English translation — קרח א

Sicha 1<pg>60</pg>

A.

In the laws of nullification of terumah in one hundred and one

(that "terumah<sup>1</sup>

is annulled in one and one hundred"<sup>2</sup>)

we learned in Tractate Terumot<sup>3</sup>

: Rabbi Yehoshua says black figs elevate the white ones, white ones elevate the black ones

(A fig of terumah, black or white, that fell into one hundred figs of chullin, half of them black and half of them white, all of them combine to nullify it..

And if a black one fell, it elevates one of the black ones, and if a white one fell, it elevates one of the white ones, and the rest are chullin as they were.

Bartenura)..

Rabbi Eliezer forbids

(If a black one fell, the black ones are forbidden, and if a white one fell, the white ones are forbidden.

Bartenura),

and Rabbi Akiva says if it is known what fell

(black or white)

they do not elevate each other,

and when it is not known what fell, they elevate each other

(and in the Rambam<sup>4</sup>

the halacha is ruled like Rabbi Akiva,

that "if it is not known whether it was black or whether white,

it is annulled in one and one hundred from all").

And behold the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer who prohibits in this law,

at first glance is understood simply,

that in reality the terumah was mixed only in fifty

(if white — among fifty white ones,

and if black — among fifty black ones),

and whichever way you look there are not a hundred of the type that fell.

And the commentators wrote<sup>5</sup>,

that Rabbi Yoshiyah holds,

that since "if he wanted he could trample them and mix them all together"<sup>6</sup>,

therefore all of them combine to nullify it

[And although we do not nullify a prohibition ab initio,

the Tosafot Yom Tov explains<sup>7</sup>

that "these words apply to increasing the permitted in order to nullify the prohibited,

but in such a case where he does not increase the permitted but changes the prohibited from what it was and separates them as they were before in order to mix them together, in such a case it seems to me that it is permitted to nullify ab initio"].

And in the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva who distinguishes between it is known what fell and it is not known,

they wrote⁸,

that if it is known which fig fell,

black or white,

"they do not combine because he can eat the others,

and since they are permitted they do not assist to nullify,

but if it is not known whether a black fell or a white fell, since all are in doubt of prohibition they combine with each other."

<pg>61</pg>

And one must understand the reasoning of Rabbi Yosi — what difference does it make that "if he wanted he could crush them and mix them all together",

behold in practice he did not grind and crush them,

and how do they combine with each other?

And likewise it is puzzling in the opinion of R. Akiva — what difference does it make that the person does not know whether it was black or white and "all of them are in a doubt of prohibition",

behold this doubt is only in the knowledge of the person,

but in reality — the terumah was not mixed into the hundred

(for a white fig does not become mixed with a black fig

(and likewise the reverse),

and in the language of the Tosafot&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;

"the black ones are not fit to be in a doubt of demua because the black ones are always distinguishable from the white ones")

; and is there not here a mixture of one in a hundred&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;?

2.

And it can be said,

that R. Elazar, R. Yehoshua, and R. Akiva dispute regarding the general definition of nullification in a mixture of dry with dry — which is not similar to a mixture of wet with wet,

for this is a real mixture,

that they become one reality that it is impossible to separate between them,

but not so dry with dry where each one is separate by itself,

except that the person does not know where the forbidden item is located — and one must explain the definition of this mixture in two ways&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;

:

A)

The definition of a mixture of dry with dry is indeed different from the definition of a mixture of wet with wet,

which is not a mixture in the object itself but only from the perspective of the person,

that in the knowledge of the person there is a mixture of prohibition with permission,

but this too is sufficient to nullify the prohibition.

B)

Also a mixture of dry with dry is in the object itself,

because the definition of "mixture" is that which it is impossible to distinguish between the permitted and the prohibited.

And this is the reason for the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer

(who prohibits)

and Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva:

Rabbi Eliezer holds that also the definition of mixture of dry with dry must be in the object itself,

and therefore he holds that the white ones cannot nullify the black ones

(and likewise the reverse),

that there is no mixture in reality,

and as above in the language of the Tosafot that it is impossible for them to mix because they are always recognizable on their own.

However, R. Yosi and R. Akiva hold that a mixture of dry with dry is sufficient even when it is only from the aspect of the person,

in the knowledge of the person

(that it is not known¹²

where the forbidden item is).

And this is also the reasoning of R. Akiva who holds that "when it is not known what fell, these rise one above the other" — due to the mixture in the knowledge of the person,

and in our case, in his knowledge they are mixed in all one hundred.

And based on this, we can also explain the reasoning of R. Yosi who holds that all of them combine to nullify it because "if he wanted, he could crush them and mix them all together"

(even though he did not crush and mix them)

: the crushing of the figs is

(not only in the category of "if he wanted" simply,

but this is)

the normal way of everyone to crush the figs¹³

; and since the mixture of dry with dry is<pg>62</pg>

(not the mixture in actuality,

in reality,

in the object,

but)

the mixture that is in the knowledge and thought of the person,

holds Rabbi Yehudah,

that since it is usual and automatically in his will to trample the figs,

behold in his will

(and his thought)

of the person he does not separate and divide between the black and the white and this is&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;

mixture of all one hundred in the will and thought of the person.

3.

And behold in the Yerushalmi&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;

there is a dispute regarding the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua,

whether this that they elevate each other is also when it is known which fell

(black or white),

or when it is known which fell also Rabbi Yehoshua holds that they do not elevate each other,

and according to this,

the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva is,

"in [the case of] he knew and forgot,

according to Rabbi Yehoshua it elevates according to Rabbi Akiva it does not elevate"

("Rabbi Yehoshua holds that since he forgot it is as if it is not known to him at the time it fell,

and Rabbi Akiva holds that since he knew at the time it fell they do not elevate each other,

even though he forgot afterwards"&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;).

