English translation — ואתחנן ג

A.

From the verse¹

"And you shall do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord" we derive the law of "bar metzra"²

: When someone sells a field to another,

the bar metzra

(the one who has a field adjacent to the sold field)

has the right to remove the buyer from the field and buy it for himself,

because it is a benefit for the bar metzra to have his fields together.

The law of bar metzra,

as it is stated in the Gemara

(and also ruled in the Rambam etc.)²,

is: When the buyer has already bought the field,

by virtue of "And you shall do what is right and good" one <b>removes</b> him from the field³.

From this it is understood,

that the obligation of "And you shall do what is right and good" lies primarily upon the buyer,

since for him there is no such difference whether to buy <b>this</b> field or a field elsewhere,

unlike for the bar metzra,

it is "right and good" that the bar metzra should be the purchaser of the field⁴.

So it is also implied from this law in the Gemara⁵,

that "one who sells to an idolater has no [application] of the law of the neighbor's right of preemption, for an idolater is certainly not subject to 'you shall do what is right and good'" - d.

h.

that this is a law whose obligation lies upon the buyer,

and therefore it does not apply when "one sells to an idolater".

b.

But - the definition of the law of the neighbor's right of preemption,

can be explained in two ways:

a)

This is <b>only </b>a matter of straight and good conduct; d.

e.

Nothing is lacking in the legal force of the acquisition of the buyer,

rather the Sages obligated him to conduct himself in a manner of "straight and good",

and therefore he must this

(which he acquired)

<b>give </b>to the neighbor

(and so too regarding other laws of the neighbor).

b)

The obligation of "and you shall do the straight and good" <b>adds</b>,

that the neighbor receives a certain ownership over the field; and therefore that which the buyer must give the field to the neighbor is it not only from the aspect of an obligation of good conduct upon him,

rather because the field has a connection to the neighbor,

and in the language of the Nimukei Yosef⁶

"as if he has a certain acquisition in the body of the land".

3.

The difference between the two manners: According to the first manner,

that the law of the neighbor's right of preemption is a fence of good conduct,

it was said to the <b>buyer</b>,

that <b>he</b> must conduct himself in an upright and good way and give the field to the neighbor

(But if he does not want - the court forces him)

; according to the second manner,

that this is a law in <b>acquisition of the land</b>,

then although also here the "and you shall do the upright and the good" is directed to the buyer,

but the command

(and its actual fulfillment)

pertains also to the court: from the aspect of "and you shall do the upright and the good" the <b>sages</b> give the neighbor a slight acquisition in the essence of the field, they weaken the acquisition of the buyer,

and consequently the buyer must remove himself.

4.

Based on this, one can say that this is a dispute among early authorities,

and especially is this emphasized in the differences of opinion of Rashi and the Rambam:

In the rationale of bar metzra — from the perspective of "And you shall do what is upright and good" — Rashi says⁷

: "A matter in which you are not so lacking that you will find lands elsewhere and you will not trouble the neighbor to have his properties divided"⁸.

The Rambam⁹

explains the law and its rationale: "If one has a neighbor who is adjacent to his boundary, he may give money to the buyer and remove him ...

And this matter is because it is said 'And you shall do what is upright and good'; the Sages said: Since the sale is one, <b>it is good and upright that</b> this neighbor acquire <b></b>the place more than the distant one"¹⁰.

4.

5.

: according to Rashi it is a <b>good conduct</b>¹¹

which relates entirely to the <b>buyer</b> — "a matter <b>that you are not</b> lacking etc. <b>and you will not trouble</b> the neighbor etc."; and as Rashi emphasizes further in the discussion,

at the law "sell to a non-Jew, a non-Jew is not subject to 'and you shall do' etc." — "and we do not have to say about the matter of 'and you shall do the upright and the good' <b>except to the buyer</b> etc. <b>to the buyer</b> it was said: withdraw your hand and let him take it."

According to the Rambam, however,

it is not only a good conduct of the buyer

(for the benefit of the neighbor),

rather this becomes a good conduct <b>in general</b>,

a saying of the Sages¹²

that thus is good and upright

(<b>and begins</b> — and primarily — regarding the neighbor)

: "one has <b>to his fellow</b> etc. <b>the Sages said</b> etc. <b>it is good and upright that he acquire</b> etc.",

it is a thing that is <b>intrinsically</b> good and upright etc.; and this is accomplished with the power that the Sages give¹³

the neighbor a slight acquisition in the body of the field.

