English translation — קדושים א

Sicha 1<pg>112</pg>

A.

The Rambam wrote<sup>1</sup>

: "Anyone who robs his fellow of a perutah is as if he takes his soul from him, as it is said<sup>2</sup>

Such are the ways of everyone who gains by violence; it takes the life of its owners<sup>3</sup>

he takes".

And according to its simple meaning,

the source of the words is the statement of Rabbi Yochanan in Bava Kama<sup>4</sup>.

But in the Gemara there it continues: "And it says<sup>5</sup>

And he will eat your harvest and your bread

[they will eat]

Your sons and your daughters and it says<sup>6</sup>

Because of the violence of the children of Yehuda who shed innocent blood in their land and it says<sup>7</sup>

To Shaul and to the house of blood because he killed the Givonim",

And the Gemara explains "What is 'and it says',

And if you say, his own soul, but the soul of his sons and daughters not,

Come and hear: the flesh of his sons and daughters<sup>8</sup>,

And if you say, these words are where he did not give money, but where he gave money not,

Come and hear: Because of the violence of the children of Yehuda who shed innocent blood in their land,

And if you say, these words are where he does directly, but indirectly not, come and hear: To Shaul and to the house of blood etc.'".

And it needs to be understood why the Rambam did not bring the continuation,

That one who robs etc. is as if he also sheds the blood of his sons and daughters,

And that this prohibition is also regarding a robber,

And even regarding indirect causation<sup>9</sup>?

In simple terms, one must say,

that the continuation of the statement of Rabbi Yochanan was not said as halacha, but rather as words of aggadah regarding the severity of the sin of theft,

and therefore the Rambam did not bring them,

for it is not the subject of his book Yad HaChazakah — a book of halachos — to bring all the homilies regarding the severity of the prohibition of theft.

But from the words of the Rambam it is proven that he holds that the statement of Rabbi Yochanan "Whoever robs, etc." was said as halacha¹⁰,

for in the continuation of this statement he writes

(And in particular — in that same halacha)

"And even so, if the stolen object no longer exists and the robber wishes to repent and came on his own and returned the value of the stolen object, it is a rabbinic enactment that we do not accept from him, but rather we assist him and forgive him, in order to draw near the straight path for those who return, and whoever accepts from him the value of the stolen object, the sages are not pleased with him."

That is, the Rambam brought this statement not

(only)

to explain the severity of the prohibition of robbery¹¹

(and to note<pg>113</pg>

that if this were the Rambam's intention, he should have brought it immediately at the beginning of the laws of robbery¹²,

or at their end,

as is his way in such matters¹³),

but rather in connection with the halacha¹⁴

regarding the enactment for penitents.

And it must be said that he holds that this severity in the prohibition of robbery

("as if he takes his soul, etc.'")

is a matter of halacha.

And if so, why did he not bring that this also applies to extortion and through indirect causation

(and likewise,

it is as if he takes the souls of his sons and daughters)?

2.

And this will be understood by prefacing an explanation of the reason of the matter,

that one who robs his fellow of a perutah is as if he takes his soul.

For behold, the Tosafot wrote elsewhere¹⁵,

that it is "because sometimes there is a severe famine and he has nothing with which to buy."

And that is,

that this law, that one who robs his fellow of a perutah is as if he takes his soul, speaks when the robbed person lacks "so much,"

that in a situation of "severe famine" he would buy with this perutah¹⁶

the life of his soul¹⁷,

and it is found that the robbery can bring about actual taking of the soul.

[And it is understood,

that it is not at all reasonable to say,

that the intention of the Tosafot is,

that since sometimes a situation may occur

(which is not common at all)

that the robbery brings about taking of the soul

("severe famine and he has nothing with which to buy"),

therefore it is considered "anyone who robs..

a perutah is as if he takes his soul"!

Furthermore: the intention of the Tosafos in this is to settle the words of the Gemara¹⁸

"Greater is the oppression of words than the oppression of money",

and R. Elazar explains "this is regarding his body and this is regarding his money" — even though "one who robs his neighbor of a perutah is as if he robbed his soul",

because this that "one who robs his neighbor etc. — this is because sometimes there is a severe famine and he has nothing with which to buy, but there are many people who are not lacking so much".

And it is proven from this that the Tosafos hold,

that the words of R. Yochanan "as if he takes his soul" were not said regarding every robbery¹⁹,

and on the contrary,

regarding "many people" it is not applicable to say so,

therefore "greater is the oppression of words than the oppression of money..

this is regarding his body and this

(only)

regarding his money"].

But it is impossible to explain thus in the words of the Rambam,

who writes explicitly "anyone who robs his neighbor etc.",

which implies that this is in all circumstances²⁰.

