English translation — משפטים א

Sicha 1<pg>112</pg>

A.

We learned¹

: Four guardians are²

An unpaid guardian and the borrower, a paid guardian and the renter: an unpaid guardian swears about everything, and the borrower pays everything, and a paid guardian and the renter swear about the broken, and about the captured, and about the dead, and pay for the lost and the stolen.

And in the Gemara<sup>3</sup>

: Who is the Tanna of the four guardians? Said Rav Nachman..

It is Rabbi Meir.

Said Rava to Rav Nachman: Is there one who does not have four guardians?

(Forcedly, four types of guardians we find.

Rashi<sup>4</sup>)

He said to him: Thus I said to you: Who is the Tanna of a renter as a paid guardian? It is Rabbi Meir.

(For he holds that the renter pays like a paid guardian)..

If so<sup>5</sup>

Four, three they are. Said Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: Four guardians and their laws are three<sup>6</sup>.

And it requires explanation:

From the plainness of his language of Rav Nachman "Thus I say to you etc." it implies,

that in his words "Who is the Tanna [who holds] a renter is like a paid bailee? Rabbi Meir is it" he did not retract from what he said before this "Who⁷

is the Tanna [of] four bailees etc.",

but rather in this he explained his first words — "Thus I say to you"; that is,

the question "Who is the Tanna [who holds] a renter is like a paid bailee?"

(It is not a different and new question,

but rather)

it is an explanation and elucidation of the first question "Who is the Tanna [of] four bailees?"

(which is settled as above from it in his answer "It is Rabbi Meir").

And seemingly in these two questions — from this that "a renter is like a paid bailee"

(that is to say that a renter does not have a separate law)

it follows that they are three bailees,

not like "the Tanna [of] four bailees"⁸

(and like the continuation of the Gemara immediately after this "If so, four are three"⁹).

2.

And one must say regarding this:

In Rashi¹⁰

is explained the reason for the dispute of R. Meir and R. Yehuda whether the renter has the status of an unpaid bailee or a paid bailee:

The one who says that he holds that his law is like a gratuitous bailee is<pg>113</pg>

Because "he gives payment for his work and does not take payment for his guarding."

That is,

even though the hirer has benefit from the object

(in that he uses it),

nevertheless he does not become thereby a paid bailee,

because this benefit does not come as payment for his guarding,

since "he gives payment for his work,"

and since "he does not take payment for his guarding" he is a gratuitous bailee.

And the reasoning of the one who says that his law is like a paid guardian is — "since it is for his benefit that it is with him, even though he pays the wage for his work, he is a paid guardian, for if he did not pay a wage he would be a borrower and liable for accidents; now that he pays him a wage, he is not a borrower and is a paid guardian."

And from the language of Rashi it is implied,

that essentially a renter should have the law of a borrower,

except that since "he pays him a wage, he is not a borrower and is a paid guardian."

That is to say,

the meaning is not that this opinion holds that the renter's obligation to guard the object is in the category of additional payment

(beyond the rental fee for his benefit from the object),

and it follows that the benefit of the object is receiving payment for his guarding it, and therefore he is a paid guardian¹¹

— rather, all his obligation as a renter is because the object is with him "for his benefit," for by this he becomes like a borrower¹²

(and only because "he pays him a wage, he is not a borrower

(literally)

and is

(only)

a paid guardian").

Explanation of the matter: There is a fundamental difference between the cause of the obligations of the guardians

(an unpaid guardian and a paid guardian)

and the obligations of the borrower: The guardian, as his name is so is he — that his matter is,

and he accepted upon himself and obligated himself to guard the object of so-and-so until he returns it intact to its owner<sup>*12</sup>

[And the reason for the difference between the obligations of an unpaid guardian and a paid guardian — that a paid guardian who receives payment for his guarding is obligated to guard the object with a more superior guard<sup>13</sup>,

to guard also from theft and loss,

and an unpaid guardian who does not receive payment for his guarding is satisfied with a lesser guard and is exempt from theft and loss]

; but not so the obligations of the borrower do not come

(only)

from his obligation to guard<sup>14</sup>

the object of the lender,

but rather it is

(also)

as if he acquired the object<sup>15</sup>

completely and consequently he is obligated to return it

(like a loan),

for since "all the benefit is his"<sup>16</sup>

he acquired the object<sup>15</sup>

to be obligated also for unavoidable accidents

(which it is not possible to guard against them,

there is no category of guarding in them<sup>*16</sup>).

