English translation — בהר א

Talk a*

pg 154

A.

We learned at the end of tractate Sheviit: "All movable items are acquired by pulling,

and whoever keeps his word, the spirit of the sages is pleased with him."

That is to say,

even though according to the essence of the law the seller can retract since he has not yet acquired by pulling¹,

nevertheless,

when he does not retract but rather keeps his word,

the spirit of the sages is pleased with him.

And in the Yerushalmi there it brings a dispute between R' Yochanan and Rav,

according to R' Yochanan — "he said to give a gift to another and sought to retract,

he retracts"; and "Rav disagrees,

for Rav said,

when I say to my household to give a gift to a person,

I do not

(I do not<sup>2</sup>)

retract",

that he fulfills his word to give the gift.

And in the continuation of the sugya the Yerushalmi raises a difficulty from the incident of Rav<sup>3</sup>,

"a certain person deposited a pledge on salt

(he made a purchase with someone for salt and gave him a pledge on the purchase),

and it became expensive

(the salt became expensive,

and the seller wanted to retract),

he came before Rav,

he said to him,

either he will give him all his pledge

(all that is against his pledge he will give him according to its value so much salt),

or

(if he does not want the purchase)

he will hand over to him the one who was exacted payment from

(for with part of the money he received he is at least obligated to accept upon himself 'mi shepara'),

Rav's system is contradicted,

there he says when I say to my household to give a gift to a person I do not retract

(by mere speech the recipient acquires)

and here he says thus"

(that even a seller who received a pledge on part can retract).

And he answers,

"There [it was] according to the attribute of judgment, and what Rav practiced was according to the attribute of piety"

(In this incident it is according to the attribute of judgment,

for according to the law he ruled thus,

and what Rav practiced himself is according to the attribute of piety,

that even though according to the law the recipient did not acquire it,

he acted beyond the line of the law,

and practiced himself the attribute of piety).

And in the commentaries<sup>4</sup>

they raised a difficulty from another incident of Rav

(in the Yerushalmi tractate Bava Metzia<sup>5</sup>),

"Rav commanded his attendant: When I tell you to give a gift to a person,

if he is poor, give it to him immediately,

and if he is rich, consult me a second time"

("Rav would command his attendant,

when I say to you give a gift to a poor person,

give it to him immediately,

and do not ask me again,

because I cannot retract,

and if he is rich,

consult me a second time whether I have not retracted"<sup>6</sup>).

Behold, there is here a contradiction in the conduct of Rav — for here

(at the end of Tractate Shevi'it)

it is explicit that Rav acted according to the measure of piety and did not retract his words,

whereas in Bava Metzia there he commanded his servant not to rely on his statement,

and not to give until he asks him again — opposite of the conduct of not changing from his speech.

<pg>155</pg>

B.

In the commentaries are said⁷

several explanations on the matter⁸

:

a)

The distinction between the two behaviors is because one deals with a small gift and the second with a large gift

(And as the Talmud distinguishes in Bava Metzia<sup>9</sup>

according to the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan who holds that words have [the prohibition of] breach of trust,

that it is only regarding a small gift, where the recipient relies on it,

whereas regarding a large gift there is no [prohibition of] breach of trust,

for he does not rely on it).

For in the incident in Tractate Sheviis it deals with a small gift, where he thus acted according to the measure of piety that he did not retract; and likewise there

(in the Yerushalmi Bava Metzia)

regarding a gift to a poor person,

for generally a gift to a poor person is a small gift; but "a wealthy person does not reconsider twice",

since to a wealthy person they give a large gift<sup>10</sup>,

he did not act stringently in this even according to the measure of piety

(And like Rabbi Yochanan who is stringent regarding words,

and nevertheless he holds that in this there is no [prohibition of] breach of trust).

b)

In the Yerushalmi Bava Metzia there it deals with the matter of the time of giving,

whether it is permitted to postpone it after the time,

and the distinction between a poor person and a wealthy person is that a statement to a poor person, which is in the category of charity, has the law of a vow<sup>11</sup>

and it is subject to the prohibition of delaying<sup>12</sup>

therefore he must give it immediately,

but regarding a wealthy person, where there is no vow in this, it is permitted to postpone the giving after the time.

