English translation — דברים ה

A.

Regarding the prohibition of bishul akum - which is derived¹

(by way of "asmachta"²)

from a verse³

"Food with money you shall sell to me and I will eat, and water with money you shall give to me and I will drink"

("Just as water which has not been changed etc. by fire, so too food etc.")

- there is a dispute among poskim,

whether the vessels that have absorbed into themselves the absorbed flavor of bishul akum also become forbidden,

or not.

There are poskim who hold⁴,

that since the prohibition of bishul akum is "because of chatanut"⁵

(because this can lead to marriage with a non-Jewish woman),

they did not forbid their "pleita",

for "in this there is certainly no concern of chatanut"⁶

; but the view of <b>most </b>poskim⁷

is,

that also the vessels are forbidden,

"<b>for all </b>that the Sages forbade, its absorbed flavor is like it"⁸.

And it can be said,

that this is in the manner of boards that are four [handbreadths] wide which are invalid for roofing,

whose law⁹

is that even "if one turns them on their sides"

("[when] they do not have four [handbreadths]"¹⁰)

they are invalid,

because "since the status of invalidity is upon them,"

they become invalid "in every manner"¹¹

; and as the Rogatchover¹²

explains,

that this is because a thing which is forbidden due to a decree because of another thing which is forbidden

(ceiling)

becomes the thing "like the essence of the prohibition"

(not only when the "reason for the prohibition" is present)

- and likewise in our matter,

that even though the <b>reason</b> for the prohibition of bishul akum is "because of intermarriage,"

it nevertheless becomes "like the essence of the prohibition,"

and consequently the prohibition remains also when the reason is <b>not</b> present,

the concern of intermarriage.

2.

And it can be said [that there is] a source for the opinion of the majority of the poskim - from the story that is brought at the end of tractate Avodah Zarah in connection with the law of how one must kasher a knife from the impurities of non-Jews "to eat with it cold [food]"¹³

- and if we will learn thus that the prohibition of the knife was due to <b>bishul</b> akum¹⁴,

then several difficulties in this story will be resolved.

And this is the language of the Talmud:

Mar Yehudah and Bati bar Tovi were sitting before Shapur the king,

they brought before them an etrog, he cut and ate,

he cut and gave to Bati bar Tovi,

he again thrust it ten times into the ground

(as the Gemara says there,

that in order to kasher a knife one must thrust it into the ground ten times)

he cut and gave to Mar Yehudah.

He said to Bati bar Tovi: And that man, is he not a Jew?

He said to him: Mar, I am certain about him, and Mar is not certain about him

("I know of him that he is a pietist and will not eat a forbidden thing, but of you I am not convinced that you are so much a pietist" - Rashi).

Some say: He said to him: Remember what you did at night

(the custom of Persians is to hand over women to guests,

and when they sent them to them the previous night,

Bati accepted,

and Rav Yehudah did not accept - Rashi).

Learning simply,

the difference between the two versions in the answer of Shapur the king is in this,

that according to the first answer Shapur the king said that he is not sure whether Bati is a pietist from a forbidden thing

("of you I am not convinced")

; and according to the "some say" he had a certainty that he is <b>not</b> a pietist etc.

(because "remember what you did at night").

According to this it is not understood: since Bati accepted the Persian women and transgressed a definite prohibition — then why did Shvor Malka,

according to the first opinion,

only say that “I am not familiar with him regarding a gentile woman”?

And it is a great difficulty to say,

that the ika de-amrei disagree with the first opinion regarding a factual matter¹⁵

— whether the case of “a slave in the night” occurred or not.

3.

In Tosafot¹⁶

it states,

that Bati did not sin by what he accepted the gentile women,

because he was a “slave partially held back by a writ of emancipation”,

and a slave is permitted to a gentile woman.

that Rashi

(who does not warn that Bati thereby did not transgress any prohibition)

and Tosafot - go according to their respective systems: regarding the law of "I have despaired of my slave Ploni...

he has no remedy except through a document"

(in tractate Gittin¹⁷)

Rashi explains: "He has no remedy - with a Jewish woman <b>and not with a maidservant</b> since he is partially freed, etc."; but Tosafot there¹⁸

learn

(not like Rashi,

but)

that "He has no remedy means with a free woman,

but with a maidservant it is permitted."