And with this it is understood what by the law of “selling to an idolater” the Rambam says

“One who sells to an idolater, they excommunicate him until he accepts upon himself any loss that will come from the idolater until the idolater conducts himself with his neighbor according to Jewish law” — a)

He <b>omits</b> the reason that stands in the Gemara “an idolater is certainly not subject to ‘and you shall do what is right and good’”

b)

He <b>adds</b>

(in the language of the Gemara)

“until the <b>idolater conducts himself with </b><b>his neighbor </b>according to Jewish law”

— because the law of neighbor’s right of preemption is not

(only)

that the <b>buyer</b> must conduct himself in a manner of “right and good”.

5.

Already spoken many times,

that there are several topics and laws in the Torah which although at first glance they are different subjects and topics that have no connection between themselves,

since however it is one Torah,

one can through delving properly find a common point between them,

or find that they are built on the same foundation,

and as one finds it in the books of several great ones of Israel and especially by the Rogatchover.

According to the above, it can be said that the two explanations in the law of bar metzra are a general boundary

(by every matter according to its particular boundaries)

: whether the matter of neighborliness creates an internal connection between the neighbors,

a change in the very neighbor

(in our case - an acquisition in the field)

; or the connection is only in an external manner

(in our case - an obligation of conduct upon the person)

*¹⁷.

And the practical difference is in many matters.

And in general - in the well-known style - in the three general matters: world,

year,

soul¹⁸.

In <b>the world</b>: the connection by way of adjacency in place regarding the law of bar metzra,

as above.

6.

<b>In the year</b>: in the matter of time.

Regarding the law of tosefet chol al hakodesh on Yom Kippur

(which is according to all opinions from the Torah)¹⁹

and on Shabbat and Yom Tov

(according to the opinions on this — whether it is from the Torah or from the Rabbis)²⁰,

where also here there is a matter of "adjacency": the time before Shabbat and after it is a "neighbor" and close to Shabbat.

And also here it can be in two ways*²⁰

A)

The adjacency makes an inner connection: the time that is before and after Shabbos,

due to its adjacency to Shabbos,

it becomes changed,

it receives²¹

from the essence of the holiness of Shabbos²².

B)

The time itself does not become in the holiness of Shabbos,

however since it is adjacent to the time of Shabbos,

therefore upon the person falls the obligation of preparation for Shabbos²³.

7.

Based on this, one can say,

that this is the explanation of the dispute of the poskim,

whether during the time of Tosafos one can fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush Shabbos etc.:

The opinions²⁴

that hold,

that during the time of Tosafos one can fulfill the mitzvah of Kiddush and eating of Shabbos and the like,

this is because they assume that the <b>time</b> of Tosafos becomes in the holiness of Shabbos and Yom Tov²⁵

is that on Chol HaMoed one may not make Kiddush and fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah during the time of tosefet - because &lt;b&gt;the &lt;/b&gt;mitzvos are connected with the &lt;b&gt;reality &lt;/b&gt;of &lt;b&gt;night&lt;/b&gt;,

and the connection of adjacency cannot effect that there should be the &lt;b&gt;reality &lt;/b&gt;of the time

(of night)&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;]

According to the opinions, however, that tosefet is only regarding the prohibition

(of man b)

of work&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;,

this is because according to their view, the time of tosefet has only an external connection to the time of Shabbos,

it is not of a category to become a part of the time of Shabbos.

And consequently, one can in this time only add upon &lt;b&gt;oneself &lt;/b&gt;in the prohibition of performing work and the like&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;,

but one cannot then fulfill the mitzvos*&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;

that are connected with the time of Shabbos&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;.

8.

<b>In soul</b>: At the end of tractate Sukkah, the Mishnah says,

that they penalized the watch of "Bilgah,"

that

(the watch that begins its service takes its portion of holy things in the north,

the north is primary*³⁰)

but]

"Bilgah always divides in the south

and its ring is fixed and its window is blocked"³¹.

And the Gemara brings two reasons for this: a)

Because of "the incident of Miriam daughter of Bilgah who apostatized, etc."

(as the Gemara elaborates on this story).

b)

Because "his watch is slow to come."

