English translation — שופטים א

Talk 1<pg>98</pg>

A.

In Rashi at the beginning of our portion: "Judges and officers" — judges are the decisors who decide the law,

and officers<sup>1</sup>

who coerce the people to follow their command<sup>2</sup>

who strike and bind with a stick and strap until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge.

And it is written in the commentaries<sup>3</sup>,

that "what he added

[Rashi,

that judges are judges]

the judges who decide the law, although it is known that every judge decides the law, in order to explain to you why he needed to say further officers, and therefore he explained that this judge does only the verdict and nothing more, that he does not enforce it,

and an officer is one who forces and compels him to fulfill the judge's command".

But it requires clarification<sup>4</sup>

: also the meaning of "officer" — and even in relation to judgment — is already known<sup>5</sup>

above in the portion of Devarim<sup>6</sup>

"And I took the heads of your tribes, wise men etc. and officers for your tribes",

That is to say, in addition to the appointment of the "judges"

("wise men etc."),

there were also appointed "officers for your tribes"<sup>7</sup>,

and as Rashi explains there "And officers I appointed over you for your tribes,

these are those who bind and strike with a strap according to the judges" — and what reason did Rashi need to explain it here once again?

And even more puzzling — that specifically here,

in the second time,

Rashi elaborates more than in his commentary in Parshat Devarim: there he wrote briefly "these are the binders and those who strike with a strap by the order of the judges",

and here he adds: a)

At the beginning of the commentary — "the rulers<sup>8</sup>

the people"

(which simply his intention is to explain that the word "shoter" here is from the term ruling<sup>9</sup>).

b)

And at the end of the commentary — "until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge".

Also there are several changes in Rashi's language:

(a)

In Parshat Devarim he wrote "by the order of the judges",

and here "after their command"<sup>10</sup>.

(b)

In Parshat Devarim he wrote "the binders and the strikers",

and here he reverses the order —<pg>99</pg>

"They would flog and bind"<sup>11</sup>.

(c)

In Parshat Devarim it only mentions "with a strap",

and here it adds "with a stick and a strap"<sup>12</sup>.

2.

And therefore it seems to say,

that according to Rashi, the "officers" here and the "officers" in Parshat Devarim are not the same,

but rather they are two types of officers:

In parshas Devarim it stands regarding "officers" who are the ones who carry out the ruling of the court,

that the judges decide what the punishment is,

and the officers are the ones who punish in practice.

And in our parshah it stands regarding officers whose function is to threaten the defendant that he accept upon himself the judgment of the judge.

That is, not the execution of the court's ruling,

but rather to compel the defendant that he accept upon himself to fulfill the court's ruling

(such as one whom the court ruled that he is obligated to pay money to his fellow and he does not want to pay,

that the officers compel him to pay the money)¹³.

And with this are explained the differences of language between the two commentaries of Rashi mentioned above:

In Parshat Devarim he writes that the officers are "those who bind and strike etc. according to the judges,"

that is,

that they carry out in practice the instructions of the judges,

and therefore he wrote "these are the ones who bind and strike with a strap" — in accordance with the order of the punishment of lashes,

that at first they bind the one being lashed¹⁴,

and afterwards they strike him with a strap.

But in our parshah Rashi writes that the officers are "those who coerce the people...

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge",

that this is the second manner of the officers — that they coerce the litigant

("they coerce the people"),

"until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge".

And therefore it is not written here "according to the judges" but "after their command",

meaning that their function is not

(only)

to carry out the instruction of the court

("the mouth of the judges")

but to coerce the subject to accept upon himself the command<sup>15</sup>

(and authority)

of the judges

(in general),

and if he does not want to accept upon himself the command of the judge — then the officers "strike and bind etc. until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge".

And with this is also understood the reason for the other changes in Rashi's language:

a)

In our parshah it says "they beat and bind"

(and not as in parshas Devarim — "they bind and beat")

— because here the intent is to coerce the defendant to accept the judgment upon himself,

and therefore Rashi enumerates two modes of coercion from the light to the severe: "they beat

(and if this does not help —)

and they bind"

(meaning that they restrain him etc.).

b)

In parshas Devarim it mentions only "strap" and not<pg>100</pg>

"Makel" — because the punishment of lashes is with a strap¹⁶

and not striking with a stick¹⁷

; but not so in our parshah where the intent is to the officers "who rule over the people" that they will fear the judge and accept upon themselves the judgment of the judge,

they need

(sometimes)

also a stick.