[And according to the Tosafos, apparently one must say,

that before them the version was "one who robs his fellow",

and not "anyone who robs etc.",

and thus it is explicitly cited there²¹

"and that which we say in chapter HaGozel Basra, one who robs his fellow etc."].

<pg>114</pg>

And furthermore: according to the Tosafos, one must say,

that what they said "one who robs his fellow..

it is as if he takes his soul" is not precise,

for the same applies to one who steals from his fellow a perutah²²,

for this reason "because sometimes there is a severe famine and he has nothing with which to buy" applies also to theft,

that in any case he takes his soul from him.

And as is proven from the Tosafos' question on the Gemara's statement "greater is verbal wronging than monetary wronging..

this is in his body and that is in his money",

that the discussion is about monetary wronging,

and it must be said that the Tosafos hold that also one who wrongs his fellow a perutah, it is as if he takes his soul²³.

But not according to the opinion of the Rambam,

for from the fact that the Rambam stated plainly

(in the language of the Talmud)

"Whoever robs, etc."

(and brought it in Hilchos Gezeilah),

it implies^*23,

that it refers only to robbery and not to other ways of taking another's money.

[And this difficulty exists also if we explain according to the Rambam's view,

that the reason that "Whoever robs, etc. is as if he takes his soul" is

(as stated in the commentaries²⁴)

because "money..

is also considered like one of his limbs..

as the Sages said many times, one who robs his fellow of a perutah is as if he takes his life..

the righteous²⁵

hold their money dearer than their body"

[And especially according to the words of our master the Alter Rebbe²⁶

regarding charity, that it is considered as if "he gives the life of his soul to G-d",

"since with this money

[that he gives to charity]

he could have purchased the life of his soul"]

— for even according to this explanation there is no difference between robbery and theft or other ways of taking another's money,

since when he causes him to lose his money which is "like one of his limbs" this is "as if he takes his soul"].

3.

And behold, ostensibly there is room to explain the reason for the matter,

according to what the Rambam said in the preceding laws²⁷

"Desire leads to coveting, and coveting leads to robbery, for if the owners do not wish to sell, even though he increased the price and importuned with friends, he will come to robbery, as it is said²⁸

And they coveted houses and robbed; and if the owners stood before him to save their property or prevented him from robbing, he will come to bloodshed."

And on this basis the Rambam adds, "Anyone who robs his fellow of a perutah is as if he takes his soul from him,"

for since robbery can lead to bloodshed,

therefore the Torah said²⁹

that immediately from the time of the robbery this definition applies to him, "as if he takes his soul."

That is: That which "anyone who robs etc. is as if he takes his soul" is not because the act of robbery itself brings about actual taking of a soul

(according to the method of the Tosafot,

"for sometimes there is severe famine and he has nothing with which to buy"),

but because the act of robbery can lead to an act of bloodshed³⁰,

and therefore the act of robbery itself is considered as an act of bloodshed³¹.

<pg>115</pg>

[And therefore this law is only regarding robbery,

because the reality of the owner standing before him to save his money or to prevent the robbery,

in a manner that will lead to bloodshed,

is — "in the majority of cases" — in robbery,

and not in theft&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;

and other modes of taking money].

But it is difficult to explain thus the intention of the Rambam because:

a)

If the intention of the Rambam is that these laws are a continuation of one content from topic to topic,

that when one forbidden act leads to another forbidden act, the first act is considered as if it includes the act that comes through it,

then he should have said first "Whoever covets is as if he robs"³³

and the like — similar to what he says later "Whoever robs..

a perutah's worth is as if he takes his soul."

And from the fact that he cited only this "Whoever robs etc." it implies that this is a special matter specifically in the prohibition of robbery.

b)

Why did he use the wording "as if he takes his soul from him",

and changed from the wording "shedding of blood" in the previous law?

3)

From the manner of the division of the laws in the Rambam, it is implied,

that this that "one who robs his fellow etc. is as if he takes his soul" is not a continuation and conclusion of the laws preceding this

(as in the law preceding this one³⁴

— "you have learned that one who covets transgresses one negative commandment etc."),

but it is a new matter.

4.

And therefore it seems to me,

that the Rambam holds,

that the reason of "as if he takes his soul" is not because the act of robbery is liable to bring about bloodshed

(in actuality),

but from the aspect of the taking itself of "a person's property by force"³⁵,

against the will of the owner: taking "a person's property by force" is not only an action of taking his fellow's property,

but through this action he nullifies and abolishes the person's ownership over his property,

and therefore this is "as if he takes his soul from him".

And it is learned from the verse "he takes the life of its owner",

since his ownership over this object is abolished by the robbery,

this is like taking his soul.