Afterwards the Gemara asks: "Granted, according to the one who says his watch is slow to come, that is why we penalize the entire watch; but according to the one who says Miriam the daughter of Bilgah converted her religion because of her daughter, we penalize only him?" Abaye said: Yes, as people say: The talk of a child in the market is either from his father or from his mother.

And because of his father and his mother we penalize the entire watch? Abaye said: Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor; good for the righteous, good for his neighbor, as it is said³²

"Say of the righteous that it is good, for they shall eat the fruit of their deeds."

("The incident with Miriam the daughter of Bilgah etc."),

it implies that this is the primary reason³³

why the watch was penalized³⁴].

And behold,

Rashi details at the end of the tractate: "From here they said: Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor; and consequently, it is good for the righteous, good for his neighbor, for the good measure is abundant."

Since regarding the matter of "good for the righteous, good for his neighbor" Rashi must arrive at the principle of "the good measure is abundant,"

it is proven that he does not have the reading in the Gemara of the proof from the verse "They said, etc."

(And in several editions of the Talmud it is indeed absent³⁵)

— one must understand the reason for this and wherein lies the difference whether the proof is from a verse or because "the good measure is abundant."

9.

It will be understood by first explaining the matter of "its ring was fixed and its window was sealed,"

which we find has two interpretations:

Rashi explains³⁶,

that "its ring was fixed" means the rings that were "in the courtyard in the place of the slaughterhouses etc. and they were set into the floor stones and the ring was open on one side and he turns it upward and inserts the neck of the animal into it and again turns its opening into the floor and the ring of Bilgah was fixed and not turned over so that she could use those of others"³⁷.

And "her window was sealed" Rashi translates: "windows were in the house of the chambers in the thickness of the walls of the cells where they store their knives

etc. 'and they sealed the window of Bilgah.'"

D.

E.

That both the "ring" and the "window" were for the benefit of the slaughter and the like.

The Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah explains: "Its ring was fixed and its window was sealed" — "a ring for each watch they would hang the animals on them and flay them, and they were all fixed in the walls, and when a watch entered, it would hang that ring to indicate that the service was its.

And likewise there were twenty-four windows and there the priestly garments, a window for each watch etc." — the ring for the flaying of the offering and the windows for the priestly garments.

Yud.

The difference between the explanations is: According to Rashi, the penalty of Bilgah is in matters that are also relevant to women,

because slaughter is indeed "valid with non-priests &lt;b&gt;and with women&lt;/b&gt;" and even initially they slaughter

(with a long knife)&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;,

and only "from receiving and onward is the mitzvah of priesthood"&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;.

According to the explanation of the Rambam, however,

they penalized her in such things that women have no connection to - not to the skinning of the offerings&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;

on the rings &lt;b&gt;in the courtyard&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;,

and certainly not to the priestly garments that are for the sake of the service&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;,

because women are invalid for service.

The foundation of their dispute: according to Rashi, one fines the watch

(because of the reason of "neighborliness"),

but in such matters that have a connection to the wicked neighbor - to the girl

(Miriam - since also <b>she</b> could have done the things)⁴⁴

and consequently, in this punishment and disgrace - it is emphasized that this comes because of the girl.

According to the Rambam, however,

the fine is also in matters that have to the wicked one - the girl⁴⁵

- no connection⁴⁶.

And this is connected with the general definition of adjacency: whether adjacency effects an inner relationship and change,

until this becomes the content of neighbor,

or it remains only an external relationship.

And they follow their respective interpretations: according to Rashi’s interpretation, the relationship of adjacency is only in an external manner and it does not affect the essence of “neighbor”

(as above in the matter of the field bordering on another’s field),

and the concept of "we penalize the entire watch" according to its simple meaning is,

that this is more than a penalty and punishment from the side of the wicked one]

And therefore Rashi teaches that also their punishment and humiliation,

which comes from the side of the neighborliness,

is only in a matter

(the slaughter)

that has a connection to the wicked one himself

(a woman)⁴⁷,

because this comes only as a result from the wicked one.

