English translation — נשא א

A.

Regarding the offering of the princes for the dedication of the altar, through the prince of the tribe of Ephraim,

whose offering was on the Sabbath day¹,

it says in Midrash Rabbah of our portion

(section 13²)

: "Three things

(that)

the princes did improperly and the Holy One, blessed be He, accepted them ..

In

what? An individual's offering does not override the Sabbath³

and here an individual's offering⁴

overrides the Sabbath,

behold⁵

we learn how beloved the offering of the princes is before the Holy One, blessed be He"

But further

(in section 14⁶)

the Midrash says about this matter: "That you should not say: How did he desecrate the Sabbath? But does not an individual's offering override the Sabbath, and this one offered on the Sabbath?

The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Not on his own did he act, <b>for I said </b>to Moses etc."

In simple terms it turns out,

that according to the first midrash, the offering on Shabbat was initially undesirable

("not proper"),

only after the fact,

because of that which "the offering of the princes is beloved before the Holy One, blessed be He",

then "the Holy One, blessed be He, <b>accepted them</b>";

But according to the second midrash,

the offering of the sacrifice on Shabbat was from the outset desirable

("proper"),

because "<b>I said</b> to Moses etc."

But if you examine carefully, one also cannot learn according to the first midrash,

that the offering of the prince was forbidden — because Heaven forbid to say that a prince would conduct himself contrary to the law&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;

; and furthermore, and primarily — Moses was present,

the priests performed their service and the Levites at their platform — and all of them contrary to the law,

Amazing!

One must say,

that also according to that midrash, the offering on Shabbat

(ab initio)

was according to the command,

only because it was a temporary ruling&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;

it is called "not proper"&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;.

One must according to this understand.

What are the &lt;b&gt;reasonings &lt;/b&gt;of the two midrashim,

that according to the first midrash the offering is "improperly",

and according to the second midrash - it is &lt;b&gt;not &lt;/b&gt;desecration of Shabbat,

it is proper,

and moreover - it is fulfillment of the command of God,

"&lt;b&gt;For I said &lt;/b&gt;etc."?

B.

In the Gemara&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;

it is brought,

that the reason that at the time of the dedication of the first Temple "Israel did not observe Yom Kippur" is because "they said a fortiori: If the Tabernacle, whose sanctity is not eternal sanctity, and an individual offering overrides Shabbat which is a capital prohibition,

the Temple, whose sanctity is eternal sanctity, and a communal offering and Yom Kippur which is punishable by karet, is it not all the more so?"

From this it is understood¹¹,

that according to the Gemara, the offering on Shabbat during the inauguration of the Mishkan was <b>not</b> a hora'at sha'ah

("not proper")

- not like the aforementioned Midrash ha' - because then one could not learn from it

(with a kal vachomer)

regarding the offerings during the inauguration of the Beis HaMikdash.

The rationales of the dispute between the Midrash ha' and the Gemara and Midrash haB'

(whether the permission to offer on Shabbat was a hora'at sha'ah or not)

can be explained in several ways,

and among them¹²

A)

The Gemara etc. speaks according to the opinion that holds that shevet is called kahal¹³,

and since the offering that the nasi brought was an offering of the <b>shevet</b>,

it is not a hora'as sha'ah,

because it is a communal offering,

they offer it like all offerings

of the community,

which override Shabbos

(and that which the Gemara calls it a "private offering" is not comparable to the tamid offering and the like before it and after it,

which are offerings of the entire congregation of the Jewish people,

all the tribes).