And this is the intention of Rashi in explaining the view of the one who says that a renter is like a paid guardian — "since it is for his benefit that it is with him": The foundation of the obligation of a renter

(according to this view)

is not because of his obligation in guarding the object,

but rather because the object is found with him

(not for the sake of guarding the object for the depositor,

but rather the opposite—)

"for his benefit",

that he may use it — like the borrower; except that since "he gives him a fee" he is not a borrower and he is<pg>114</pg>

a paid guardian,

that is, since there is not "all the benefit is his" because he pays for his benefit,

this diminishes and deducts from his obligation as a borrower and "he is not a borrower and he is a paid guardian",

that is, that the payment of the wage detracts from the law of a borrower in which he would be liable for accidents and there remains upon him only the liability for theft and loss

(like a paid guardian)¹⁷.

And it is found that the renter is like an "intermediate" between a paid guardian and a borrower — in the quality of his obligation and his essence he is a borrower

(and in the quantity of his obligation and his law he is a paid guardian).

3.

And now the continuation of the words of the above Gemara is well understood

(Section 1)

:

The intention of the question "Who is the Tanna of the four guardians?" is: from the fact that the Tanna stated their count

("Four guardians are they")

— for seemingly, why do I need their count?<sup>18</sup>?

— Rav Nachman learned,

that their dispute regarding "four guardians" is not merely an external division,

that in reality there are four modes in the existence of the object in the possession of the guardian

(in the language of Rashi<sup>19</sup>

"This one for free and this one for pay, this one borrows and this one rents"),

but rather they are also divided in their definition and essence.

And therefore Rav Nachman said "

(Who is the Tanna of the four guardians..)

Rabbi Meir is it" — because specifically according to his view that a renter pays like a paid guardian it is possible to say that the four guardians have four distinct categories:

According to the one who says that the renter pays like a unpaid guardian,

behold even though the renter

(for pay)

is not similar to an unpaid guardian,

as above,

nevertheless regarding the category of the obligation of guarding that is placed upon the guardian

(Four guardians they are)

behold the renter is exactly like an unpaid guardian

(because "he does not take payment for his guarding")

and consequently there are here only three

(types of categories of)

guardians and not four.

But not according to the view of R' Meir that the renter pays like a paid guardian — this is not because the definition and cause of his obligation of the renter is the definition of the obligation of the paid guardian,

but only his law is like a paid guardian

(that is,

he is similar to a paid guardian only in the quantity of his obligation,

but in the quality of the obligation he is like a borrower).

And therefore he is indeed a special type of guardian,

and that is four guardians.

And this is what Rav Nachman explained when Rava asked him "Is there anyone who does not have four guardians"

(thinking that the matter of "four guardians" is because of their division in reality,

and "necessarily we find four types of guardians")

— "This is what I am saying to you"

(that what he said previously "Who is the Tanna of four guardians..

it is R' Meir",

the intention in this)

is that this is the same: the emphasis of the Tanna in our Mishnah "Four guardians are" — that there are four distinct definitions in guardians,

works well only according to the view of R' Meir who holds that a renter is like a paid guardian,

as above.

And this is also the intention of the Gemara in the conclusion,

"If so, four,

they are three..

Four guardians and their laws are three": according to the reasoning of the questioner they are two contradictory things — if the renter and the paid guardian are different

(not only in reality,

but)

in their essential definition and essence,

how is it possible that they should be equal in their obligations?

And since there is no difference between them in the quantity of their obligations,

it necessarily follows that "they are three"²⁰

also<pg>115</pg>

in their essential definition²¹.

And on this he answers "Four guardians and their laws are three",

that indeed they are divided into four guardians,

and nevertheless this is not a contradiction, for regarding the law they are divided only into three,

as above.

4.

