English translation — מאמר ביום השני הקריב תשל"ב

With the help of Heaven.

Shabbos Parshas Naso,

14 Sivan 5732

"On the second day, Nasanel ben Tzuar, the prince of Yissachar, brought his offering, etc."

And Rashi explains: What is the meaning of "he brought, he brought" twice? Because of two things he merited to bring [the offering] second among the tribes:

One, that they were knowledgeable in Torah, as it is said,

"And of the sons of Yissachar, those who had understanding of the times," and the other, that they gave advice to the princes to volunteer these offerings.

And it needs to be understood,

For according to these two reasons, it would seemingly have been fitting for him to bring [the offering] first among the tribes.

And even more so, it is not understood,

for it is stated in the Midrash,

"Why is 'he brought' stated regarding him? Because he merited through the counsel of the princes, Scripture credits him as if he brought [the offering] first."

Based on this, the reason for this—that in actuality Yehudah brought first and Yissachar brought on the second day—needs to be understood even more.

Also, it needs to be understood regarding the statement "Nasanel ben Tzuar, the prince of Yissachar,"

that it precedes his name

(Nasanel ben Tzuar)

before saying that he was the prince of Yissachar,

for seemingly,

since that he brought his offering is because he was the prince of Yissachar,

it should have said "the prince of Yissachar"

(and afterwards)

"Nasanel ben Tzuar,"

as it is written regarding the other princes who brought offerings after the second day, where first it says "the prince of the children of..." and afterwards the name of the prince is stated.

And likewise, regarding the prince who brought on the first day, it is stated,

"Nachshon ben Aminadav, of the tribe of Yehudah,"

[where] first [comes] "Nachshon ben Aminadav" and afterwards "of the tribe of Yehudah."

B)

And it can be explained based on what is stated in the Midrash

on the verse "Nachshon ben Aminadav, of the tribe of Yehudah":

"Why was his name called Nachshon? Because he descended first into the waves of the sea... He who sanctified My name at the sea shall bring [the offering] first."

And it can be said,

that this precision of the Midrash—"Why was his name called Nachshon"

(which it does not precisely ask regarding the other princes)—

is

because from the language of the verse "Nachshon ben Aminadav, of the tribe of Yehudah"

(and not "the prince of Yehudah")

it implies that his being the one who brought the offering on the first day is

(not only because of the virtue of the tribe of Yehudah,

but also)

due to his own personal virtue,

and since a person's name alludes to his essence

(and his virtue),

therefore it precisely asks why his name was called Nachshon.

And it explains that Nachshon's virtue

(alluded to in his name)

is that he sanctified the name

(of the Holy One, blessed be He)

and therefore he brought [the offering] first.

And it can be said similarly regarding "Nasanel ben Tzuar, the prince of Yissachar,"

that the verse precedes "Nasanel ben Tzuar" before "the prince of Yissachar,"

is

to hint

that his bringing [the offering] on the second day

(immediately after Yehudah),

and moreover, that Scripture credits him as if he brought [the offering] first

(before Yehudah),

is because of the virtue within him that is alluded to in his name.

And although it is stated regarding him "the prince of Yissachar"

[unlike Nachshon, regarding whom it is stated "of the tribe of Yehudah"]

from which it is proven that his bringing [the offering] on the second day

[and also that Scripture credits him as if he brought [the offering] first]

is due to the virtue of the tribe of Yissachar,

nevertheless, "Nasanel ben Tzuar" is stated before "the prince of Yissachar,"

because this virtue of the tribe of Yissachar

[for which he brought on the second day and as if he brought first]

is alluded to in the name "Nasanel ben Tzuar."

And it is explained in the discourses,

that the connection of Nachshon and Nesanel to Yehudah and Yissachar is,

that Yehudah is the matter of bittul (self-nullification)

[therefore he is called by the name Yehudah, from the phrase "This time I will thank (odeh) the L-rd"],

and therefore the prince of the tribe of Yehudah was Nachshon, who first descended into the stormy waves of the sea,

the matter of mesiras nefesh (self-sacrifice),

bittul.

And Yissachar is the matter of Torah

(as above).

And therefore the prince of Yissachar was Nesanel,

the letters of "Nasan Kel" (G-d gave),

for the Torah is a gift.