But this Midrash holds like the opinion

that a tribe is not called a congregation,

and accordingly the prince's offering had the law of an ordinary individual offering which does not override Shabbat,

and the permission to offer it was by virtue of a temporary ruling.

b)

According to everyone a tribe is called a congregation,

; but the offering of the princes each prince brought from <b>his</b> own property - not from what the tribe

(as a whole)

had given,

as it states explicitly in the Midrash

that "he brought from his own and did not collect from his tribe";

And the dispute between this Midrash and the Gemara etc. is: according to the Midrash,

since the Nasi did not collect from his tribe for the offering,

it remains in the category of an individual offering which does not override Shabbat

(and therefore one must say that the permission to offer it was a temporary ruling)

But not according to the Gemara etc.,

is although "from his own he brought",

the "he brought" was nevertheless regarding "below Judah"

(and the like)

"the verse had mercy on his tribe"¹⁹

a sacrifice for the entire tribe²⁰,

his sacrifice is a communal sacrifice,

which overrides Shabbat.

One must say,

that with this is also explained the precision of the language in the Midrash²¹

-where he says that from "this is the sacrifice of Nachshon ben Aminadav" one derives that "<b>from his own </b>he brought and not that he collected from his tribe and brought" - and he says there at the conclusion of the matter "this sacrifice overrides Shabbat and an individual sacrifice does not override Shabbat" -

What from the language of negation "And there is no &lt;b&gt;individual offering&lt;/b&gt; that overrides the Shabbos"

(and not "And there is no other&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;

individual offering overrides the Shabbos" or the like)

implies,

that the offering of the prince is not in the category of an individual offering&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;

; but,

on the other hand,

from the precision

the language at the beginning of the study "&lt;b&gt;This &lt;/b&gt;offering overrides the Shabbos"

(as well as from the fact that one needs altogether a study that it overrides Shabbos)

implies that the offering of the prince has a connection to an individual offering,

and therefore one needs a special study regarding this type of offering

("this")

that it overrides Shabbos -

And according to the above it is understood,

because in any case: since the prince did not collect the offering from his tribe,

it turns out,

that the offering is an individual offering; but from the aspect that the offerer is a "prince of a tribe" his offering has the &lt;b&gt;law&lt;/b&gt; of a communal offering].

3.

According to the above it turns out,

that the second midrash

(the above section a)

- which according to it the offering of the prince's offering on Shabbat was initially a proper matter - and the opinion of the Gemara is identical - that he offered the offering on Shabbat because it is a communal offering,

and one need not come to a hora'at sha'ah.

But it is difficult to learn thus in the language of the midrash&lt;sup&gt;24 &lt;/sup&gt;

"Not by his mouth did he do &lt;b&gt;I said &lt;/b&gt;to Moses one prince etc.",

that is,

that there was a &lt;b&gt;special &lt;/b&gt;saying and command regarding that offering

(- a temporary directive).

It is not understood simply,

that it is a very great difficulty to say,

that the "I said to Moses &lt;b&gt;one prince &lt;/b&gt;etc." does not mean the saying of "one prince etc." and in general there was no particular saying in that matter,

But this means the directive and law general and for generations - that a tribe is called a congregation,

or that a sacrifice of the prince has a law of a sacrifice of the tribe]²⁵.

And the difficulty returns to its place: What is the reasoning of the dispute between the two midrashim mentioned above?

4.

And one must say the explanation in this:

According to both midrashim,

the offerings of the miluim of the consecration of the altar

(which "there are none like them for generations"²⁶)

were only temporarily and in the category of a hora'at sha'ah

(just like the other details of the offerings of the nesi'im which were temporarily and in the category of a hora'at sha'ah²⁷

and likewise in several of the offerings of the days of the miluim)

and only by virtue of that hora'at sha'ah was there the permission to offer the offering of the nasi on Shabbat;

Only this heter can be learned in two ways: the

(issur)

Shabbos is "dechuyah" - that the issur melachah is in its full force,

only chanukas hamizbe'ach is &lt;b&gt;docheh&lt;/b&gt;; or in a manner of "hutrah" - that the melachah is there lechatchilah

(not forbidden,

only it is)

a davar hamutar beShabbos.

whether it is "docheh" or "mutar"].