The above explanation,

regarding that "Four guardians and their laws are three" — that the paid guardian and the renter are different in the very essence of the obligation of their guarding

(therefore there are "four guardians")

but nevertheless regarding the law the renter pays like a paid guardian

(— "their laws are three")

—

It can be said that it corresponds with the explanation of the matter of the four guardians in spiritual service²².

And as it is brought in the Shelah²³

that "Just as four guardians apply between a person and his fellow, so

(apply)

between a person and the Omnipresent, blessed be He."

And one can explain the matter²⁴

:

It is known that the existence of the world depends on the fulfillment of the Torah and commandments of the Children of Israel²⁵.

And it is found,

that the Children of Israel are in the category of "guardians",

that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave His world into their authority that they "guard" it²⁶,

and in the manner that it is said²⁷

"to work it and to guard it",

and the guarding of the world is through the fulfillment of the Torah and commandments.

And behold, according to its simple meaning, the four guardians are divided into three general categories regarding their relationship to the guarded object and its owner:

(a)

an unpaid guardian, that all the benefit from this guarding is for the depositor

(for the guardian does not gain anything from guarding the deposit,

which is only for the benefit of the depositor)

;

(b)

a borrower — that all the benefit is his

(for the lender does not receive any benefit from the object)

;

(c)

a paid guardian and a renter,

that the point common between them is,

that in both there is benefit both for the owner and for the guardian&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;

[In a paid guardian — the depositor benefits from this that his object is guarded

(and with superior guarding),

and the guardian receives payment for his trouble; and a renter has the benefit of using the object of the lessor,

and the lessor receives in exchange for this the rental fee].

And according to this, the content of the &lt;pg&gt;116&lt;/pg&gt; will also be understood

"Guards" in the matter of "between man and the Omnipresent, blessed be He"

(as explained in the Shlah&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;)

:

"An unpaid guardian is the highest level, that not for the sake of receiving reward at all,

he guards only for the sake of His name, blessed be He",

and in the language of the Rambam&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;

— "one who serves out of love..

not because of any thing in the world..

and not in order to inherit the good

(even not in order to merit the life of the World to Come&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;)

but rather does the truth because it is truth..

because&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;

that the Master is worthy of being served by him".

"Guards reward — the worker on condition to receive reward",

and likewise the hirer³³

— "it is on the way of the one who says³⁴

this sela for charity on condition that my son lives"

(and as follows section 6).

"A borrower, all of whose benefit is his..

does not believe in reward and punishment",

and as explained in the Shelah³⁵

that they are the wicked who do not engage at all in the service of God.

5.

And perhaps we must explain his words thus — to explain in detail the concept of the “borrower” in a way that this level is also possible for one who observes Torah and mitzvos

(and the simple meaning of the matter is sweetened,

that all four types are called guardians&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;

— guardians of the world

(as above)

which is through their being guardians of Torah and mitzvos&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;)

— and with the introduction:

Since the entire world was created for the sake of Israel

(as per the statement&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;

“For the sake of Israel who are called ‘first’”)

behold, each and every one of Israel can demand and claim&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;

— and justly — all his material needs,

children, life, and ample sustenance,

because of his being a son of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob

(without any action or effort on his part).

Similar to the opinion&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;

regarding one who pledges sustenance to a worker, that “even if…

he makes for them like Solomon’s feast in his time” he has not fulfilled his obligation, because “they are sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,”

for since he is a son of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, he is worthy of a great feast greater than “Solomon’s feast in his time”&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;

[And the Tanna who disagrees and says "everything is according to the custom of the country"&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;

His reason is not because he holds that each and every one of Israel is not worthy, Heaven forbid, of this,

but rather because he holds that the intention of the householder was not to provide him with sustenance except according to the custom of the country

(including — the worker in this country)

And therefore it is impossible to obligate him more].

&lt;pg&gt;117&lt;/pg&gt;

And this is the matter of the "borrower"

(in spirituality)

All of whose benefit is his — that he benefits from the world

(in receiving all his needs etc.)

without "payment"

(work)

on his part.