But according to the law of keeping one's word, he would not retract even regarding a wealthy person.

3)

This that [the case of] the end of the Sabbatical year deals when he said to give in the presence of the recipient of the gift,

therefore even though in a substantial gift his mind does not rely, nevertheless there is a measure of piety not to retract from what he promised,

but in the Yerushalmi Bava Metzia there it deals not in the presence of the recipient of the gift and only to his servant he informed that he would give the gift¹³,

and therefore there is a difference between a poor person that it becomes like a vow, unlike a rich person,

for since the recipient of the gift does not know,

there is not in it even a measure of piety not to retract¹⁴.

But in addition to the difficulty and the strain that is in each of these explanations¹⁵

— it requires examination in the essence of the matter,

for seemingly from the plainness of the words of the Yerushalmi here it is understood that the conduct of the measure of piety of Rav was that he never retracted from his speech,

and it was<pg>156</pg>

He fulfills his word even though according to the law he was not obligated in this,

And according to this reason there is no difference whether the recipient is rich or whether it is a large gift

(and the recipient does not rely on it)

or whether it is not in the presence of the recipient etc. — because in any case this is a change in his speech,

that he does not fulfill what he says; and one cannot say based on the great measure of piety of Rav

(Rav especially used to practice the ten matters of piety&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;)

that he did not fulfill his word in its particulars.

And although in the Bavli it is stated&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;

that Rav disagrees with Rabbi Yochanan and holds that words do not involve breach of faith — behold, there too the discussion is according to the law and not regarding the unique conduct of Rav himself; but not so regarding that which is in the Yerushalmi Bava Metzia which deals with the conduct of Rav himself, like that regarding Shevi'it&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;.

3.

And it appears to explain this with the introduction of the precision in the change of language in the two sugyas of the Yerushalmi: At the end of Shevi'is, the language of Rav is "when I say to my household",

And in Bava Metzia the language — "Rav commanded his attendant".

[And one cannot say that because this conduct was a measure of piety,

therefore to his household he wanted to show and educate them in the measure of piety,

but not so to his attendant, for whose education he is not responsible&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;

— for even when "he commanded his attendant",

the discussion is conduct as his agent of Rav].

And it seems to me that the distinction is,

that in his words to his household members Rav spoke about the private money and property of Rav and his household members,

but what he said to his servants specifically

(for it is not applicable to say to his household members)

discusses not his private property of Rav and his household members,

but rather property that is in his possession by virtue of being Rav in his city,

that several types of property are in his possession and under his responsibility

(even though they are not his),

such as: the community fund,

money

(of an individual or many)

that was given to him to distribute or to be in charge of its distribution to charity.

And the like²⁰.

And it is understood that regarding this property that is in his possession

(which is not his),

Rav was accustomed to command the servant

(servant of the court)

and the like,

while regarding property

(matters)

that are in his house — Rav would command his household members,

including a steward and servant in his house.

And based on this, the difference between the incident of Rav in the Jerusalem Talmud Shevi'it and the incident in the Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia is understood.

The conduct of Rav regarding his private property

(about which he commanded his household)

was in the measure of piety not to change from his word

(even when this is connected to a monetary loss,

such as in a gift,

or in a sale when the market price increased and the like²¹)

; but regarding property that is not his,

rather property of the community

(or of an individual)

that is in his possession,

there is no place to be stringent upon himself to conduct with <pg>157</pg>

The trait of piety not to change in his speech,

since this is a matter that pertains to the congregation

(or to individuals)

whose property is found in his possession — and therefore his trait of piety

(of the Rav)

does not apply regarding this property

(of the congregation or the individuals).