And on the contrary — Rashi precedes "Makel" because this is a sign of "ruling"¹⁸.

— But according to the above, one must understand in the matter itself: what is the necessity

(in the simple explanation of the verse)

that there should be two types of officers:

(the ones mentioned in Parshat Devarim)

"those who bind etc. by the order of the judges" and officers

(of our parshah)

"who rule over the people..

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge"¹⁹?

3.

And one must say the explanation in this:

"Judge" in the Torah

(in the plain sense)

is not only a judge who decides the law,

but also the one who executes the law in practice²⁰,

and as explained above at the end of Parshat Balak²¹,

that Moses said "to the judges of Israel, slay each man his men."

And it is explained in Rashi there "slay each man his men — each and every one of the judges of Israel would kill two etc."

And likewise later regarding the punishment of lashes it is explicit in the verse²²

"and the judge shall cause him to fall and strike him etc."

And based on this it is understood that it is impossible to explain that "officers" here are those who carry out the sentence in practice

(as in Parshat Devarim)

— for this is included in the command of "judges..

you shall give for yourself."

And it is not comparable to "and officers for your tribes" in Parshat Devarim,

that Rashi explained that it was a separate appointment²³

over "those who bind and strike..

according to the judges" — because in the verse there the judges were not called by the name "judges"²⁴

(rather as it is stated "And I took the heads of your tribes, wise and well-known men, and I appointed them as heads over you, captains of thousands etc."),

and it is understood that what is stated afterwards "and officers for your tribes" can be interpreted as those who carry out the instructions of the judges in practice²⁵

(and both are called by the name "judges" — and all were included in what is stated in the verse after this²⁶

"And I commanded your judges at that time etc. 'And you shall judge righteously etc.'").

But not so in our portion where it is said "Judges and officers you shall appoint for yourself",

behold that the "officers" are not included in "judges" —<pg>101</pg>

And therefore Rashi here²⁷

that the intention is to those "who coerce the people according to the command

(of the judges)..

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge" — these coercers are not connected to the essence of the judgment

(not to the instruction and also not to the execution of the judgment in practice),

but to the coercion of the people that they will fear the judges and accept upon themselves their judgment,

as above at length.

4.

But still needs explanation — to the other side:

Since it is possible to explain that "shotrim" are "those who rule the people" — from where does Rashi have to explain in Parshat Devarim that "shotrim" there means "those who bind and strike...

according to the judges"?

And especially that we find in several places

(as above)

that the judges themselves carry out the judgment in practice,

and from where does Rashi have that there was a special appointment for such shotrim?

And one could say,

Rashi hints at the necessity for his interpretation,

by the extra wording there "And officers — I appointed over you for your tribes these are the binders etc.'",

for at first glance,

the novelty in Rashi there is²³

that the officers are an appointment in themselves

(and not that the judges that he gave "heads over you" are themselves the officers),

and it should have said "And officers — I appointed for your tribes",

and what is his intention in the word "over you" — and is it not simple that the appointment is over the children of Israel?

Rather, by this Rashi hints at the necessity for the continuation of his interpretation "these are the binders etc. by the order of the judges":

If the "police" are "those who rule over the people..

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge",

then the content of this appointment is not — dominion over Bnei Yisrael&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;,

but rather assistance to the judges

[since the discussion is about a litigant who does not obey him,

he needs police who will threaten the litigant to accept the judgment of the judge]

— and if so, the verse should have said "and police for

(assist)

your judges"?

And therefore Rashi explained that the intention is to "those who bind and strike..

according to the judges" — based on this it is understood that this is an appointment over Bnei Yisrael

("over you"),

because they are two parts in the appointment of judges

(over Bnei Yisrael)

: a)

wise men etc. — who teach Bnei Yisrael the law,

b)

the police who carry out and execute the law in practice&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;.

And we must explain the reason that in the days of Moshe Rabbeinu we do not find that they appointed "shotrim" to coerce the people to accept upon themselves the judgment of the judge — because

(according to the simple explanation&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;)

in the days of Moshe when he appointed the judges,

they did not need this,

because the Children of Israel were afraid of the judges and did not need shotrim to threaten them etc.; but not so in our parshah,

which is a commandment for generations,

in every situation that may be,

therefore they were commanded to appoint "shotrim" — "who coerce the people...