But just as a borrower

(as its simple meaning)

he acquires the object to be liable for unavoidable accidents since all the benefit is his — so it is in spirituality,

that one who wants to benefit from the world without any work,

this receiving of benefit itself obligates him to "return" his portion in the world to the Holy One, blessed be He, in completeness — which is through the fulfillment of Torah and mitzvot upon which the existence of the world depends as mentioned above — and he cannot exempt himself with a claim of "ones" (unavoidable accident)

(And even not "a great ones"⁴²).

And it follows that the fulfillment of Torah and mitzvot of the "borrower" is not in the category of work,

"service of God",

whose meaning is to obligate and enslave oneself in work for the Master, God, blessed be He,

for regarding the borrower this is an obligation caused by his benefit

(like the obligations of the borrower that branch out from this that all the benefit is his,

it is as if he acquired the object and consequently is liable even for unavoidable accidents,

and this is like an obligation towards himself⁴³).

6.

According to what was explained above in the elucidation of the opinion of Rabbi Meir regarding the difference between a hirer and a paid guardian, it seems that one should add explanation also in the words of the Shelah in explaining their matter in spirituality — a paid guardian is one who works in order to receive reward, and the hirer "is like the one who says: This sela [coin] is for charity on condition that my son lives" — which are not only different modes in relation to receiving the reward

(and the benefit)

of the work,

but rather they are different types.

And the explanation: Just as a paid guardian and a hirer in their simple sense differ from each other in their very essence

(as above at length),

that the paid guardian, his essence is — a guardian,

who obligated and bound himself⁴⁴

to guard the object of the depositor,

and for this he receives his reward; but by the hirer it is the opposite,

that his main purpose is that the object be with him for his enjoyment,

and in order to obtain it he pays rental fees —

So too it is also in spirituality: the beginning and essence of the "paid watchman" is — service of G-d — that is, he wants to fulfill His will, blessed be He, and to guard the world for His sake, blessed be He,

except that he has not yet reached the level of an "unpaid watchman"

(not for the sake of receiving a reward)

in a way that matters of reward do not occupy a place with him,

and therefore he expects to receive reward for his work; but the essence of the "hirer" is the opposite — his will and desire is to enjoy from the world

(and to receive all his needs etc.),

except that he knows and feels that he must "pay" the Holy One, blessed be He,

(the Master of the world)

for this pleasure,

and therefore he fulfills Torah and mitzvos etc.

[And therefore the Shelah brings on this the example of "on condition that my son live",

in which it is emphasized that the main giving of charity is caused by this that he needs G-d's salvation — that "my son will live"&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt;].

&lt;pg&gt;118&lt;/pg&gt;

And it is found that the hirer in his essence is neither like a borrower nor like a paid guardian:

He is not like a borrower,

for since the fulfillment of his Torah and mitzvos has in it a matter of "payment" to the Holy One, blessed be He, for his benefit from the world,

and therefore this is in the category of service of God,

that he does his work for His sake, blessed be He

(and unlike a borrower,

who demands his needs for free,

whose fulfillment of Torah and mitzvos is not in the category of "service of God",

as above, section 5).

But also as a paid watchman he is not,

since the paid watchman,

the essence of his work in fulfilling the Torah and mitzvos is for His sake, blessed be He,

(for he does not benefit in his guarding from the body of the deposit,

and his reward is in a peripheral matter)

; in contrast, the hirer, whose fulfillment of the Torah and mitzvos from the outset is in the category of "payment",

in exchange for his benefit from the world,

and it is not for the purpose of "guarding".

7.

But nevertheless, the law of the hirer is like a paid watchman,

and consequently "their laws

(of the four watchmen only)

are three":

After all,

since also by the renter there are actions of "service of G-d",

therefore his law is to be included in the category of "service of G-d

(at least)

not for its own sake" like the paid watchman⁴⁶,

And we are commanded⁴⁷

— "A person should always engage in Torah and commandments even if not for their own sake, for out of not for their own sake comes for their own sake",

That is,

that ultimately each one will reach — even the questioner

(the lowest level of "not for its own sake")

— the service out of love,

that he does not care about his own existence,

until that "his soul is bound with love of G-d and he is engrossed in it constantly..

and he will abandon everything in the world except for it"⁴⁸

— "and the end of goodness will come because of it"⁴⁹.

(From the talk of Shabbat Parshat Vayishlach 5747)