And the matter of Ben Tzuar,

Tzuar from the term "mitz'ar" (diminutive/small),

is,

that the vessel for Torah is bittul.

And this is that Yehudah brought an offering before Yissachar,

for the matter of bittul

is before

(and above)

the occupation with Torah.

For the root of Torah is in Chochmah (Wisdom),

for "the Torah emanates from Chochmah",

and through bittul there is a drawing down of Kesser (Crown) which is above Chochmah.

And it is necessary to understand,

that according to what is explained in the discourses that Yehudah is in Kesser and Yissachar is in Chochmah,

why did Scripture credit Yissachar as if he brought an offering first

(first also before Yehudah).

3)

And behold, it is known that Yehudah is the matter of action

(as stated in the discourses that explain the matter of the presentation of Yehudah and Yosef),

and according to this,

Yissachar and Yehudah are the matters of study and action.

And it is explained elsewhere

that although they counted and concluded that "study is greater",

nevertheless,

since the reason that study is greater is because study leads to action,

behold from this itself it is proven that action is the main thing

[for the root of action is above the root of study, and therefore in the future action will be greater].

And according to this it can be said,

that this [matter] that Scripture credited the prince of Yissachar as if he brought an offering first

(first also before Yehudah)

is in the manner of "study is greater",

and that in actuality Yehudah brought an offering first is because action is the main thing.

And to add,

the establishment of the Mishkan and the Giving of the Torah are related to each other.

And as is understood from the Midrashim of our Sages

on the verse

"I have come to My garden",

that the drawing down and descent of the essential Shechinah below to earth began at the time of the Giving of the Torah,

and the main drawing down was when the Mishkan was erected.

And according to this it can be said,

that just as the Giving of the Torah was through their having preceded "Naaseh" (we will do) to "Nishma" (we will hear),

emphasizing the superiority of action over study and understanding

("Nishma" from the term meaning understanding)

and in a manner that they preceded "Naaseh" to "Nishma"

[for after the Giving of the Torah,

although action is the main thing

and the reason that study is greater is because it leads to action, nevertheless study is greater,

and study precedes action.

But in order for the drawing down of the Giving of the Torah to be, there needed to be the preparation of the precedence of "Naaseh" to "Nishma"],

similarly is it regarding the drawing down that was at the erection of the Mishkan.

And therefore,

at the Chanukas HaMishkan, Yehudah brought an offering

(action)

before Yissachar

(study).

4)

And it is necessary to understand,

that since even this [matter] that study is greater is because it leads to action and action is the main thing,

what is the difference between the two matters,

that generally study precedes action

[precedes in time,

and also precedes in level,

"study is greater"],

and at the Giving of the Torah and likewise at the Chanukas HaMishkan action preceded.

And the point of the explanation in this is,

that this [matter] that action is the main thing

[even though action is the most external power,

and likewise Above action is the end of the chain of descent],

is because "their beginning is wedged in their end and their end in their beginning",

and also because "the end

of the deed is in the initial thought".

And the Rebbe

(the Rebbe Rashab)

explains in the Hemshech TaRa"B,

the difference between the two matters,

that "their end" is the final conclusion of the drawing down.

And this level is wedged in "their beginning", the beginning and origin of the drawing down.

And as is brought there a parable for this from the giving of charity to a poor person,

that the beginning

(of the influence)

is that one is aroused with compassion for the poor person,

and from this there is generated within him afterwards a desire to benefit the poor person

[for compassion is the reason for the desire],

and afterwards the desire is drawn into intellect and emotions etc. until it comes into actual deed,

that he gives charity to the poor person.

And the matter of "their end is wedged in their beginning" is,

that the main intention in the arousal of compassion

(their beginning)

is that there be the actual influence

(their end).

And if there is no actual influence

[even though through the compassion there is generated the arousal of all his lofty powers,

desire, intellect and emotions,

and even when his desire to benefit the poor person is revealed in speech

(that he speaks words of appeasement to the poor person)

but does not come into actual deed],

the main thing is lacking.

And because "their end is wedged in their beginning",

that the intention

(the wedged [intention])

in the arousal of compassion

(their beginning)

is that there be the actual deed

(their end),

therefore "their beginning is wedged in their end",

that the revelation of the power of the aspect of beginning is

specifically at the end of the influence,

in the actual deed.