And likewise regarding Bati,

who was a "one whose bill of manumission is withheld"¹⁹,

that according to Rashi he is forbidden to a maidservant²⁰,

and according to Tosafot he is permitted to a maidservant

(and likewise to a non-Jewish woman²¹)].

It is not understood

(according to the explanation of Tosafot)

: since Bati had <b>not</b> transgressed any prohibition,

why did Shabur the king throw at him "Remember what you did at night"?

The Ritva

explains,

that "Shapur the king did not know this,

and therefore suspected him that just as he was not careful about the non-Jewish woman, he would not be concerned about the impurities of non-Jews,

and this is not so, because a slave is warned regarding all prohibitions,

and just as he is forbidden in pig and carrion, he is forbidden in their impurities."

But at first glance the reasoning is not entirely smooth: Shapur the king was after all an "expert in laws"

(as is evident

(also)

from the very sugya)

- it is not logical that he did not know the law that a slave is permitted in a non-Jewish woman; it is also difficult to say that he did not know that Bati was still a "partial slave" - because Rav Yehuda had about this <b>proclaimed</b> in public.

4.

Also one must understand in the details of the narrative:

It is understandable that what Bati took the etrog from Shvor Malka and

(as is implied from the narrative)

ate it — one can explain simply,

that this is

or because he did not know the law of non-Jewish cooked foods

(for from his question "and that man is not a son of Israel" it is understood that he knew and it bothered him),

but]

because if he would not eat what the &lt;b&gt;king &lt;/b&gt;gives him,

he would thereby be a rebel against the kingdom&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;,

and this is a concern of danger to life&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;

which overrides the entire Torah — "let him transgress and not be killed"&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;,

(And there is no contradiction to this,

of course,

that &lt;b&gt;after &lt;/b&gt;he saw that Shvor Malka prevented Mar Yehuda from a forbidden thing,

he asked "and that man, is he not a son of Israel?" - why he did not also warn him,

Bati bar Tuvi).

It remains, however, perplexing - from the side of Shvor Malka:

a)

Since Shvor Malka did not want to cause him to stumble with a forbidden thing²⁸

- is it therefore because he was not <b>certain</b>

("<b>lo kim</b> li b'goy'")

that Bati is a separation from a forbidden thing,

is this sufficient that he should certainly cause him to stumble,

give him to eat a forbidden thing?

b)

Even according to the ika d'amrei,

that Bati certainly transgressed a prohibition at night

(whether in truth - according to Rashi; or only in the opinion of Shvor Malka - according to Tosafos)

- is it nevertheless any reason that he should cause him to stumble with <b>another</b> prohibition?

It could be that Bati indeed could not withstand the great test²⁹

of the urge of transgression

(with a non-Jewish woman),

and nevertheless he was careful regarding forbidden foods.

And especially since the prohibition of licentiousness with a non-Jewish woman

(not "in the manner of marriage")

in private is a rabbinic prohibition³⁰,

and gieiulei akum is a prohibition <b>from the Torah</b>³¹.

3)

The question is even stronger: Since Shvor Malka had <b>both</b> stuck the knife into the ground

(because of Mar Yehuda),

he could have done this a few moments earlier,

before he gave the blessing over the etrog,

and thereby also prevent the blessing over the prohibition — why did he wait and stick the knife into the ground <b>only after</b> giving the blessing

(so that he should specifically eat a forbidden thing)?

5.