And therefore,

both regarding the property of an individual that is found in his possession,

one must estimate the opinion of the owner of the property how much he wishes to give,

and regarding the community fund and the like,

one must estimate the opinion

(of the majority)

of the congregation and those responsible for the fund.

And therefore the Rav said to his attendant,

that when he tells him to give a gift to a poor person,

he should give him immediately,

because it is certain and clear to the Rav,

that not only regarding the community fund designated for the community charity do they rely on him

(the Rav)

to distribute them,

but also regarding an individual — it is pleasing to this individual,

since he is the Rav of the community,

that he give to the poor person; however, regarding a wealthy person he commanded "I will consult a second time",

because his initial statement to give was according to the opinion of the Rav

(himself),

and therefore he must estimate

(at least)

the opinion of the property owners — whether they agree to this gift

(to the wealthy person),

and therefore "I will consult a second time".

4.

And one must understand in this: Even if the discussion in Bava Metzia deals with the property of others,

nevertheless,

when the Rav later changed from his speech there is in this a lack of the trait of piety of the Rav

(because he does not stand by his speech — even though he has a reason for it).

And if so, then from the perspective of the trait of piety the Rav should not have spoken about this giving initially if it is possible that he will change his speech.

And furthermore: If the Rav was given the responsibility and full ownership

(as a gabbai and the like),

seemingly we do not care what the desire of the property owners is,

for is not everything in the authority of the Rav?

And one must say the explanation in this:

That which in tractate Sheviit, that from the aspect of the quality of piety, Rav did not retract from his statement,

the intention,

that in addition to this that after he said he did not retract,

behold, still this,

that this effected a change in the essence of his statement.

Since at the time of his statement his regular conduct is that "your yes

(should be)

righteousness"²²,

namely to fulfill his word and to justify it²³

(and certainly at the time of the utterance it must be "your yes is righteousness"²⁴

— that he should say to him certainty to give him,

and not in a joking manner and the like²⁵

— one with the mouth and one with the heart²⁶)

— through the speech alone he completes and acquires,

through the speech itself an acquisition is made²⁷

in the object that he gives as a gift.

And as is proven from the beginning of the words of the Yerushalmi Shevi'is there,

that they questioned the conduct of Rav — "A Mishnah contradicts Rav: When did they say&lt;pg&gt;158&lt;/pg&gt;

Movables are acquired by pulling in the public domain or in a courtyard that is not of either of them, etc. In the domain of the seller, he does not acquire until he lifts or until he pulls the entire item out of the owner's domain, etc.'"

[For at first glance,

what is the relevance of the words of Rav to the Baraisa?

Behold, Rav said that he would not retract his statement

(in order not to be among those lacking good faith,

or in order that the spirit of the Sages be pleased with him, etc.),

and not regarding the acquisition of the object,

whereas in the Baraisa it discusses the law of acquisition,

"He does not acquire until he lifts, etc."?

And it is proven from this]

that the Yerushalmi explains the words of Rav that he holds that there is an acquisition in this, and therefore he does not retract it,

as is written in the commentaries&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;,

and this is that it asks: "If regarding a seller and buyer they said that the buyer does not acquire until he lifts it or until he takes it out of the owner's domain,

all the more so regarding a recipient of a gift, he does not acquire by speech alone,

and why does Rav say, 'I do not retract'?"

[And it is simple according to what he answers in the Yerushalmi there: "Here, when he stood with him; there, when he did not stand with him,"

as explained by the commentators&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;,

that "Rav establishes this baraita when he did not stand the buyer with him, therefore he did not acquire until he acquires through the methods of acquisition; and that of Rav himself, when he stood the recipient with him at the time he said to give him and showed him what it is,"

since "he stood him with him,"

therefore he acquired&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;

and he does not retract]

—

Now, something similar to this can be said according to the conclusion of the Yerushalmi: "There, for the attribute of judgment; and what Rav practiced was the attribute of piety,"

that this, that Rav himself practiced the attribute of piety that he would not retract,

is not a different category from what he initially thought

(in the Yerushalmi)

in the opinion of Rav

(that his speech has acquisitional force).