And this is the explanation of the difference between the two midrashim:

According to the exposition that "the princes offered improperly",

is the permission of the offering only in a manner of "deferred",

the offerings pushed aside the prohibition of Shabbat "to the side" — even after the deferral the prohibition itself was not nullified³⁰,

rather it is merely <b>pushed aside</b> because "the offering of the princes is beloved before the Holy One, blessed be He";

The second midrash holds however that this is in the manner of "permitted,"

i.e.

it is a boundary of a thing of permission

it is a boundary of a thing of permission

(the offering of the sacrifices of the dedication of the altar on Shabbos),

in this case the prohibitions of labor on Shabbos are not applicable from the outset;

And therefore the midrash emphasizes — not only can one not say "he desecrated the Shabbos"

(or "improperly")

but rather — it is a fulfillment of a command,

"Not by his word did he act, for I said, etc."

5.

Based on this one could also explain why in the aforementioned midrash

(end of paragraph b)

on the verse "This is the offering of Nachshon etc." the language stands: "This offering overrides Shabbat, but an individual's offering does not override Shabbat"

(Earlier it is said how the law is <b>here</b>,

by the offering of the prince — "this offering overrides",

and afterwards how the law is by an individual's offering in general — "and an individual's offering does not etc."),

that this is in the <b>opposite</b> order from

it is said in the aforementioned midrash

(section a)

: "Everywhere an individual's offering does not override Shabbat, but here an individual's offering overrides Shabbat" —

One should say,

that the difference depends on the two manners mentioned above:

According to the first midrash, it is only "pushed off"

(as above),

and therefore the midrash prefaces "&lt;b&gt;In every place &lt;/b&gt;an individual offering pushes off Shabbos",

which emphasizes that in and of itself it is a forbidden act

("not proper")

which only "here" is it &lt;b&gt;pushed off&lt;/b&gt;,

in this &lt;b&gt;case&lt;/b&gt;;

Not so according to the midrash on the verse "This is the offering of Nachshon etc." it is with "was permitted"³¹,

and therefore he begins "This offering overrides the Shabbos" and the introduction and emphasis is here on the special law and permission of the offering of the prince

(and from this perspective "this" - one may bring on Shabbos),

and only afterwards does one relate that "and no individual offering overrides the Shabbos".

And according to what is explained above

(section b)

that according to this midrash on the verse "This is the offering etc." the offering of the prince is <b>in the manner of </b>like an offering of the tribe

(community),

one can say,

that this is the reason and cause of the dispute of <b>the </b>two midrashim:

According to the first midrash that it was "not proper"

("deferred"),

then the offering of the prince is an individual offering

etc. <b>And here </b>an offering <b>of an individual</b>³²

etc."],

and therefore the temporary ruling only effected a "deferral";

But not according to the midrash "This sacrifice overrides etc.",

then the people had a law regarding it like a sacrifice of the tribe - Shabbat is permitted regarding it³³.

Based on this, however, it will turn out,

that in our matter there is also in this the category of "permitted" itself, for the midrashim differ:

According to the midrash that "this sacrifice overrides Shabbat etc." Shabbat was permitted because the sacrifice of the prince is like a public sacrifice;

But not according to the aforementioned midrash

(section a)

- "that you should not say how could he desecrate etc. and is not an individual's sacrifice overridden etc. I said etc." - and it holds that "was permitted"

(as above section d),

it implies that they had a law of a sacrifice of an <b>individual</b>

(only because "I said etc." is - "this one offered on Shabbat").

6.

One will understand this by prefacing another

(fourth)

midrash in our parshah

(parshah 14&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;)

on this matter,

and its language: "Who preceded Me that I should repay&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;,

speaks of one who preceded and guarded the Sabbath before it was given ..

Said the Holy One, blessed be He: You guarded the Sabbath before the Torah was given,

by your life, that I

will repay your son that he will offer sacrifices on the Sabbath, which an individual does not offer, and upon Me is to accept his sacrifice willingly"&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;.

It is perplexing: how can one say,

that the reward for &lt;b&gt;observing &lt;/b&gt;Shabbos is — “that he will offer his sacrifice on Shabbos, which an individual does not offer etc.” — an action which is

(entirely)

the &lt;b&gt;opposite &lt;/b&gt;of observing Shabbos?