And this rule is in every one who robs his fellow of the value of a perutah,

without distinction whether his fellow is poor or rich

[except that if it is less than the value of a perutah,

that less than the value of a perutah is not money³⁶,

it is not considered as "taking his soul"³⁷,

since in this manner he does not nullify ownership of "property"³⁸],

And it is understood that this is only in robbing his fellow,

<pg>116</pg>

and not in theft or in other manners³⁹

of monetary oppression⁴⁰.

[And according to the Rambam this is not included in that of Bava Metzia that verbal wronging is greater than monetary wronging

(for this is in his body and that is in his money),

that this is only in monetary wronging and not in robbing his fellow].

And based on this one can resolve why the Rambam did not bring the continuation of the Gemara that it also applies to the persons of the sons and daughters of the robbed one and also in extortion and in indirect causation,

for the Rambam holds that the essence of the law is learned only from the first verse "the life of its owner he shall take",

and the intention of Rabbi Yochanan in bringing the other verses is to add an additional stringency that applies only in certain conditions: if the robbed one has children who might die as a result of this robbery⁴¹

— their "death" is attributed to the robber; a special novelty in extortion that is not of the same type as "as if he takes his soul from him" like in robbery⁴²,

for since he gives money,

and does not simply take it against the will of the owner,

he does not thereby nullify

(so much)

the ownership of the person over his money

(and on the contrary he acknowledges his ownership and therefore gives money)

; indirect causation — when he causes actual death that the death is attributed to him,

or when through his action he causes the cutting off of all source of vitality of the other

(as with the Gibeonites)⁴³.

And therefore the Rambam did not bring these details and these verses,

because here he brought only what pertains to the essence of the act of robbery

[Even robbery of a perutah's worth⁴³

which is something equal for all

(without additional conditions)],

namely that every act of robbery to which applies the prohibition of "Do not rob,"

applies to it also this severity of "as if he takes his soul" from the aspect of the essence of taking a person's money by force.

5.

Based on all the above, one can also explain the words of the Rambam in the continuation of this halacha: "And nevertheless, if the stolen object no longer exists and the robber wishes to repent and came of his own accord and returned the value of the stolen object, it is a rabbinic enactment that we do not accept from him, but rather we assist him and forgive him in order to draw near the straight path for those who return, and whoever accepts from him the value of the stolen object, the spirit of the sages is not pleased with him."

At first glance it is not understood: For in this chapter, several halachos before&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;

the Rambam already brought the matter of "the enactment for returnees" — that if "one stole a beam and built it into a building, since it has not changed, the law of the Torah is that he should demolish the entire building and return the beam to its owners,

but the Sages enacted, for the sake of the enactment for returnees, that he should give its value and not&lt;pg&gt;117&lt;/pg&gt;

cause a loss to the building",

and if so, it is puzzling why the Rambam wrote this detail in the enactment for returnees

(when the stolen object is not extant)

after several halachos and did not write it above,

in continuation of the enactment for returnees not to cause a loss to the building&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;?

And based on the above, it can be said,

that this is because the details of this enactment

(as the Rambam elaborated)

—

(a)

that it only deals when the stolen object is not extant,

(b)

that the robber wants to repent,

(c)

and furthermore — that "he came on his own and returned the money of the robbery",

(d)

that not only do we not accept from him,

"but we help him and forgive him in order to bring near the straight path for the penitents" — belong to the above category in the prohibition of robbery,

that it is as if he takes his soul,

due to the very act of taking by "force",

against the will of the owner.

Explanation of the matter:

The intention of the Rambam in the continuation of his language in this halacha — "Anyone who robs etc. is as if he takes his soul..

And nevertheless etc." — it can be said,

that it is

[not only to explain,

that since robbery is as severe as bloodshed, therefore it would be logical that the repentance of the robber is most severe,

and therefore it teaches us regarding the enactment for returnees that they were lenient with it — but rather even more]

to explain the essence and definition of "the enactment for returnees"

(as below section 6).

For behold, ostensibly there is room to wonder: regarding the monetary damage in the act of robbery there is room for this enactment,

for money is subject to forgiveness on the part of the robbed party

(and also the court has the power to declare property ownerless),

but since the act of robbery is considered as taking a soul,

how did the Sages enact that one should forgo returning the stolen object,

when forgiveness of money has no power to nullify this, that the act of robbery is as taking a soul?

And this difficulty is hinted at by the Rambam in what he wrote, "Anyone who robs etc. is as if he takes his soul from him etc. And nevertheless etc.,"

That is to say,

Since the act of robbery is considered as taking a soul,

Therefore, ostensibly, it is a great novelty in what the Sages instituted that "we do not accept from him."

And continuing from this, the Rambam writes several details regarding this enactment,

For only under these conditions is there room for this enactment,

Since the act of robbery is as taking a soul, as will be explained below.

6.