That is,

that the attribute of piety of Rav

(not to retract from his speech)

does not mean that he did not later retract from his speech,

but rather that from his attribute of piety, his speech itself was in force,

that he finalized and transfers ownership&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;.

And based on this it will be understood that all this can be said only regarding the saying to his household members,

that regarding his personal objects and property, his speech has the force of a kinyan in the gift that he said to give to his fellow,

but when it concerns matters of another or of the community,

except that they are in his possession to command etc.,

as in the case of Bava Metzia that Rav instructed his attendant,

then a kinyan does not take effect on this property

(or even an obligation)

in the body of the gift

[and accordingly the "measure of piety" of Rav to stand by his speech does not apply here from the outset,

and if his speech is not fulfilled afterwards due to the owners of the property, there is no deficiency in his measure of piety].

And therefore "Rav instructed his attendant: When I say to you 'Give a gift to a certain person,' if he is poor, give it to him immediately, and if he is rich, consult me a second time,"

that the intention in this is not that regarding a poor person a vow is made and accordingly he cannot retract,

but rather the opposite

(and as the plain meaning of the continuation in the Yerushalmi there,

which brings the case of Rav in continuation of what preceded it, that he can retract)

— to emphasize by this the difference regarding the saying to his household members,

that here the kinyan is not

(and the like)

by means of the saying and speech,

that by his mere saying he fully transfers

(or obligates himself)

as in his saying to his household members,

but rather it depends on who the recipient is,

and therefore when the recipient is poor then he must give it to him immediately,

since he knows that also the intention of the owner of the property

(or the community)

is to give,

and there is no place for further clarification,

and as above.

&lt;pg&gt;159&lt;/pg&gt;

5.

And behold, all matters of the Torah are precise,

and it is understood from this,

that this that the conclusion of tractate Shevi'is is

(not only in matters of Shevi'is,

but)

in a law concerning monetary matters and the like — "and whoever fulfills his word, the spirit of the sages is pleased with him",

and in this itself the Gemara adds

(Yerushalmi)

about the conduct of Rav in this matter in a manner of the measure of piety — that this conduct of "whoever fulfills his word"

(and in a manner of the measure of piety)

is connected to the entirety of the content of the concept of "Shevi'is".

And we will explain this in the manner of the homily

(in the service of man),

with the preface of the statement of our sages, may their memory be blessed³¹

on the verse³²

"And the faithfulness of your times [shall be] etc.",

that "faithfulness — this is the Order of Seeds",

and "it is explained in the Yerushalmi that one believes in the Life of the worlds and sows"³³.

And it is explained elsewhere³⁴,

that although the matter of sowing is in nature and the conduct of the world,

creation,

and also a non-Jew who does not believe in the Living G-d sows and relies on his sowing,

nevertheless,

a Jewish man who sows does so not because this is the way of the world — like the conduct of his non-Jewish neighbor,

and even not because he himself has done so several times,

that he has already sown many times and each time the sowing brought forth growth etc. — but only because he "believes in the Living G-d and

(only therefore he)

sows"

(now).

And more deeply: the novelty in this that a Jewish man relies on the Holy One, blessed be He,

("the Living G-d")

when he sows,

can be in two ways³⁵

:

a)

He is confident that the sowing will bring about growth

(as is the nature of the world)

because he relies on the Holy One, blessed be He,

Who created the world and embedded the laws of nature in the manner of "seed and harvest etc. shall not cease"³⁶,

And only because of this is he confident that his sowing will succeed and bring forth growth.

For in this manner, the ways of nature occupy a place for him,

except that their importance is not from themselves but only because the Holy One, blessed be He, embedded these laws in creation.

b)

"who believes in the Eternal Life",

that the ways of nature have no place for him at all,

and he does not rely on them at all

(because he feels that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the Creator of nature every moment from nothing and the laws of nature have no existence at all)

— rather he sows only because of his faith in the Holy One, blessed be He,

that since the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded him to sow,

he is confident and certain that He, blessed be He, will make his sowing succeed so that it grows.