And one must say the explanation of this,

and with the introduction that the prohibition of the knife was <b>not</b> because of the forbidden foods

(in general)

that he swallowed in the house of Shvor Malka

- For being a &lt;b&gt;king&lt;/b&gt;- is indeed "nothing is lacking for the king's house"&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;

- It has no place to say,

that for cutting fruits

(esrog)

one used a knife with which one had used for hot meat dishes etc.; certainly there were separate knives for fruits,

and consequently there was not by them the absorption of forbidden foods -

But the knife was forbidden because of &lt;b&gt;bishul akum&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;

- one used the knife also for cooked fruits

(and sharp things)&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;

and it had absorbed from bishul akum*&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;.

Based on this, the statement of "Ika d'amrei" is understood,

that Shavur Malka said "Idkar mai avadt b'oreita":

The reason for the prohibition of bishul akum is

(as above)

"because of chasnut" - "b'noschen".

Since Bati was

(according to the opinion of Tosafos)

&lt;b&gt;permitted &lt;/b&gt;regarding "b'noschen" - therefore regarding him the prohibition of bishul akum does not apply

(which is because of b'noschen)&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;.

And although that one takes [it]

(as above section 1)

that the prohibition of bishul akum becomes "like the essence of the prohibition"

(and therefore it remains in its prohibition also there where the reason for the prohibition becomes nullified)

- this is not comparable to our case,

because

(besides this,

that the rule of "becomes like the essence of the prohibition" applies only when one judges regarding a specific thing and object,

that since upon that thing has been placed the "name of disqualification",

it remains upon it "in every circumstance"; but not so in such cases in which the intellect obligates that the prohibition is <b>ab initio</b> not applicable to the thing,

since the reason of the prohibition is with them from the outset of the law not relevant³⁶.

And as one sees in our very case,

that there are <b>several</b> manners where there is not the prohibition of bishul akum because with them is fundamentally not relevant the decree "because of intermarriage"³⁷

- is in addition to this)

That which the prohibition remains also when its

(reason 6)

reason becomes nullified,

means only that there is no concern that bishul akum can lead to the prohibition of intermarriage,

but the very prohibition of intermarriage exists there; in contrast, in our case regarding Bati,

there is indeed &lt;b&gt;not &lt;/b&gt;the prohibition of intermarriage — so there is indeed no place to say,

that when the matter of "intermarriage"

is a permitted thing,

should indeed be prohibited that

(bishul akum)

which can lead to intermarriage!

And in this vein one can explain the answer of Shvor Malka "Idkar mai avadt b'urta" according to Rashi's approach,

that Bati was &lt;b&gt;forbidden &lt;/b&gt;with a non-Jewish woman

(although he was a "partial slave")

: Since the prohibition of bishul akum is only to prevent from "their daughters" — he held that there is no reason and necessity to guard Bati from this &lt;b&gt;fence &lt;/b&gt;around the prohibition

("their daughters"),

when he is not careful in the prohibition itself

("their daughters")

("their daughters").

6.

Based on this, one can explain,

according to the first opinion,

why Shabur the king did <b>not</b> say "Idkar mai avadt b'oreita":

Besides the aforementioned reason for the prohibition of bishul akum — "because of intermarriage" — there is another reason: "so that a Jew should not be accustomed to him in eating and drinking, and he will feed him something impure"³⁸.

And it must be said,

that the two opinions in the Gemara are connected with the two reasons,

and they disagree which of them is the reason

(primary)

: according to the "some say" the reason is

(primary)

"because of marriage",

and therefore "what work is done at night" answers why one need not guard against cooking of non-Jews

(according to Tosafot - because he is permitted to their daughters,

and according to Rashi - because he is as if not careful about their daughters)

; but according to the first version the reason is

(primary)

- "so that a Jew should not be accustomed etc. and feed him an impure thing",

and regarding this concern the matter of "work done at night" is not an answer.

It remains, however, not understood,

as above,

according to the first opinion: how is Shapur the King's claim "I am not well-versed in a non-Jew" a justification to cause stumbling with a forbidden thing³⁹?

Also, it is not yet well explained according to the "Ika de'amrei" to Rashi's method: indeed,

that Bati was not careful regarding "their daughters" and therefore there is no necessity to prevent him from this fence regarding their daughters - it would still have been better if he had preceded and stuck the knife into the ground before he cut the etrog for Bati

(and incidentally prevent him from a prohibition),

since this is not connected with any trouble.