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge"

(that they should be prepared if the situation requires conduct of coercion).

&lt;pg&gt;102&lt;/pg&gt;

5.

According to the above we must explain the sugya in the Gemara in Maseches Sanhedrin&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;

:

(And these are the judgments)

which you shall place³¹

which you shall teach them — it should have said

(But)..

these are the tools of the judges,

Rav Huna, when he would go out to judgment, would say thus: Bring me out my tools from my store: a staff and a strap and a shofar

(for excommunication and ostracism.

Rashi)

and a sandal

(for halitzah.

Rashi),

And I commanded your judges at that time²⁶

Said Rabbi Yochanan: Corresponding to a staff and a strap you shall be zealous

(that they should cast awe upon the public for the sake of Heaven.

Rashi).

And it requires explanation — why did Rabbi Yochanan mention only "a staff and a strap" and omit the other tools of the judges that were mentioned before this — "a shofar and a sandal"?

Regarding the "sandal" that is for chalitzah, one can answer,

because it is not related to instilling fear in the public — but it is not understood why he omitted "shufra"³².

And according to what we have learned

(in the explanation of Rashi's method on the Torah)

one can say,

that the two statements in the Gemara discuss two different matters:

The explanation of "the vessels of the judges",

namely the vessels needed for the actions of the court: a sandal for chalitzah — specifically in court,

(and in Rashi's commentary in the Talmud there)

"a strap,

for lashes.

A staff,

for the lash of rebellion etc.³³.

A shofar,

for excommunication and ban";

But not so that which "opposite a staff and a strap you shall be diligent",

the intention is to the officers³⁴,

whose role is to impose fear upon the public

(in Rashi's language in our parshah — "who subdue the people..

with a staff and a strap..

until he accepts upon himself the judgment of the judge"),

and therefore it did not mention here "shofar" for ban and excommunication,

for they are not actions of the officers,

but rather of the judges.

And this is also the opinion of the Rambam,

that the matter of the "police"

(in our parshah)

is that the people will accept the judgment upon themselves,

and his language³⁵

: "These police are masters of stick and strap and they stand before the judges who go around in the markets and streets and at the stores to fix the prices etc. and to strike

(another version: and to fix)

every perversion..

And everything they see as a perverted matter they bring him to the court and they judge him according to his wickedness" — behold, these police are not those who execute the verdict of the judges,

but they are "masters of stick and strap³⁶..

who go around in the markets and streets"<pg>103</pg>

to fix the conduct of the people and to bring a "perverted matter" before the court

(and the court "judges him according to his wickedness"³⁷)].

6.

And in this way another question is simply resolved regarding the commandment of appointing "judges and officers":

All enumerators of the commandments counted the appointment of judges and officers as one commandment,

even though superficially they are two separate actions,

the appointment of judges and the appointment of officers

(as emphasized in the language of the baraita³⁸

"From where [do we derive] that judges are appointed for Israel? The verse states 'Judges you shall appoint,'

officers for Israel from where [do we derive]? The verse states 'Officers you shall appoint'")

— and why were they not enumerated as two commandments?

y”m³⁹

that judges and officers hinder each other⁴⁰,

and therefore they were counted as one commandment

(as the Rambam wrote⁴¹

that if parts of a commandment hinder each other they are counted as one commandment),

and they brought a proof from what they said in the Sifri⁴²

“If there are officers there are judges; if there are no officers there are no judges”,

and in the Tanchuma⁴³

“If there is no officer there is no judge,

how so,

since when a person is obligated in court to his fellow, if there is no officer to extract from him, because when he departs from the judge, the judge has no power to do anything to him unless he hands him over to the officer”,

and it is found that “through these and these together the judgment is completed”.

But it is forced to explain thus,

for in practical law it is not mentioned in the Rambam that judges and officers hinder each other,

and simply, even if they are unable

(for whatever reason)

to appoint officers,

they are obligated in the appointment of judges⁴⁴.

[And simply,

also the intention of the Sifri

(and the Tanchuma)

is not for law that "if there are no officers there are no judges",

but only for the benefit of the matter,

that without officers it is possible that the matter of judgment will not come to fruition — but in practice they are obligated to appoint judges even without officers⁴⁵.