Not only if the sacrifice of the prince merely overrides Shabbos, which then still means it is improper,

a kind of desecration of Shabbos,

but only as a temporary ruling the prohibition is actually set aside because of the sacrifice&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;]

; rather even if it is “permitted,”

this only means that there is &lt;b&gt;no &lt;/b&gt;desecration,

but this is not an action and content of &lt;b&gt;observing &lt;/b&gt;Shabbos

(which would be a &lt;b&gt;reward &lt;/b&gt;for observing Shabbos)

is from this itself compelled,

that according to <b>the </b>midrash,

did the offering of the princes on Shabbat effect an <b>addition </b>in the observance of Shabbat.

7.

And one can say the explanation in this:

The four sayings of the aforementioned midrash divide themselves

(in general)

into two types:

The exposition that these were offerings "not properly" and the exposition "This offering overrides Shabbos, but an individual's offering does not override Shabbos"

(both in section 13)

- stand upon the <b>generality</b> of the matter of the offerings of the princes,

which <b>one</b> of the novel aspects in the offerings of the princes

(between

Others³⁷)

was,

that the offering of the princes superseded Shabbos.

But not so the other two discourses

(both in parshas Yud)

- "Shani amarti etc." and "Mi hikdimani vashalem etc." - stand upon

(the verse "On the <b>seventh</b> day the prince of the children of <b>Ephraim</b>"³⁸,

and speak specifically about)

the virtue of the offering that the prince of Ephraim sacrificed on the day of Shabbos.

And based on this, it must be said,

that the general distinction between the two types is:

In the first two discourses

(which speak about the offerings of the princes in general)

it is brought out that the matter of the pushing aside of Shabbos is a law that is connected with the totality of the offerings of the princes for the dedication of the altar,

i.e.,

that

that from the perspective of the general virtue of

(the dedication of the altar by means of)

the offerings of the princes, the offering pushes aside Shabbos³⁹.

But in the other two midrashim*³⁹,

that speak about the special offering of the prince of Ephraim <b>on the Sabbath day</b>,

it is explained how the rejection is

(not from the aspect of the generalities of the offerings of the princes,

nor a law in the dedication of the altar,

but as it is)

a <b>law in</b>

(laws of)

Shabbat,

that from the aspect of Shabbat the prince had to then offer the offering.

8.

And in this itself,

that it is a law in the laws of Shabbat,

one can learn two ways⁴⁰

a)

So from the aspect

(laws)

of Shabbos the offering is <b>permitted</b>.

d.

e.

This is not a matter that is permitted from the aspect of the virtue of the offerings of the princes for the dedication of the altar, for the Torah says that the virtue of the offerings of the princes is so great,

that it outweighs the prohibition of work on Shabbos],

but rather this is a condition in

(the prohibitions of work b)

<b>Shabbos</b>,

that regarding <b>the offerings</b> the prohibition of work on Shabbos is ab initio not applicable.

And so it is found in several places regarding "a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment",

that the positive commandment becomes a condition upon which the negative commandment depends

(dependent)⁴¹,

the negative commandment is ab initio not applicable in a case where there is against it a positive commandment]⁴².

b)

The offering of the sacrifices on Shabbat is a part of the <b>commandment of Shabbat</b>: just as from the side of the holiness of Shabbat labors are forbidden on Shabbat,

so too the holiness of Shabbat <b>obligates</b> that one should offer the additional offerings of Shabbat,

and likewise the offering of "one prince <b>for a day</b>" of the Shabbat,

and the "I said" of the offering

(of the prince of Ephraim)

on Shabbat,

and specifically through this the keeping of Shabbat is fulfilled properly.