According to the Rambam's approach that the matter of neighborliness creates a connection in content⁴⁸,

and in our discussion that the "woe to the neighbor" means not only regarding an external matter

(<b>punishment</b> of the "neighbor"),

but also regarding the wickedness that neighborliness effects in the essence of the neighbor,

: "The way of a person's nature is to be drawn <b>in his opinions</b> and in his actions after <b>his friends and companions</b> etc." as he elaborates there on this]

And consequently it is understood that also the punishment and disgrace is not limited to matters that indicate a cause of the wicked person

(the young woman)⁵⁰,

since the punishment is from the wickedness of the neighbor itself⁵¹.

Yes.

According to this the difference is understood,

whether one reads "as it is said, 'Say the righteous that it is good etc.'" as a proof that "good for the righteous, good for his neighbor",

or one derives it from logic,

as above:

The proof from the verse "Say of the righteous that it is good, for they shall eat the fruit of their deeds" is in plain sense

: Since the verse begins in the singular language - "Say of the righteous that it is good" - and concludes in the plural language: "for the fruit of their deeds they shall eat",

it is proven that also others,

the neighbors of the righteous,

will eat together with the righteous from "the fruit etc."

But seemingly it should have said "for the fruit of his deeds they shall eat",

since they eat the fruits of the deeds of the righteous?

But this very thing is what the Gemara means with the proof from the verse: from the aspect of the matter of neighborliness it is not only that they also receive the result,

reward because of the righteous,

but moreover,

it is "the fruit of their deeds they shall eat" - there is in them a change until the deeds of the righteous also become "their deeds".

But this very thing is "&lt;b&gt;Say of the righteous &lt;/b&gt;that it is good",

One says of the righteous

(or about the righteous,

praise of the righteous*&lt;sup&gt;52&lt;/sup&gt;),

because that which "the fruit of their deeds&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;they shall eat" comes about due to their proximity to the &lt;b&gt;righteous &lt;/b&gt;- they learned from &lt;b&gt;him&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;53&lt;/sup&gt;

and became &lt;b&gt;different&lt;/b&gt;.

And consequently it is understood that according to Rashi's approach as above,

that the matter of proximity does not affect the essence of the neighbor himself&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;,

rather it remains an external connection&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;,

there is here no place to bring a proof from the verse "Say of the righteous that it is good etc.";

And consequently he brings the proof from "Good for the righteous, good for his neighbor" from the reasoning "the good measure is abundant": if we find in the side of the not-good that because of the external neighborliness to the wicked it is "woe to his neighbor", then all the more so that the neighborliness to the righteous is a matter of "

(Good for the righteous)

good for his neighbor".

12.

But it is still not smooth: why is it necessary, according to Rashi, to arrive at the detail that

(good measure)

<b>abundant</b> - even if the "good measure" were equal to the opposite measure, would it still not be enough to carry out "woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor", so also "good for the righteous, good for his neighbor"?

So the explanation of this is:

That which the watch of Bilgah was penalized was certainly not a punishment that affected the inner essence of its matter,

but only externally: they did not take away from her the service, not even a part of it,

nothing more than a matter of disgrace and shame⁵⁶

regarding some details in the order of the service.

And this corresponds to the matter of "Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor" in general—for the matter of calamities and punishment upon a Jew in general is only in externality,

and is not an internal matter.

And as our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said⁵⁷

At the most severe punishment "you are not excluded from the World to Come"

Corresponding to this, that the general matter of evil among Jews is only an external thing⁵⁸

and an additional adjunct to his existence⁵⁹,

therefore also the punishment and calamities are only in externality and temporarily;

But not so regarding the matter of "good for the righteous, good for his neighbor,"

the drawing down of the good that comes through the neighborliness to the righteous,

it is a good that is inner and eternal,

which acts in the innerness of the Jew.

And accordingly it is understood that it is not sufficient when "good for the righteous, good for his neighbor" is in the same measure as in the opposite aspect "woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor,"

because,

as said,

through external neighborliness to the wicked the <b>effect</b> is also an external one,

in contrast, through neighborliness to the righteous even when it is only a connection of externality and not an inner bond,

the righteous effects an inner effect upon the Jewish neighbors to him and he draws down to them an inner good.

Therefore Rashi must say "a good measure &lt;b&gt;abundant&lt;/b&gt;",

which thereby is explained and emphasized that the "&lt;b&gt;good &lt;/b&gt;to his neighbor" of a tzaddik is an action and extension &lt;b&gt;internal&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;60&lt;/sup&gt;.

13.