And it is possible that the matter of judgment will come to fruition even without

(the threat of)

officers⁴⁶.

And furthermore, primarily there is need and necessity for "judges" to instruct in all matters of the Torah

(most of which are not connected with punishment and the like)].

Seemingly, one can say based on the words of the Rambam⁴¹

(regarding techelet and white that were counted as one commandment,

even though they do not impede each other)

"that even the parts that do not impede each other sometimes will be<pg>104</pg>

One mitzvah when the matter is one" — and indeed also in our case

(in the language of the aforementioned commentators³⁹)

"Certainly judges and police officers their matter is one."

But still one can discuss this,

because the aforementioned rule in the Rambam was not stated and established in every place,

and as the commentators elaborated⁴⁷

to raise difficulties upon it and among them — from the matter of tefillin of the hand and of the head were counted as two mitzvot,

and "behold the tefillin are considered more one matter

(techelet and white)

" — and they answered that in tefillin they are "two actions"

(two wearings)⁴⁸,

and also "their order and their form are not one but there is in them great difference and above all the difference of their place these on the head and these on the hand"⁴⁹,

And based on this, also in our subject — behold, the appointment of the judges and the appointment of the officers are "two actions,"

and also in their content "there is a great difference between them" — and the difficulty returns to its place,

why were they not counted as two commandments?

And according to what we have learned regarding the nature of the officers — the matter is resolved simply:

If the matter of the officers is to uphold and carry out the verdict of the judges in practice,

and "judges" are only those who instruct and rule the law — then it turns out that the matter of judgment is divided

(in the Torah)

into two different parts — the instruction of the law

(by the judges),

and the execution of the verdict

(by the officers)

; then there is room to count the appointment of the officers as a separate commandment⁵⁰,

for even though their matter is one

(judgment)

they are "two actions",

two appointments

(as above sec. 4)

;

But according to the above that the role of the judges includes

(not only instruction,

but)

also execution of the law,

and all the matter of the officers is only assistance to the judges,

for if the judge cannot carry out his verdict in practice,

then one must use "masters of staff and arm" who will force the litigant "to accept the verdict" — it is simple why the appointment of the officers was not counted as a separate commandment,

for

(a)

this is a detail in the matter of carrying out the judgment in practice by the judges⁵¹.

(b)

And the main point: it is not at all an essential matter to the content of the matter of judgment,

for it is possible to bring the judgment to light

(also in practice)

without officers.

7.

The meaning of the Torah in Rashi's commentary:

Known are the words of the Shach on the Torah⁵²,

that "Judges and officers you shall appoint for yourself in all your gates" also refers to "the gates of the body",

the eyes and the ears etc.,

"to teach a person that he should have an officer and a ruler over each and every one of these limbs etc."

And behold, simply,

the distinction between "judges" and "officers" in this matter is,

that the appointment of "judges"

(judges)

is fulfilled through the study of the laws of the Torah,

to know the deed which they shall do and those which they shall not do; and the appointment of "officers" is fulfilled through the fulfillment of the laws of the Torah in actual deed.

But according to what was explained above, it is understood,

that also the matters of the "deed" are included in the appointment of "judges" itself&lt;pg&gt;105&lt;/pg&gt;

(Like "judges" simply, whose role is also to carry out their judgment,

as above).

And the reason can be said,

for "the purpose of wisdom is repentance and good deeds"⁵³,

and if the study does not lead to action,

it is lacking

(not only in action,

but)

also in the study itself,

as explained elsewhere⁵⁴.

And according to this explanation it must be said,

that the matter of the "officers" is⁵⁵

when a person's evil inclination overpowers him and there is a need to beat it so that it does not confuse him from Torah and service,

that then one needs an "officer" — to incite his good inclination against his evil inclination⁵⁶,

and to "strike it"

(with striking of words)

"to say to it: you are evil and wicked and abominable and detestable and vile etc.'"⁵⁷,

by which the dominion of the inclination is nullified etc.

And based on this, the language of the promise "And I will restore your judges as at first etc."⁵⁸ is understood

— and "officers" are not mentioned — because then the evil will be nullified and there will be no need for "officers",

but only "judges" — the study of Torah and the fulfillment of the commandments,

"they will go from strength to strength" in holiness itself⁵⁹.

(From the talk of Shabbat Parshat Shoftim 5725)