The first condition is,

that the enactment of the penitents was enacted only when the stolen object does not exist,

but if the stolen object exists,

he must return the stolen object which he stole.

And the reason for the matter: returning the stolen object itself has the power to rectify the sin from its root,

but not so when he pays money and does not return the stolen object,

he rectifies only the monetary loss of the robbed party but not the body of the transgression

[and in the manner that it is regarding the prohibition of robbery,

as understood from the words of the Rambam at the beginning of the Laws of Robbery regarding the reason that they are not lashed for the prohibition of "Do not steal,"

"for behold the verse transferred it to a positive commandment, that if he stole he is obligated to return..

And even if he burned the stolen object he is not lashed, for behold he is obligated to pay its value, and any prohibition that is subject to payment they are not lashed for it",

that when he returns the body of the stolen object he rectifies the prohibition

(retroactively⁴⁶),

but not so<pg>118</pg>

When he pays money, he does not rectify the prohibition, and only rectifies the monetary loss⁴⁶].

Therefore,

when the stolen object exists, it is possible to rectify by returning the object itself, which is "as if he took his soul from him,"

for by this that he returns the body of the stolen object to its owner,

as it was before the theft,

it is as if "he returns his soul" which he took from him through the act of theft⁴⁷.

[And only when he builds a beam in the palace,

that then there is concern that if he cannot pay the money,

he will not repent at all,

then they instituted a special enactment — because it is better that at least he pays money to repair the monetary loss,

than that he does not return at all].

But not so when "the robbery was not extant",

that then even when he pays the money it is impossible to cancel that he took his soul from him,

then there is place for the enactment for penitents,

that they should not accept the money of the robbery.

And based on this, also the remaining details mentioned above will be explained:

In the rectification of the act of robbery there are two things,

the rectification of the sin from the side of the affected

(in another style: towards the robbed),

and its rectification from the side of the actor

(the robber).

And this, that through payment of the robbery money the act of the sin is not rectified

(that he took his soul from him),

this is from the side of the affected

(the robbed),

for since his object was not returned to him,

and the robbery is lacking,

the act of robbery and its consequences are not nullified

(that taking against his will by force is like taking his soul)

; but regarding the robber,

when he admits with all his heart etc. to his fellow's ownership of his property and expresses his regret etc.⁴⁸,

behold at least from his side there is a rectification for the act of taking his fellow's soul.

And this is what the Rambam wrote,

that specifically when "the robber wanted to repent and came on his own and returned the money of the robbery",

that by this he rectifies

(regarding himself)

the act of taking against the will of the owners,

then the Sages said that for the sake of the enactment for penitents we do not accept from him the money of the robbery,

because only then will nothing be lacking from the rectification of the possible sin when the stolen object does not exist,

and behold the robber did all that he could to rectify his deeds

[but if the robber did not come on his own to repent and return the money of the robbery,

they did not enact not to accept from him even the money of the robbery

(even if the victim wants to forgive),

since he did not do all that he could to rectify the act of his robbery].

And this matter the Rambam emphasizes also at the conclusion of his language,

that "we help him and forgive him in order to draw near the straight path for penitents",

that the intention in the enactment for penitents is not

(only)

a mere leniency

(like the one who places a beam in a building,

that we are concerned lest he not repent at all),

but rather

(also)

help so that his sin will be rectified,

"to draw near the straight path for penitents",

that they repent truly and with a complete heart.

7.

And from this halacha one can learn a wonderful lesson in "the correction of the opinions"⁴⁹

— in the general work of "to bring near the straight path for the returnees":

If in order "to bring near the straight path for<pg>119</pg>

Regarding returnees, Chazal instituted that a person should forgive his money,

surely all the more so that involvement in bringing Jews close to their Father in Heaven must be in a manner that it is clear to the one involved in this

(and also to the other)

that there is here no intention of gain

(physical gain or even spiritual gain)

but all his intention is to bring close to the straight path.

And beyond this,

that when involvement in this causes him a "loss" — physical loss

(as it is simply in our case,

that he does not receive the money of his robbery)

and also spiritual loss,

that he lowers and humbles himself to involve himself also with one who belongs to "taking of the soul" — then specifically the spirit of the Sages is pleased with him.

And He declares His words to Jacob, His statutes and judgments to Israel,

that also the conduct of the Holy One, blessed be He, is in such a manner⁵⁰,

that when "the robber desired

(that "the sinner is called a robber of his father and mother"⁵¹)

to repent" — then He, may He be blessed, humbles Himself, as it were, to the sinful person,

and helps him and forgives him,

in order "to bring close the straight path for returnees",

And then — when Israel do teshuvah — "immediately they are redeemed"⁵²

In the true and complete redemption,

Very soon.

(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Bereishis 5748)