors to effect upon every Jew in pleasant ways and in peaceful ways that his evil inclination be weakened

(only to compel him etc. — there must be a complete court),

and that his true and inner will be revealed openly that every Jew "desires ..

to perform all the commandments and to distance himself from transgressions",

this is even more hastening and speeding the building of the Third Holy Temple,

when all Jews will make the pilgrimage and there will be the "to see and to bow before You

(in completeness as is proper)

in Your chosen House",

speedily in our days, literally.

(Moshiach, Shabbos Parshas Haazinu 5745)