And the matter of "the end of the deed is in the initial thought" is above the matter of "their beginning is wedged in their end and their end in their beginning".

For the explanation of "the end of the deed" is

(not the end of the action itself,

the action of the person,

but rather)

the deed that comes about through the doing and action of the person.

For in the influence of kindness,

the matter of "the end of the deed" is the reception of the influence,

that the poor person receives the influence with goodness and enjoys from it.

For this matter

(in what manner the poor person receives the influence)

is not dependent on the giver but on the recipient.

And this reaches "in the initial thought",

i.e., in the beginning that is before the beginning of thought,

above the root of the influence.

For the root of the influence

(the arousal to bestow good)

is the beginning of thought,

and the revelation of this matter is at the end of the influence – "their beginning is wedged in their end",

and the level of "the end of the deed"

(the reception of the influence)

is that "the end of the deed" reaches the beginning that is before the beginning of thought,

above the root of the influence.

And therefore the pleasure that the influencer has from the reception of the influence

(from this that the poor person received the influence with goodness)

is a greater pleasure than the pleasure in the influence itself.

And just as31 it is regarding the flow of influence, so too is it in all of action,

that their end is the action itself,

the making and doing of man,

and it is called by the name "their end,"

for the power of deed is the most ultimate power,

and also the activity of the deed comes at the end.

For first is the pleasure,

and from this are drawn will, intellect, and the emotions,

and the emotions are clothed in thought and speech,

and afterward comes the deed32.

And their end is interwoven in their beginning, and their beginning in their end,

for the root of the deed is in the pleasure,

which is the "beginning,"

the cause of the will and the other faculties.

And likewise their beginning is interwoven in their end,

for the revelation of pleasure is specifically in the deed.

And the end of the deed is

(not the action itself,

but rather)

the deed that is done through the making and doing of man.

And the main point of the end of the deed is in the deed that comes through his doing, which is not dependent on man's will.

And like a craftsman who does work,

that the fact that the craftsman cannot take upon himself that the work will be successful

[for this matter is not dependent on the craftsman.

And it is in the manner explained above regarding the reception of influence,

that this depends on the recipient and not on the giver].

And the end of the deed is in thought at first,

that the pleasure of the craftsman from the fact that the work is done with utmost splendor and beauty

(in a manner of success)

is a pleasure more elevated than the pleasure in the doing of the work.

For the pleasure that the work is done is a composite pleasure

(pleasure from the doing of the work),

and by his seeing that the work is done with splendor and beauty,

the simple pleasure is revealed

(as explained in the continuation above).

5)

And it is known33

that the superiority of man begins from the power of speech within him34

(unlike deed, which also exists in animals).

And based on this, it can be said,

that the two matters in deed—the making and doing of man

(their end),

and the deed that comes through his doing

(the end of the deed)

—there are

(their parallels)

also in the action of man.

For that the faculties of man

(intellect, emotions, thought, and speech)

are drawn and clothed in the deed,

is in the manner of the making and doing of man,

and the deed itself

(as it is separate from the faculties above it,

which are the essence of man)

is in the manner of the deed

(that is outside of man)

that is done through the making and doing of man.

And the distinction between the two matters in their root in the soul is,

that the root of the deed that pertains to the faculties above it

(i.e., the clothing of the faculties in the deed)

is in the aspect of the revelation of the soul.

And that is35,

that also the root of this matter in the deed is in the soul that is above the faculties.

For the faculties in themselves are separate and it is not within their capacity to descend so low and to be clothed in deed,

and that it is possible for them to descend and be clothed in deed is through that which is drawn into them from the soul

(which is above the faculties),

which is present in all the faculties and limbs equally.

But this matter in the soul

(that it has the capacity to descend very low)

is the aspect of its revelation—in the manner of "their end is interwoven in their beginning,"

that the root of "their end"

(the doing of man)

is in the "beginning,"

the root of influence.

And the root of the deed itself

(as it is separate from the faculties above it)

is in the essence of the soul35

—in the manner of "the end of the deed is in thought at first,"

that the root of the end of the deed

(that is outside of man)

is in the beginning that precedes the beginning of thought,

above the root of influence.

And it can be said,

that in the superiority of the deed in that through it the limitless aspect of the soul is revealed—the intellect and emotions etc. are before

[and above]

the deed.