And <b>similarly</b> one finds the idea

(and opinion⁴³)

regarding danger to life,

that this means not only that danger to life overrides the prohibition of labor on Shabbat or even that the labor becomes permitted on Shabbat,

rather danger to life is a law in the <b>keeping</b> of Shabbat

(and accordingly will be sweetened what is stated in the Laws of Shabbat),

that it adds to the keeping of Shabbat,

as one learns it from "<b>And the children of Israel shall keep</b>⁴⁴

the Shabbat"⁴³,

and in the language of the Or HaChayim⁴⁵

: "Why should I say that you shall desecrate Shabbat for the sick person,

this is not called desecration, on the contrary this is called <b>keeping Shabbat</b>".

9.

Based on this, the innovation of the last two midrashim is understood

(that are in chapter 14)

regarding the first two

(that are in chapter 13)

According to the midrashim in chapter 13, the permission of the offering is from the side of the general law of the offerings of the princes as above — the difference between them is only in this,

whether it is "pushed aside" or "permitted"

(as above, section 5).

But not so the midrashim in section 14,

which speak specifically about the offering of the day

(the Sabbath)

the seventh,

both hold that it is a law in <b>Shabbat</b>,

and therefore in both midrashim the distinctiveness of the offering is not emphasized by that it is like a communal offering and therefore the offering should be in the category of permitted

(as in the aforementioned midrash

(section 13)

"This offering overrides Shabbat")

— but on the contrary: in them the emphasis is how the prince's offering is in the category of an individual offering

("But is there not an individual offering that overrides Shabbat, and this one offered on Shabbat? The Holy One, blessed be He, said etc. 'I said etc.'"; "that he should offer his offering on Shabbat, which an individual does not offer etc.")

For the permission to offer the offering according to these midrashim is not because the <b>offerings</b> have in themselves a special essence and force and therefore they override Shabbat in the manner of "permitted",

but because <b>Shabbat</b> says that "this one shall offer on Shabbat",

even though they are individual offerings.

Only these two midrashim differ in the two manners mentioned above,

How so? This is a law regarding Shabbat⁴⁶

According to the midrash "I am different, said [the Holy One, blessed be He], etc.",

this is as if "a condition regarding Shabbat",

that Shabbat "says" that regarding this offering, the prohibition of Shabbat does not apply ab initio,

therefore the midrash warns "lest you say how did he desecrate the Shabbat, etc., the Holy One, blessed be He, said, etc., I am different, said, etc.",

that it is entirely not in the category of desecration of Shabbat,

because this is according to the command, as we find the language in the poskim⁴⁷

"Those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death⁴⁹

and on the day of Shabbat two lambs⁵⁰

both were said in one utterance")

"to inform that at the time this was permitted, this was forbidden, and to teach that this is not desecration of Shabbat"⁵¹].

And according to the Midrash that says,

that this was in the category of "reward" for that which "one who guarded the Sabbath before it was given",

it turns out,

that this is not only a condition in Shabbat,

that the offering of the prince of Ephraim of the consecrations is <b>permitted</b> on Shabbat,

but that through this

one fulfills in a <b>positive</b> manner the commandment of <b>guarding</b> Shabbat — the offering adds to the holiness of Shabbat.

And on this path, as discussed elsewhere⁵²

In the explanation of the words of the aforementioned Mechilta in greater depth,

Then that which "with one utterance they were said" does not mean

(only)

That they are not contradictory to each other,

Rather both have the <b>same content</b> of the holiness of Shabbat: it is a)

Through the offering of the lambs,

b)

Through the prohibition of work].

And therefore this is a reward commensurate with Yosef's observance of Shabbat: because he observed Shabbat with addition,

"Until <b>it was not</b> given",

Therefore they gave him an <b>addition</b> in the observance of Shabbat

(relative to other Jews),

That specifically "your son's son" added in the holiness of Shabbat by offering a special sacrifice on Shabbat⁵³.

----- • -----

(Adding points for additional explanation)

Yud.

The matter is, however, still in need of explanation:

True, indeed, that what the prince of Ephraim offered his sacrifice on Shabbat <b>can</b> be a reward for Joseph's keeping of Shabbat,

because the offering adds to the holiness of Shabbat as mentioned above — what, however, is the reason,

that the reward expressed itself <b>specifically</b> in an act which is

(in its own essence)

the <b>opposite</b> of keeping Shabbat?