And the Rambam who ruled like Rabbi Akiva

(as above),

ruled also according to the words of the Yerushalmi,

that "he knew what it was after it fell and forgot, behold all are mixtures".

And superficially it is necessary to understand the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva why when he knew and forgot all are mixed and they do not nullify each other,

behold now all are in the category of a doubt of prohibition?

And one cannot say that since already the fifty became mixed

(when he knew),

they are no longer nullified afterwards when he forgot&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;

— for it is explicit in the Mishnah&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;

"A se'ah of terumah that fell into less than one hundred

(se'ah)

and afterwards non-sacred produce fell there if he was unaware it is permitted",

for even though at first there were not one hundred to nullify and they became mixed,

behold when afterwards more fell there unintentionally they combine to nullify,

and why should we not say also here that when he forgot

(and this is unintentional)

behold all are in a doubt of prohibition and they combine to nullify?

And one can say,

that according to the Jerusalem Talmud

(and the ruling of the Rambam)

— the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva is a third manner in the definition of a mixture of dry with dry.

For according to Rabbi Yishmael the entire definition of the mixture is solely in the knowledge and thought of the person,

but Rabbi Akiva holds,

that even though the foundation of a mixture of dry with dry is from the aspect of the knowledge and thought of the person,

behold the state in the knowledge of the person acts upon the object.

That this is a novelty of the Torah in the law of a mixture of dry with dry,

that even though from the perspective of the reality itself,

the prohibition is not actually mixed into the permit and only that it is not recognizable by itself,

and if so the foundation of the definition of the mixture is from the aspect of the state of the knowledge of the person,

behold this state in the knowledge of the person causes a change in the reality of the thing,

as if they are actually mixed.

And therefore the law of mixtures applies from the perspective of human knowledge only when he did not know at the time of the fall,

that then we say that the mixture from the perspective of human knowledge effects the application of the law of mixture,

and as if it fell into a hundred,

but when at the time of the fall he knew,

and it is found that from the perspective of human knowledge the black and white were not mixed,

the forgetting afterwards cannot create a new status in the figs,

since from the perspective of the figs the white and black are not mixed,

and forgetting cannot uproot this reality

(and also cannot uproot the human knowledge at the time of the fall,

that it was known to him whether a black one fell or a white one fell).

&lt;pg&gt;63&lt;/pg&gt;

In a different style: In order for human knowledge to effect a law in the object itself,

the black and white figs,

which intrinsically are not mixed,

there must be a change in the figs themselves,

that a black or white one fell,

by which a mixture in reality is made here,

that the black fig is among the black ones,

and then when it is not known which of them fell,

the mixture in human knowledge effects a mixture in the figs into which a fig of terumah fell,

but when he knew and forgot,

a person's forgetting does not mix the figs which in reality are not mixed.

4.

And we must explain the reason that this matter,

that the knowledge and thought of a person has the power to act upon something external to him,

is explicitly stated specifically regarding terumah — because the foundation of the law that thought acts is explicitly stated regarding terumah,

that we learn from what is written¹⁹

"And it shall be reckoned to you, your terumah, as the grain from the threshing floor,"

"By thought alone it will be terumah"²⁰.

And even though in our case the discussion is not about the law of the separation and sanctity of terumah but about the law of its nullification,

that the figs are permitted for eating,

nevertheless this stems from the fact that in the laws of terumah, the thought of a person has a special power.

And in a deeper sense, one could say

(in the manner of a hint),

that even by permitting all the figs for Israel's eating, there is effected in them in the manner of separating terumah,

and as the precise wording of the Mishnah "they elevate one another",

even though the intention is that they were permitted for eating,

because this very thing—that the figs were permitted for eating for Israel—effects in them an elevation,

even before the person eats them.

And it is in the manner of the matter of terumah that exists in thought²¹,

for even according to the opinions that thought does not effect that it should be terumah,

nevertheless it is effective to permit the tevel for eating²²,

that he sets his eyes on this side and eats on that side,

and this too is learned from what is said "and it shall be considered"²³.

And similar to this in our subject,

that the knowledge and thought of a person affects an object outside of him that it becomes permitted in eating.

And from the aspect of its preparation for eating for Israel²⁴

this itself is an elevation in the thing,

as above.

And from this a lesson in the matter of the greatness of the value of the knowledge and thought of a person — that from this one learns both in the negative aspect,

how much one must be careful from an improper thought,

for in addition to the severity of the matter in itself it also harms the world around it²⁵,

and the positive — and the measure of good is greater — in the greatness of the elevation and the need for a good thought,

to think about the welfare of another,

that in addition to the help in actual deed or speech,

also thought helps greatly²⁶.

<pg>64</pg>

And by means of each one of Israel thinking only good about the other,

behold, a good thought the Holy One, blessed be He, joins to action²⁷,

that the Holy One, blessed be He, brings that it will be actualized and in actual deed,

and reveals in each one of Israel,

in whatever state he is,

the

(concealment)

good that is in him,

that it will come into actuality in his thought, speech and action,

in daily life in the fulfillment of the Torah and its commandments,

And by this we bring closer the true and complete redemption,

the coming of all Israel, all who dwell on their land,

and the fulfillment of the commandment of terumah and all the commandments dependent on the land,

according to their simple meaning in all the details,

and according to all opinions, from the Torah,

speedily in our days, literally.

(From the talk of Shabbos Parshas Eikev 5745)