And this is the precise wording of our Sages, "who believes in the Eternal Life",

for if it were only because he relies on the Holy One, blessed be He, the Director of nature, there would be no need now for faith

(which is above intellect)

since with the addition of his father etc. this is more than a hundred times

(and one)

; but since for him the ways of nature have no place at all,

and he relies only on the Holy One, blessed be He,

that He, blessed be He, will make his sowing succeed — for this he needs faith that is above intellect.

6.

And based on this will be understood and sweetened the greatness of the matter of the commandment of the Sabbatical year,

that in its simple sense the root of this commandment is to instill and imprint in man the recognition that the growth in the land depends solely on the Holy One, blessed be He³⁷,

therefore God commanded "and the land shall rest a Sabbath to the Lord"³⁸,

in a manner that man relies solely on the Holy One, blessed be He,

and therefore even though "not<pg>160</pg>

We will sow and not gather in our produce"³⁹,

"And I will command⁴⁰

My blessing upon you etc.'

And it can be said,

that the intention in this commandment is not only for one who has not yet reached the level of "believes in the Eternal Life and sows" and therefore he needs the commandment of the Sabbatical year to instill in him this awareness,

but even one who sowed his field during the six years in the manner of "believes in the Eternal Life and sows"

(as above)

— nevertheless,

also by him the commandment of the Sabbatical year effects a fundamental innovation.

And the explanation of this:

During the six years,

even though the person knows that the laws of nature and the act of his sowing are not the true cause of the growth of the grain and the fruits,

nevertheless,

since in practice there is in this the doing of man,

and the blessing of G-d comes to him through his doing,

"And the L-rd your G-d will bless you in all that you do"⁴¹

specifically,

his faith in the Life of the worlds is not discernible openly and to the eyes of flesh;

And specifically in the seventh year,

when he does not sow etc. and there is no action and work of man,

and nevertheless he is engaged in the study of Torah⁴²

in tranquility without any worry,

this indicates his faith in the Life of the worlds.

7.

And according to all the above will be understood the connection of Shemittah to the conduct of "He fulfills His word"

(until the ultimate perfection in this in a manner of the quality of Chassidus,

and up to the conduct of a Rav)

:

The ways of acquisitions exist also among the nations of the world,

that when a person makes an acquisition

(according to the ways of acquisition in each country,

the customs in every place and location)

the item passes into his ownership.

But regarding a Jewish person,

the validity in his act of acquisition is not because it is accepted in the ways of the world, but because so the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded in His Torah,

and gave us the laws of acquisitions,

as it is written⁴³

"When you sell [etc.] or buy from the hand of your fellow" and the like.

And the Mishnah adds at the end of Sheviit,

that there is a conduct even more elevated,

that "whoever fulfills his word",

even though there was here no act of acquisition,

and thus not only from the side of the ways of the world was the object not acquired,

but also from the side of the Torah according to the strict law

(which gave validity to the ways of acquisitions)

seemingly there is no acquisition — nevertheless,

due to the greatness of his pious trait

(which comes from the general commandment of the Torah regarding one who stands by his speech),

since he obligated himself with his speech,

it is considered by him that the item has already been acquired,

and he fulfills his word.

And may it be His will that through the study of tractate Shevi'it until its completion and conclusion,

we will soon merit to fulfill this mitzvah in actuality,

that the prophecy "You have favored, O Lord, Your land

("Observe the Shemittah years")

the Sabbath of rest for Jacob"&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;,

with the coming of Mashiach our righteousness,

who will lead us upright to our land this year&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;

— the year "your hands will be desisted"&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;

— literally.

(From the talks of 6 Tishrei and Shabbat Parshat Haazinu 5747)