Bechirah (בחירה) — Free Choice
Core definition
Bechirah — free choice, "chofshis habechirah" — is the power to choose as one wishes between two opposites. In the corpus it is defined sharply: "the matter of bechirah belongs specifically to man, since choice is according to intellect and understanding — this belongs specifically to man" [58842/maamar_002 :: §6–7]. Man "has the ability over two opposites: if he chooses good, he can be in the virtue and level of a tzaddik, and it is good for him" [58842/maamar_002 :: §29–30]. True bechirah means the two ways are equal before him — "not according to a deciding reason; otherwise it is not bechirah" — and he chooses in one specifically [15966/maamar_012 :: §91–93].
How the Rebbeim develop it
Why only man? Other created beings lack hiskallelus (inter-inclusion): each is in one particular middah and remains as created — the angels, each in one middah and level (Michoel in chesed, Gavriel in gevurah), do not include evil at all, so choosing evil "does not apply to them" [58842/maamar_002 :: §40–44]. Man alone includes all middos and levels — Yackov, the man of chesed, could suppress his mercy for the Akeidah — and from man's inclusion of Chesed and Gevurah there unfolds, through hishtalshelus, the inclusion of evil itself (the yetzer hara from kelipas nogah): hence the power to choose either way [58842/maamar_002 :: summary]. "The matter of bechirah is in man specifically: not compelled in his conduct according to his nature — he can change his nature. Unlike the animal: natural, compelled... unable to change its nature" [15966/maamar_012 :: §94–95].
Bechirah is in daas. Choosing is through daas — "v'havdalah b'chonen hadaas"; "im ein de'ah, havdalah minayin" [15966/maamar_012 :: §62–63]. Daas is what is above the division of the lines (kavin): seeing the two de'os equally, it can decide so or so — deciding toward the side which daas specifically leans, "without any intellectual decision, the two sides' intellection being equal" [15966/maamar_012 :: §89]. Havchanah (discernment) is Binah's, but havdalah — separation — and bechirah, in potential and in actuality, are through daas specifically [15966/maamar_012 :: §101]. The midrashic parable (Eichah Rabbah, "chelki Havayah amrah nafshi"): a king enters a province with dukes and governors, and each officer chooses whom to take — so daas chooses [58842/maamar_002 :: §54–55].
The root in the neshamah. Deeper: "in truth, the root of the power of choice in nishmas Yisrael to choose Divinity is from the root of their neshamah" — which cleaves to the living Elokim ("hugged and cleaving to You," the Awtsmoos of Ohr Ein Sof); hence they understand in their intellect that they must choose Divinity [58842/maamar_002 :: §167–168]. This is why meluchah (kingship with will) applies specifically to the neshamas of Yisroel: in them there is bechirah — they choose Divinity — "ana nasiv malka" (I shall take a king), from the side of knowledge and apprehension, "which is the aspect of true life" [58842/maamar_003 :: §1–2]. In Atzilus and the highest worlds, where "ihu v'chayohi v'garmohi chad" without separation, bechirah does not apply — and therefore meluchah does not apply [58842/maamar_003 :: §27–28]. On every Rosh Hashanah, the neshamas of Yisroel — rooted in the essential, with bechirah in their descent — arouse the will for kingship from its first source [58842/maamar_003 :: §325].
Bechirah vs. the essential ratzon. The deepest distinction: "bechirah through da'as can change, but the essential ratzon above bechirah cannot" [58838/maamar_028 :: summary]. The Torah commands "u'vacharta b'chayim" (and you shall choose life) — choice, which shifts — yet there is also a command on the simple essential ratzon above bechirah: "v'ahavta... b'chol me'odecha" (with all your might) — actual mesiras nefesh, which comes from the essential natural ratzon, hiskashrus with Awtsmoos Ein Sof, "with no feeling of pleasure at all" [58838/maamar_028 :: summary, §23–30]. The two verses seem to contradict; both stand: "u'vacharta" elevates bechirah, "v'ahavta" elevates the essential ratzon [58838/maamar_028 :: summary].
Key distinctions
- Bechirah vs. animal behavior: man can change his nature; the animal is compelled by nature [15966/maamar_012 :: §94–95].
- Bechirah vs. deciding reason: true choice is not compelled by a deciding reason — the two ways equal, choosing in one specifically [15966/maamar_012 :: §91–93].
- Bechirah (daas) vs. essential ratzon: the former can change and is commanded in "u'vacharta"; the latter is above change, the source of mesiras nefesh, commanded in "v'ahavta b'chol me'odecha" [58838/maamar_028 :: summary].
- Man vs. angels: angels, each in one middah, have no bechirah; man, including all, has it [58842/maamar_002 :: §40–44].
Related concepts
- Bechirah is the ground of meluchah (willing kingship) and of Rosh Hashanah's crowning; its faculty is daas; its root is the neshamah's cleaving to the Awtsmoos.
Sources
- [58842/maamar_002 :: §6–7, §29–30, §40–48, §54–55, §163–168, summary] — bechirah specifically in man; the power over two opposites; angels' lack of bechirah; the king parable; the root in the neshamah's cleaving
- [15966/maamar_012 :: §62–63, §87–101] — bechirah in daas specifically; above the division of the lines; true bechirah not by deciding reason; man vs. animal
- [58842/maamar_003 :: §1–2, §10, §27–29, §325, summary] — meluchah requiring bechirah ("ana nasiv malka"); Atzilus lacking bechirah; Rosh Hashanah's arousal
- [58838/maamar_028 :: §23–30, summary] — bechirah vs. the essential ratzon above it; "u'vacharta" vs. "v'ahavta b'chol me'odecha"