7.

So the explanation in this is:

The law⁴⁰

is,

that a leader appointed over the community may not do any work in the presence of three; and all the more so that this is so with a king.

a matter with reason that is in its perfection — also with a gentile, and especially the gentile in his own conduct — and,

in general,

one is obligated in their honor of the kings of the nations of the world⁴¹.

And one can say the reason,

that the honor of the king is a thing that pertains to the settlement of the world

("For were it not for the fear

(of the kingdom)

a man would swallow his fellow alive"⁴²),

that the children of Noah are also commanded regarding this⁴³,

and consequently the obligation in their honor applies also to Jews].

It turns out,

that from the perspective of the honor of the king,

Shabur Malka <b>was not allowed</b>⁴⁴

to stick the knife into the ground*⁴⁴

in front of Bati and Mar Yehuda.

And since that when Bati eats the etrog

(even without sticking into the ground)

he would not thereby transgress any prohibition,

and on the contrary,

he is obligated to eat from the perspective of the concern of danger to life,

as above section d⁴⁵

- therefore Shabur Malka had to give him the etrog without sticking the knife into the ground first.

Based on this, we can explain the reasoning of Shvor Malka why he stuck the knife into the ground specifically before Mar Yehuda — because "Mar kaim li begavrei": by this he did not mean that regarding Mar Yehuda he is certain that he will not eat a forbidden thing, and regarding the other one he has a doubt — rather "kaim li begavrei" that Mar Yehuda will under no circumstances eat the etrog

(even though he is permitted to eat it according to the law),

even when this is connected with saving lives —

And especially if you say that here it speaks about Rav Yehuda about whom the Gemara

says about him,

that he was among the "early ones" who "would sacrifice themselves for the sanctity of [God's] Name"

(even when one is not obligated in this

And consequently, Shavur Malka was &lt;b&gt;compelled&lt;/b&gt; to consult for him about the knife in the ground&lt;sup&gt;49&lt;/sup&gt;.

However, regarding Bati,

that "lo kim lei b'goy" - he is uncertain

(not whether he is generally removed from prohibitions, G-d forbid,

but only)

whether Bati would sacrifice himself for this - Shavur Malka, as king,

&lt;b&gt;was not allowed&lt;/b&gt; to forgo his honor and do for him the work of sticking the knife in the ground&lt;sup&gt;50&lt;/sup&gt;.

8.

From this story there is also a lesson in the service of G-d:

Here it is told that before Shapur the king were sitting two men who were obligated in honoring the king.

One of them was in fear of the non-Jewish king and therefore he ate from the fruit that Shapur the king cut with a non-kosher knife,

finding a heter for this based on the reason of pikuach nefesh etc. — and the Jew did not have before the king proper honor;

And the second,

that by Shapur the king there was "kim li be-gavra" that he would not transgress any prohibition even when it touches the honor of the king until self-sacrifice — specifically the Jew did not only not lose the favor with the king,

but on the contrary — Shapur the king himself forwent his royal honor and he himself troubled himself to serve Mar Yehudah.

At first glance: he could have called in one of the king's servants and ordered him to stick the knife into the ground,

or even tell Mar Yehudah himself to do this?

Only when a gentile sees before himself a Jew who is a G-d-fearing person who separates from prohibitions until self-sacrifice - then the gentile considers it a <b>honor</b>

(Also - also the honor of the king⁵¹)

to be able to serve him.

And not just serve - rather to give in to him and help and also with his body - in all refinements

(And as above that according to law Mar Yehudah was permitted to eat the esrog without sticking the knife into the ground).

And through this conduct the "conclusion" of "idol worship" becomes - one nullifies the matter of idol worship in the world,

and it becomes "And the kingdom shall be the Lord's"⁵²

in the entire world,

"And the Lord shall be King over all the earth"⁵³,

very soon.

(From the talk of Yud-Tes Kislev 5731)