For since the revelation of the limitless aspect of the soul is that the intellect and emotions are drawn and clothed in the deed,

behold, the intellect and emotions precede the deed.

And also above the deed.

For the superiority of deed

(in this aspect)

is not in the deed itself but in that the intellect and emotions are clothed in the deed

[And based on this, it can be explained what they said: "Study is greater, for it brings to deed"

(for at first glance,

from this very fact that the greatness of study is that it brings to deed, it is proven that the deed is primary,

and nevertheless study is greater than deed),

for the advantage of deed over study in this level is that study brings to deed

(for that study brings to deed is through the drawing into it of the limitless aspect that is above study itself),

therefore study is greater].

And in the superiority of the deed from the aspect that the root of the deed itself is in the essence of the soul—the deed is before

(and above)

all the faculties,

and this is that before the giving of the Torah they prioritized "we will do" over "we will hear,"

and likewise in the dedication of the Mishkan, Yehudah offered

(deed)

before Yissachar

(study),

for at the giving of the Torah and the establishment of the Mishkan there was the drawing down of the Awtsmoos,

and there—the deed precedes study.

6)

And we must connect this explanation

[that Yehudah offered first is due to the superiority of action]

with the explanation

(brought above in section 2)

that Yehudah offered first because Yehudah is the aspect of bittul (self-nullification),

for the concept of bittul is in action.

For the powers that are above action,

since their essence is superiority and perfection,

as explained above

(section 5)

that the beginning of man's superiority is the power of speech within him,

their bittul to the soul is not complete bittul,

and specifically the power of action, which is not from man's superiority,

its bittul to the soul is complete bittul.

[And in action itself,

the essence of bittul is in the level of action as it is separate from the powers above it.

For in the level of action in which the powers above it are clothed,

there is the elevation that through it the hidden aspect of the soul is revealed,

and therefore it is "existence."

And the essence of bittul is in the action itself

(which is separate from the powers above it),

for since it has no elevation,

therefore it is felt in it that all its existence is only from the soul.]

And we must connect this with the fact that the root of action is in the essence of the soul,

for in the essence of the soul there is no place for existence outside the soul.

And from this it is understood,

that the root of action being in the essence of the soul is because all its existence is only from the essence of the soul.

And likewise above

(in the distinction between Torah and mitzvos),

that the will for mitzvos is in the action of the mitzvos

(and in physical things),

even though action has no value,

it is because the root of mitzvos is in Atzmus,

and therefore,

the essence of bittul is in the action of the mitzvos.

And it can be said,

that also the will for the intention of the mitzvos,

is not due to the superiority of the intention of the mitzvos, but because it arose in His will, blessed be He.

However, the revelation of this matter is in the action of the mitzvos,

and through this it is revealed that it is so also in the intention of the mitzvos.

And likewise in Torah,

that although Torah is wisdom

[and also above,

Torah is the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He],

that "the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are entirely one" is not due to the superiority of Torah, but because it arose in His will, blessed be He.

However, the revelation of this matter is in the mitzvos, and through the mitzvos it is revealed that it is so also in Torah.

7)

And this is "On the second day, Nesanel ben Tzu'ar offered" — the term "Tzu'ar" [implies distress],

for after the bittul of Yehudah regarding the matter of mitzvos, Nesanel ben Tzu'ar drew this bittul also into the occupation with Torah.

And therefore Scripture considers him as if he offered first

[even though Yehudah is above Yissachar,

as explained above

(section 2)

that Yehudah is in Kesser and Yissachar is in Chochmah],

for the concept of "offered first" is that he drew the bittul of Kesser

(the aspect of "beginning")

into Chochmah.

And it can be said that in the phrase "as if he offered first"

(and not "as if he offered on the first day")

is also hinted the bittul from the aspect of "beginning" — the beginning that precedes the beginning of thought,

in which arose "the end of action"

(the action of mitzvos)

and Nesanel drew this bittul also into Torah.

[Also, it can be said that the meaning of "as if he offered first" is a beginning before Yehudah.

For the drawing of bittul into Torah is a greater innovation and consequently more elevated than the bittul in the action of mitzvos.]

And through the bittul of "Tzu'ar" that was in him, he became "Nesanel,"

the letters of "Nasan Kel" (God gave),

meaning that Torah was given to him as a gift.