In the two matters,

"Woe to the wicked woe to his neighbor - good to the righteous good to his neighbor",

is hinted the content of the general two matters that exist in the aforementioned neighborliness: "border neighbor" and "additions of Shabbat and Yom Tov":

The explanation of "Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor" in the service of man: the expression "woe"⁶¹

indicates pain

(and as one sees in human nature,

that when a person finds himself in deep pain,

it expresses itself in the outcry "woe"),

and in the pain of sins, this is the service of repentance which effects the breaking and nullification of the evil⁶².

And these are the two matters: "Woe to the wicked etc." is the breaking of evil,

i.e.

that is

the service of "Depart from evil"

(and in the soul — the matter of bitterness and gravity),

and "Good to the righteous etc." is the service of "Do good"

(and in the soul — the line of joy).

And when a Jew effects in himself the two matters, this also effects "&lt;b&gt;away &lt;/b&gt;from our dwelling" - the breaking and nullification of evil - "turn from evil" in "our dwelling",

and "&lt;b&gt;good &lt;/b&gt;to our dwelling" - the "and do good" in "our dwelling".

Which in the world in general are the two matters "border neighbor" and "addition of Shabbat and Yom Tov":

The law of "bar metzra" is indeed literally,

obligating the person to conduct himself contrary to his nature - to give away the <b>purchased </b>field in order not to cause any damage or even just a bother to another,

which is the point of "sur meira";

So it is also in the generality of the matter of "bar metzra" where it does not deal with matters of holiness and mitzvah,

but in relation to a field and the like,

matters of the permissible,

which

There one must primarily safeguard the "turn away from evil".

In contrast, the matter of "adding to Shabbat and Yom Tov" speaks generally about matters of "do good": to add matters of Shabbat and Yom Tov,

which means an addition of good and holiness in the world.

14.

Based on the above,

the second interpretation of "Woe to the wicked, woe to his neighbor",

one will understand what is written in Megaleh Amukot⁶³

that Elul is an acronym <b>A</b>woe <b>L</b>to the wicked <b>V</b>and woe⁶⁴

<b>L</b>to his neighbor: because at first glance one can ask: Elul is indeed a month of <b>mercy and forgiveness</b>,

so what connection does this have to the matter of <b>calamities</b> of "Woe to the wicked and woe to his neighbor"?

Rather, the interpretation is based on the above,

that "Woe to the wicked" means the breaking of evil through the repentance of the month of Elul,

and "and woe to his neighbor" means that the breaking of evil of the month of Elul also affects the neighbor,

the time adjacent to it,

the month of Av.

The explanation of this: it is stated in the Zohar⁶⁵,

that the months that belong to Jacob

(our father)

are Nissan, Iyar, and Sivan,

these are the months of holiness.

And accordingly, Esau also should have taken three months,

but in practice he took only "two months, Tammuz and Av, and it was not found and was lost, for Elul is not his"; and in the month of Av itself there are only nine days "his" and no more.

From this it is understood⁶⁶

that there is a difference between the month of Av

(after the Ninth of Av)

and Elul.

And therefore "woe to the wicked" alludes to Elul itself: one breaks the evil and wickedness from the outset,

that one gives it from the beginning no hold in this time,

although it should have belonged to the opposite; and "woe to the neighbor" — as the time of Elul effects the breaking of evil also in "his neighbor",

in the time close to it,

that also in the month of Av — from the Ninth of Av onward "it is lost and not found",

that what is said regarding the month of Av: "Whoever has a lawsuit with a gentile should avoid him",

it means only until the time after Tisha B'Av].

15.

But the purpose of the breaking of evil is indeed,

that through this there should come an addition also in doing good,

in the revelation of light;

So too is the purpose of the breaking of evil in the month of Av,

that through this comes an addition of light — the matter of “Menachem Av”,

that after one effects the breaking of the harsh judgments and evil

(Woe to the wicked,

as above)

each day of the nine days,

the “Av” itself becomes “Menachem”,

until one comes to consolation twofold,

“Console, console My people”

until “I, I am He who consoles you”.

And then one enters the month of Elul which is the month of mercy,

the drawing down of the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy which are above comprehension,

which is a preparation for the writing and sealing for good on Rosh Hashanah,

that each and every one is written and sealed immediately in the book of completely righteous ones.

6 Tishrei 5728)