Is the explanation in this:

This*⁵³

that Yosef fulfilled the mitzvah of observing Shabbat "until &lt;b&gt;before &lt;/b&gt;it was given" is a proof,

that his observance of Shabbat is from a "level" that is even &lt;b&gt;higher &lt;/b&gt;than the level of "it was given".

As the explanation of "nitanah" - the thing exists from before and it is afterwards given to the one to whom it was given.

It is understood that in every "place" where Shabbos is "nitanah",

the holiness and observance of Shabbos is according to the place where it was given.

&lt;b&gt;In a similar vein&lt;/b&gt; and along these lines, as we find in halacha&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;

the distinction between Torah scholars and laborers and householders: "Laborers and householders should engage more &lt;b&gt;in Torah &lt;/b&gt;on Shabbat etc., and Torah scholars should continue more &lt;b&gt;in the delight of eating and drinking&lt;/b&gt;".

Until this general distinction, that the concept of cessation and guarding is with the Most High

("for in it He rested from all His work"&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;)

which is cessation from speech and utterance&lt;sup&gt;56&lt;/sup&gt;

the world was created"&lt;sup&gt;58&lt;/sup&gt;),

and below is the concept of cessation

(primarily&lt;sup&gt;59&lt;/sup&gt;)

-from action&lt;sup&gt;60&lt;/sup&gt;.

From this it is understood,

that in that "world" above which is <b>higher</b> than the world of speech — in that world which does not engage in mundane matters⁶¹

— is the holiness of Shabbat

(and its delight)

not a cessation from speech,

but in the cessation of the descents and contractions of the world and its powers

(similar to Gehinnom⁶³,

that on Shabbat "all the lords of wrath and masters of judgment flee and are removed from it"⁶⁴),

in Gan Eden a higher delight is then revealed, etc.

And this is also the function of the Shabbat observance of Yosef "before it was given"*⁶⁴

: by him the concept of Shabbat was illuminated as it is in a world which is <b>higher</b> than the land in which Shabbat was "given" — its cessation is from a higher concept than the cessation from work which derives from the "He rested on it" of the world of speech

(Ten Utterances)

; and the delight of Shabbat in <b>that</b> level

("before it was given")

consists of a revelation of a higher supernal delight,

as above.

And therefore the reward for the shvita and shmira in the level of Shabbos "that was not given" came into an opposite matter from the elevation of Shabbos and the spirituality of Shabbos in the Land where it was given — in the manner that we see,

that a pleasure <b>more supernal</b> is revealed

(sometimes)

— specifically in a matter that is <b>more lowly</b>⁶⁵,

And in the manner of a father and his son⁶⁶,

that specifically in a small action of his infant son there is a higher pleasure

(more — than from the intellect of his adult son).

11.

Based on all the above, one will also understand the connection of this matter specifically to Yosef and Efrayim:

The concept of Yosef is — "Yosef Hashem li ben acher"⁶⁷,

that he makes from "acher" a "ben"⁶⁸

; and this was expressed

Especially in Ephraim — on the name "for &lt;b&gt;He has made me fruitful &lt;/b&gt;God in the land of &lt;b&gt;my affliction&lt;/b&gt;"&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;,

His matter is,

That specifically in "the land of &lt;b&gt;my affliction&lt;/b&gt;" becomes — "&lt;b&gt;He has made me fruitful &lt;/b&gt;God",

The turning of darkness into light and bitterness into sweetness&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;.

And therefore,

Specifically by him was the matter of offering the sacrifice on Shabbat,

That from a matter of offering,

Which on the day of Shabbat is seemingly a matter of "affliction" — becomes reversed,

"&lt;b&gt;He has made me fruitful&lt;/b&gt;",

An addition in

(Keeping of)

the holiness of Shabbat.

(From the talk of Shabbos Parshas Metzora,

7 Nissan,

5741)